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The Cost of Scruples: A Call for Common Law
Protection for the Professional Whistleblower
Terry Ann Halbert*
I. Introduction
Dr. Grace Pierce began to work for Ortho Pharmaceutical Corpo-
ration in May, 1971 as Associate Director of Medical Research. By
March of 1973, she was Director of Medical Research/Therapeutics,
responsible for overseeing development of therapeutic drugs. In early
1975, Dr. Pierce was on a team researching loperamide, a drug for the
treatment of diarrhea in infants and older people. Lopermide was to be
taken in liquid form, since the very young and the very old might have
trouble swallowing pills. The drug was to be sweetened with saccharin.
Each bottle would contain forty-four times the concentration of
saccharin that the Food and Drug Administration permitted in a
twelve-ounce can of artificially-sweetened soft drink.
Dr. Pierce and her project team, aware of the controversy sur-
rounding saccharin as a possible carcinogen, began to submit memos to
Ortho's management, urging an alternative formula before tests would
be conducted on humans. The project team's toxicologist, for instance,
noted that saccharin was a "slow carcinogen;" that is, it produced be-
nign and malignant tumors in laboratory test animals after seventeen
years. The harm it might cause would be obvious only after a long
period of time, and "any intentional exposure of any segment of the
human population to a potential carcinogen is not to the best interest of
public health or the Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation."1 It seemed,
however, that the invitations had already been sent; that is, Ortho had
no intention of moving the deadline for putting loperamide on the mar-
ket. Pressure from company management made Dr. Pierce's colleagues
change their minds, and by April of 1975, the team voted to go ahead
with clinical testing.
* Assistant Professor, Legal and Real Estate studies, Temple Univ. School of
Business; J.D., Rutgers Univ. School of Law Camden, 1981; N.A., Jordenhill College,
Glasgow, Scotland, 1974; B.A. Colby College, 1970.
1. H. KURTz, WHISTLEBLOWING: LOYALTY AND DISSENT IN THE CORPORATION
111 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Whistleblowing].
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Dr. Pierce held out for reformulation. As the only medical doctor
on the team, responsible for setting up and monitoring tests on human
beings, she felt it was her professional, ethical duty to resist, and she so
informed her supervisor. In her deposition she said, "I wanted to be on
that project but I didn't want to take that high saccharin formula out
to the clinical practice ... I could not ethically take that out and give
it to children." 2 As a result of her stand, Dr. Pierce was first demoted
(or "re-assigned" as Ortho put it) and removed from all therapeutic
drug projects. Later, she was told that Ortho's management considered
her unpromotable. In June of 1975, Dr. Pierce submitted her resigna-
tion.3 Dr. Pierce brought a lawsuit against her former employer for
wrongful discharge. Ortho filed for summary judgment, pointing out
that Dr. Pierce signed no contract, only a secrecy agreement, and her
job had no fixed term. As an employee at will, Ortho argued, she could
be fired for "good cause, or bad cause, or no cause at all."'
In January of 1978, a New Jersey Superior Court granted Ortho's
motion, but the Appellate Division reversed, noting "that a growing
minority of jurisdictions permit recovery where the employment termi-
nation contravenes a clear mandate of public policy."5 Without imme-
diately jumping on the bandwagon, the court sent the case back down
for development of the facts at trial, adding that the public policy ex-
ception might be "particularly pertinent to professional employees
whose activities might involve violations of ethical or like-standards
having a substantial impact on matters of public interest, including
health and safety."'
The New Jersey Supreme Court, while recognizing a cause of ac-
tion for wrongful discharge when a clear public policy has been vio-
lated, found that Ortho's motion for summary judgment should have
been granted.7 Public policy sources could include statutes, regulations
and case law, and, the court added, a professional code of ethics. The
court also mentioned a professional employee's "special duty" to ad-
here to such a code, even when it obliges them to decline to perform
acts required by their employers. The Court drew a line, however:
2. Id. at 113.
3. Id. at 113-14.
4. NLRB v. McGahey, 233 F.2d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 1956).
5. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 166 N.J. Super. 336, 339 A.2d 1023
(1979).
6. Id.
7. Pierce v. Ortho, 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
[Vol. 10
5
: Nova Law Review 10, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1985
Protecting the Professional Whistleblower
"[A]n employee should not have the right to prevent his or her em-
ployer from pursuing its business because the employee perceives that a
particular business decision violates the employee's personal morals as
distinguished from the recognized code of ethics of the employee's pro-
fession."" The Court stated that Dr. Pierce made her objections to
loperamide before Ortho asked the FDA for approval of the formula,
and, therefore there was no imminent risk to human beings. If the
FDA had disapproved it and Ortho had then required Dr. Pierce to go
ahead with human testing, the situation would have been different.
Further, saccharin was not harmful, merely controversial. It was not as
if Dr. Pierce was resisting the inclusion of cyanide in a drug to be given
to babies. There was merely "a difference in medical opinions," in
which Dr. Pierce found herself on the other side of the fence from her
co-workers and superiors. According to the court, Dr. Pierce was, in
effect, trying to force her employer to drop research on loperamide be-
cause she believed it was unsafe.
Justice Pashman, in dissent, listed various codes of medical ethics
which forbade doctors from conducting drug tests on humans "where
unnecessary medical risks have economic profit as their only justifica-
tion." 10 He pointed out that Dr. Pierce did not claim she had the right
to put an end to the loperamide project; she only claimed the right to
her professional autonomy. She merely expected to be able to express
her opinions on the use of saccharin in the drug without suffering the
loss of her job. Therefore, the majority's worry over granting doctors
"complete veto power over desirable drug development [was] ill-
conceived.""
Justice Pashman stated the majority also turned a blind eye to the
FDA's history of failing to monitor dangerous drugs. This very history
made it all the more important for professionals to act on their ethical
beliefs. The dissent believed that Dr. Pierce's reactions were timely,
8. Id. at 513.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 515-17. They were: The Declaration of Helsinki of the World Medical
Association, the guidelines of the American Medical Association, and the "Nurenburg
Code," as well as the Hippocratic Oath, which had been specifically mentioned by Dr.
Pierce. Judge Pashman chided the majority for rejecting as irrelevant the general lan-
guage of the Hippocratic Oath, as if that were the only source of ethics Dr. Pierce had
relied upon. She did speak of standards, plural and if the majority faulted her for
failing to be more specific, it was dismissing a claim merely because of a formal defect
in the pleadings.
11. Id. at 519.
1985]
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and that the danger she wished to avoid was imminent enough at the
time she voiced her protest. Justice Pashman asked, "[w]ould the ma-
jority have Dr. Pierce wait until the first infant was placed before her,
ready to receive the first dose of a drug containing forty-four times the
concentration of saccharin permitted in twelve ounces of soda?"' 2
Pierce v. Ortho is still good law in New Jersey. 13 At present, most
jurisdictions would deny a cause of action for wrongful discharge to
professionals who, because they have taken a stand based on their ethi-
cal codes, now find themselves at odds with their employers, and then
without a job at all. It is the thesis of this article that the professional
whistleblower in private employment should be protected by the com-
mon law from retaliatory firing. This article first examines the develop-
ment of employment-at-will and its counterdevelopments in statutes
and contract and tort law. It focuses on the so-called public policy ex-
ception to employment-at-will, which some courts use to grant relief for
these whistleblowers in case of wrongful discharge. Finally, this article
describes the ways in which a professional employee's response to her
ethical code is connected to public policy arguments as seen by: 1) the
ethical codes themselves, and their importance to the professions and
society as a whole; 2) the duty of the professional to consider the long-
range consequences of decisionmaking in connection with long-range
loyalty to an employer; and 3) the enormous and relatively unchecked
power of large private employers to affect the quality of life in our
society.
Professional whistleblowers are uniquely situated. Although myr-
iad government regulations do exist, these employees play essential
roles as buffers between private industry and the consuming public, es-
pecially when the former's focus on profits often clouds its judgment
regarding the health and safety of the latter. In order to be effective as
buffers, professionals who blow the whistle should be granted a cause of
action for wrongful discharge, not only when their employer's actions
violate a law or regulation, but also when these actions violate public
12. Id.
13. See 199 N.J. Super. 18, 488 A.2d 229 (1985), where a nurse would not ad-
minister kidney dialysis to a terminally-ill double amputee, because, on previous occa-
sions when she had performed the dialysis, the patient suffered severe internal hemor-
raging and cardiac arrest. She told her superiors that she had moral and philosophical
objections to repeating the procedure, as expressed in the Code for Nurses, and asked
to be reassigned. The nurse was again asked to dialyze the patient, however, and she
refused and was fired. Citing Pierce, the New Jersey Superior Court found that there
was no violation of public policy, and summary judgment was granted the defendant.
[Vol. 10
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policy as reflected by professional codes of ethics.
II. Historical Background
Employment-at-will is a relatively recent doctrine. It was adopted
more out of response to a rapidly industrializing economy than out of
feudal tradition. Due to the shortage of labor caused by the Black
Death, the Statute of Laborers1 4 was enacted in England in the mid-
Fourteenth century. This law provided that a servant hired for an un-
stated time period was presumed to be hired for one year. Even after
the statute was repealed, English courts still construed employment
contracts of unstated duration as contracts for one year.15 This inter-
pretation was followed by American courts until the 1880's. During the
industrial revolution, however, pressure built to allow more flexibility in
hiring and firing. Laissez-faire and freedom-to-contract were the fa-
vored economic ideologies, and a new rule regarding employment was
needed. In 1877, Horace Woods first enunciated this new rule.
"Wood's Rule," as it was to be known, stated that a hiring for an un-
specified period was a hiring at will, terminable by either party."6
The new principle of Woods Rule was given constitutional dimen-
sion during the Lochner era,' 7 when the Supreme Court struck down
laws aimed at controlling employment conditions as violations of sub-
stantive due process. In Adair v. United'States,'8 for instance, an em-
ployee of a railroad was fired for belonging to a labor union. Federal
legislation which would make this discharge a crime was held a depri-
vation of property and of personal liberty without due process. The
Court described the situation as if it were equally in the interests of
both parties to be free to contract for employment without interference
from the state. It stated, "[t]he right of an employee to quit the service
of the employer, for whatever reason, is the same as the right of the
employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with the services of such
14. 31 Edw. III, ch. 7, repealed by S.L.R. 1863.
15. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LE-
GAL HIsT. 118, 119-20 (1976).
16. H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272
(1877).
17. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) was the leading case. In Lochner,
a state law setting maximum hours for labor in bakeries was struck down as a depriva-
tion of liberty without due process.
18. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
8
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employee."19
In Coppage v. Kansas,2" similar state legislation was invalidated
on fourteenth amendment grounds. Coppage reflects a complete accept-
ance of freedom to contract, together with an acknowledgement of the
unequal basis upon which the employer and the employee face each
other. The Court wrote:
Since it is self evident that, unless all things are held in common,
some persons must have more property than others, it is from the
nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the
right of private property without at the same time recognizing as
legitimate inequities of fortune that are the necessary result of the
exercise of those rights.2 '
Twenty-two years later, the Supreme Court announced the first
limitations on employment at will in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.22 The Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act, explicitly
approving the Act's protection of the right of employees to organize
and form unions. The Court said, "[t] he Act does not interfere with the
normal exercise of the right ... to discharge. The employer may not,
under cover of that right, intimidate or coerce its employees with re-
spect to their self organization."2 3
A large segment (29.9%) of the American workforce is union-
ized,24 and their collective bargaining agreements provide that these
employees may not be fired except for just cause. The proportion of
workers protected by these provisions is dwindling, however. 25 Further,
as the worker's collar gets lighter, he or she is less and less likely to be
a member of a union.26 The concept of organizing and confronting the
employer as a group is virtually anathema to the professional employee,
whose image has traditionally been one of dignified personal auton-
19. Id. at 174-75.
20. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
21. Id. at 17.
22. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
23. Id. at 45-46.
24. A. SLOANE AND F. WHITNEY, LABOR RELATIONS 4 (1985).
25. Id. 20.9% of the workforce was unionized in 1984, down from 24.7% in
1970.
26. Id. at 6-7. The following list was based on figures provided by the U.S. De-
partment of Labor:
[Vol. 10
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omy.27 Unionization, then, is not likely to be a major limitation on the
discharge of professional workers.
A. Statutory Developments
Since the National Labor Relations Act of 1935,28 federal and
state29 legislatures passed a number of statutes establishing civil reme-
dies against employers who discharge employees because of their
race,30 sex,3 1 age, 2 or physical handicap.33 In addition, there is
Industry Percentage Unionized
Railroads 78.6
Automobiles 66.2
Primary metals 59.8
Postal 52.2
Paper 48.7
Other transportation 42.9
Telephone communication 40.1
Stone, clay and glass 39.6
Construction 39.2
Fabricated metals 38.2
Local government 19.6
State government 13.3
Wholesale, retail trade 10.2
Hospitals 8.4
Services, finance 7.8
The disparity will continue to have a great effect on overall union membership,
since fewer and fewer American workers are employed in heavy industry, while the
number of jobs in the white collar sector is on the rise.
27. Id. Professionals in unions include teachers (National Education Association
and the American Federation of Teachers), college instructors (125,000 belong to the
American Association of University Professors), and, to some extent, physicians
(16,000), engineers (50,000), and lawyers (several thousand). But most of the profes-
sionals represented by unions work for the government or for large institutions. Those
in the private sector are still vulnerable to employment-at-will. See also Note, A Rem-
edy for the Discharge of Professional Employees Who Refuse to Perform Unethical or
Illegal Acts: A Proposal in Aid of Professional Ethics, 28 VAND. L. REV. 805, 19-20
(1975).
28. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
29. Anti-discrimination statutes have been passed in 49 states.
30. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2a (1976).
31. Id.
32. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. §
623(a) (1976).
33. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. V
1981).
1985]
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"whistleblower's" legislation on state and federal levels, protecting em-
ployees against dismissal for reporting violations of, for example, the
Clean Air Act, 4 ERISA, 35 OSHA,38 or the ERA.37 But a recent fifth
circuit decision 8 raises serious questions as to the effectiveness of such
legislation for those who voice their concerns to their superiors instead
of to the external enforcement agency. In Brown & Root, Inc., defen-
dant contractor at a nuclear power plant in Texas allegedly fired a
quality control inspector for reporting flawed welds to his corporate
superiors. The plaintiff employee claimed that his reports were pro-
tected activity under the federal law preventing retaliation against an
employee whistleblowing to enforce NRC regulations. 9 The Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, reversing the administrative law judge, found
that the statute covered only whistleblowers who actually file their
complaints with the NRC, not those who merely reported to their em-
ployers.4 Although there is a split in the circuits on this issue,4' the
Department of Labor has chosen not to appeal the Fifth Circuit's rul-
ing to the Supreme Court. Such a narrow interpretation of the statu-
tory protection laid out by Congress bodes ill for professionals. The
more discreet, intracorporate form of blowing the whistle might often
be preferred by the professional, whose complaints are more likely to
affect employer practice than those of the ordinary worker. Further-
more, the relative power of professionals might deter them from going
straight to the regulatory authority, since, more than ordinary workers,
they can be expected to identify with their employers' public image and
long-range concerns. Perhaps this explains why, almost without excep-
tion, when professional whistleblowers attempt to sue for the tort of
wrongful discharge, their complaints were expressed only to their
superiors, not to the appropriate government agency, nor the media."2
34. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 312(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7622(a)
(Supp. V 1981).
35. See Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 510, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1140 (1976).
36. See Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, § 11(c), 29 U.S.C. §
660(c) (1976).
37. See Energy Reorganization Act § 210(a), 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)(3)(1976).
38. Brown & Root, Inc. v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1984).
39. Id. at 1029-31.
40. Id. at 1036.
41. Mackowiak v. University, 735 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1984).
42. Dr. Pierce vis-a-vis Ortho. See also Percival v. General Motors, 539 F.2d
1129 (8th Cir. 1976) (misrepresentations made to government, reported by engineer to
[Vol. 10
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Further statutory encroachments on employment-at-will include
state laws designed to prevent employers from intimidating their em-
ployees in certain ways. 43 For example, such a law might make it ille-
gal for an employer to threaten to fire any employee who will not vote
as ordered. 44 In Missouri, where such a statute existed, a worker was
fired because he refused to vote for a certain judge.4 5 But when he
brought a civil action against his boss, he lost because the law was a
criminal sanction, and made no mention of a civil action for damages
for the employee. 46 Other examples of statutory inroads upon employ-
ment-at-will are the civil service rules which protect federal, state and
local government employees against arbitrary dismissal.47
superiors); Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 111 111. App. 3d 502, 444 N.E.2d 588
(1982) (embezzlement of corporate funds reported by head accountant to chief execu-
tive officers); Suchodolski v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 316
N.W.2d 710 (1982) (senior auditor reported questionable internal systems to superi-
ors); Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86
(1983) (accounting improprieties and illegalities reported by assistant treasurer to top
management). But see, Rozier v. St. Mary's Hosp., 88 Ill. App. 3d 994, 411 N.E.2d 50
(1980) (indicating a willingness to go public). In Rozier, a nurse leaked damaging
information to the press, but only after her superiors ignored her complaints as to im-
proper treatment of patients.
43. See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1101-02 (West 1971); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
210A.14 (West Supp. 1981); Mo. REv. STAT. § 115.637.7 (Vernon 1966); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 12.07 (West Supp. 1984) (making it a crime for an employer to retaliate
against an employee for political activities); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-203 (West
1971); CAL. LABOR CODE § 450 (West 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.03 (1977) (mak-
ing it a crime for an employer to force an employee to, or prevent them from, patroniz-
ing particular businesses); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-15 (Burns 1974); MIcH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 418.125 (West 1970); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c § 1 (Vernon
1971) (making it a crime for an employer to fire an employee for filing a worker's
compensation claim; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31.379 (West 1975); MIcH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 15.362 (West 1981) (making it a crime for an employer to fire an employee for
reporting violations of state employee safety codes). For a detailed list of such statutes,
see 4 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1:35-:52 (1985).
44. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-1012 (West 1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 56, § 33 (West 1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 12.09 (West Supp. 1984).
45. Bell v. Faulkner, 75 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934).
46. Id. at 614. But see, Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 2d
481, 486, 171 P.2d 21, 25 (1946), where the statute included provision for a civil
remedy.
47. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1970) (defining conditions for discharge of fed-
eral civil service employees); 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (1981 Supp.) (no disciplinary ac-
tion can be taken against certain federal employees for disclosure of nonprivileged in-
formation reasonably believed to evidence a violation of law, mismanagement of public
funds, or substantial and specific danger to public health or safety); or, on the state
1985]
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In spite of these existing protections, there are still millions of
American workers who, because they do not have a contract for a
stated duration, could be summarily fired and have no redress. Thus,
the existence of employment-at-will carries a tremendous potential im-
pact in our society, in which it is far easier for an employer to replace
an employee than for an employee to find a new job. The employment-
at-will doctrine has been criticized by a number of scholars.' 8 Professor
Lawrence E. Blades, in a seminal article of this ilk, describes it as a
severe threat to individual freedom. He says:
We have become a nation of employees. We are dependent upon
others for our means of livelihood, and most of our people have
become completely dependent upon wages. If they lose their jobs,
they lose every resource ... [.] [S]uch dependence of the mass of
the people upon others for all of their income is something new in
the world. For our generation the substance of life is in another
man's hands.49
B. Contract Law Developments
In many states, courts have set limits on an employer's right to
terminate at-will employees by using contract law. There are two main
approaches: 1) to find a covenant of "good faith and fair dealing" im-
level, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-50.5-103 and 105 (1980 Supp.) (state government em-
ployee's disclosure of public interest information cannot be disciplined). For a list of
statutes protecting whistleblowers at state level, see, 4 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 1:52
(1985).
48. See, e.g., Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting
the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967); Summers,
Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV.
481 (1976); Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The
Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931 (1983); Note, A Common Law Ac-
tion for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435 (1975); Note, A
Remedy for the Discharge of Professional Employees Who Refuse to Perform Unethi-
cal or Illegal Acts: A Proposal In Aid of Professional Ethics, 28 VAND. L. REv. 805
(1975); Comment, Protecting the Private Sector At Will Employee Who 'Blows the
Whistle': A Cause of Action Based on Determinants of Public Policy, 1977 Wis. L.
REV.; Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Employee's Duty of Loyalty and
Obedience: A Preliminary Inquiry, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 279 (1971).
49. See Blades, supra note 48, at 1404, quoting F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY
OF LABOR 9 (1951).
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plicit in the contract of employment, 50 or 2) to imply a contractual
term from an employer's handbook, policy statements, or behavior.5 1
The first method of ameliorating the employment-at-will doctrine
through contract principles is actually a contract-tort hybrid. Courts in
some states have imposed a duty of good faith and fair dealing upon
the parties. Under this theory, an employee may collect damages if he
can show that his dismissal was motivated by bad faith or malice. The
theory draws from tort law in that the duty imposed comes from public
policy concerns rather than an express or implied promise made by the
employer. However, it is generally described as sounding in contract,
and damages have been limited accordingly.
Courts in only seven states52 hold employers to the good faith and
fair dealing standard and they have been doing that gingerly. For in-
stance, New Hampshire, the first state to use the good faith rule,53 has
narrowed the rule's applicability to situations where employees are dis-
charged because they performed acts that public policy would en-
courage, or refused to do that which public policy would condemn. 4 In
a Massachusetts case, 55 the absence of good cause for discharge was
held not to be the equivalent of an absence of good faith. Good faith
was only one factor in determining fair dealing. In another Massachu-
setts case, Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.,56 a salesman
claimed that his employer fired him after twenty-five years of service in
50. See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
51. See Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr.
722 (1980) (examination of written personnel policy and duration of employment);
Greene v. Howard University, 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (employee told he is
"indispensable"); Fulton v. Tennessee Walking Horse Breeders' Ass'n., 63 Tenn. App.
569, 476 S.W.2d 644 (1971) (resolution of congratulations passed at annual meeting of
directors); Zimmer v. Wells Management Corp., 438 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(granting of additional authority, promotion, and permission to participate in stock
transaction); Maloney v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 352 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (custom of the industry).
52. Alaska, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Montana and New
Hampshire.
53. See Monge, supra note 50, where a female employee was fired for refusing
the sexual advances of her supervisor. This case pre-dates the development of sexual
harassment theory under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
54. Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 297, 414 A.2d 1273, 1274
(1980); Cloutier v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d
1140 (1981).
55. Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 659, 429 N.E.2d 21 (1981).
56. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
1985]
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order to avoid paying him commissions. He was discharged one day
after a customer placed a five-million dollar order with him. In general,
Massachusetts expects an employee to demonstrate that a dismissal
would financially benefit the employer at the employee's expense before
it questions an absence of bad faith.57
The second application of contract principles is only slightly more
popular. Fourteen states are willing to imply additional terms; usually,
that the employer will only fire the employee for "just cause."58 In this
theory's leading case, Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Michigan,59 Mr. Toussaint was handed a personnel manual at his hir-
ing which included a "just cause" policy statement. Also, in response to
his questions about job-security, he was told that if he was "doing his
job" he would not be discharged. 60 The court found that such state-
ments, written or oral, could amount to enforceable contractual
promises.61 Although an employer need not make such promises, once
they are made, the employer enhances the employment relationship,
"secur[ing] an orderly, cooperative and loyal work force."862 The court
also noted that terms could be implied although the policy manual that
gave rise to them was never signed, contained no specific reference to
the employee nor to his position, and could be changed unilaterally by
the employer without notice to the employee. Further, the court stated
it would not matter that the employee might not even realize that such
a manual existed until after he or she was hired.63 Another case in
which a "just cause" provision could be implied from a personnel hand-
book and verbal assurances at hiring was Weiner v. McGraw-Hill,
Inc.6 4 The court explained that consideration for such a promise could
be found in an employee's detrimental reliance on it. Mr. Weiner had
been lured away from another publisher with the promise, had seen it
incorporated in the employment application, had stayed on with Mc-
Graw-Hill, turning down job offers because of it, and had actually had
to use the "just cause" procedures himself in dismissing certain of his
57. See Siles v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 13 Mass. App. 354, 433 N.E.2d 103
(1982).
58. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Idaho, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Mon-
tana, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota.
59. 408 Mich. 579, 592 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
60. Id. at 884.
61. Id. at 890.
62. Id. at 892.
63. Id.
64. 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982).
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own subordinates at McGraw. 5
Even where there was no booklet or manual, employees have been
able to argue the existence of an implied promise to discharge for just
cause. In Pugh v. See's Candles, Inc.,6 Mr. Pugh worked his way up
from dishwasher to vice president in thirty-two years of employment.
Right after a trip to Europe which he took with the president of See's
and their respective families, he was summarily fired. When he asked
why, the president told him that he should "look deep within
[him]self" to find the answer, that "things were said by people in the
trade that have come back to us." Up until this point, Pugh was consid-
ered an exemplary employee, honored by the company for his part in
making the previous year the most successful in See's history.67 The
court held that the jury could find an implied promise not to behave
arbitrarily toward employees, pointing to the length of his employment,
the promotions and commendations he had received, See's policy of not
firing administrative personnel without just cause, and assurances that
Pugh had been given during his early years with the company that "if
[he was] loyal to See's and [did] a good job, [his] future [would be]
secure."68 The above examples reflect a minority development, how-
ever. 9 Most courts would find that there was no consideration for any
implied promise to employ permanently, for instance. In exchange for
his or her labor, the employee collects a wage. Nothing extra is bar-
gained for on either side. 0
Some argue that, in the face df the majority's tendency to adhere
rigidly to traditional contract principles, an employee must negotiate
more favorable terms at the outset. But this is an unrealistic expecta-
tion. Employees generally are not in a position to bargain effectively for
job security. Only uniquely valuable employees would have such clout.
Even among professionals, a group perhaps most likely to behave with
a degree of educated assertiveness, the norm is to accept a job rather
informally, often verbally. Not much in the way of terms of employ-
ment is specified, usually nothing regarding its duration.7 1 Even where
65. Id. at 445.
66. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
67. Id. at 316-19.
68. Id. at 317, 329.
69. See, e.g., Beidler v. W.R. Grace, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
70. See Note, Employment Contracts of Unspecified Duration, 42 COLUM. L.
REv. 107, 121 (1942); Blades, supra note 48, at 1420.
71. See Note, A Remedy for the Discharge of Professional Employees, 28
VAND. L. REv. 805, 808, n.9 (1975).
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the minority rule of implied terms holds sway, employers can easily
circumvent the implied promise possibility by inserting express provi-
sions in a contract of employment insisting on their right to terminate
at will. Such provisions have been upheld in Michigan, where Tous-
saint was decided, for instance.7 2
C. Tort Law Developments
In response to this vulnerability, courts in recent years have been
willing to create a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge, where
an employee has been fired in circumstances which contradict sound
public policy. In one group of such cases, the employees were dismissed
for exercising a statutorily-given right. In Frampton v. Central Indiana
Gas Co.,7 3 for example, the plaintiff alleged that she had been fired in
retaliation for filing a worker's compensation claim. Although the stat-
ute did not confer upon her a civil remedy, the court held that she had
a cause of action. If employees could be intimidated in this way, they
would not file claims, "opting, instead, to continue their employment
without incident. The end result, of course, is that the employer would
be effectively relieved of his obligation,' 74 and the public policy that
underlay the statute would be contravened. In Perks v. Firestone,5 the
employer was investigating complaints that some of its suppliers were
procuring prostitutes for employees. Plaintiff employee was told to take
a polygraph test. When he refused, he was fired. Since making employ-
ment contingent upon taking such a test was a misdemeanor in Penn-
sylvania, the court held that public policy was violated by the dismissal,
and reversed summary judgment for the defendant.7 6 These cases illus-
trate that, where an employee has been fired for exercising a right con-
72. See Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980);
Schipiani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich. App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981).
73. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
74. Id. at 427. Accord Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d
151 (1976); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 102 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979).
75. 611 F.2d 1363 (3rd Cir. 1979).
76. Id. at 1365. Not all jurisdictions have been that flexible with the public pol-
icy argument, using it to give teeth to employment-related statutes which are silent
regarding an employee's civil action for damages. For instance, in Kelly v. Mississippi
Valley Ga Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981), the court granted no cause of action
where an employee was fired for filing a worker's compensation claim. Also, the Ari-
zona Supreme Court held in Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907
(1977), that an employee's refusal to take a lie detector test did not entitle him to a
cause of action where the statute was merely a criminal sanction against the employer.
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ferred by statute, even in the absence of a corresponding personal rem-
edy, courts have been willing to grant a cause of action for wrongful
discharge. The public policy is easy to spot, since it is statutorily-man-
dated and in the context of employer-employee relations.
What should be the result when the employer has violated a law,
and the employee is fired for either refusing to go along with such be-
havior or making active efforts to end it? The statute involved in these
situations typically has no direct bearing on the employment relation-
ship and mentions neither an employee's right nor remedy. It is not
easy to generalize about the case law in this area, perhaps because pub-
lic policy, "the unruly horse of the law," can be many things to many
judges. One commentator has described the decisions as "ad hoc judg-
ment(s), uninformed by detailed examination of the merits of drawing
the line in one place rather than another . . . an unpredictable and
sometimes counterintuitive pattern of holdings . . .
The case law in this area is untidy. Amid the confusion, certain
trends can be identified. These trends support the thesis of this article;
that there is a clear public policy justification for granting a cause of
action for wrongful discharge to the professional whistleblower.
Some jurisdictions simply will not create a right of action on pub-
lic policy grounds. A New York plaintiff, an employee of 23 years, an
assistant treasurer, alleged that he was fired for announcing to top
management that he knew of illegal accounting practices involving at
least 50 million dollars. He told them that secret pension reserves had
improperly inflated the company's growth, allowing certain officers to
receive unwarranted bonuses via a management incentive plan.78 In an-
other case from New York, the plaintiff worked for Citibank and re-
ported illegal foreign currency manipulation to his superiors. 79 Neither
of these whistleblowers had a cause of action, since New York does not
recognize the tort of wrongful discharge as against public policy. Simi-
larly, in Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hospital8 0 plaintiff was fired for re-
fusing to falsify medical records. The Alabama Supreme Court, cling-
ing to the concept of the employer's right to terminate at will,
77. Note, Protecting Employees at Will, supra note 48, at 1949.
78. See Murphy, supra note 42, at 89-90.
79. Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 100 Misc. 2d 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269, 270, affd
74 A.D. 2553 (1979).
80. 352 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Ala. 1977). Accord Gil v. Metal Service Corp., 412
So. 2d 706 (La. App. 1982); Goodroe v. Georgia Power Co., 148 Ga. App. 193, 251
S.E.2d 51 (1978).
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described public policy as "too nebulous a standard," and affirmed
summary judgment for the defendant.
Among the state courts recognizing the public-policy-based cause
of action for whistleblowers is California, where, in 1959, Petermann
v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters"' was decided. There, the plaintiff
was instructed by his employer to lie when testifying before a legisla-
tive investigatory committee. He refused and was fired. The court
found that he had a cause of action, and described public policy as
"that principle of law which holds that no citizen can lawfully do that
which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against public
good." ' When his boss made plaintiff's continued employment depend
upon his willingness to commit perjury, public policy was clearly vio-
lated. The effect "would be to encourage criminal conduct upon the
part of both the employee and the employer, and would serve to con-
taminate the honest administration of public affairs."8' 3
Petermann has been cited in a number of whistleblower cases that
have been heard in recent years.8 4 Where a plaintiff appears to be un-
fairly stuck between the 'rock' of job loss and the 'hard place' of partic-
ipation in an employer's illegal scam, some courts support an action for
wrongful discharge. For example, where an employer would expect an
employee to falsify pollution reports,8 5 or take part in illegal price fix-
ing,86 these courts view public policy as support for "good citizenship;"
in effect they forbid an employer from forcing an employee to commit
a crime. The various encroachments on employment-at-will are often
reviewed in these cases, producing such conclusions as "[t]he employer
is not so absolute a sovereign of the job that there are not limits to his
prerogative. One such limit is ... the employer cannot condition em-
81. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1969).
82. Id. at 27.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111, 1119 (E.D. Pa.
1979); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 836, 610 P.2d
1330 (1980); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385
(1980); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Hawaii 370, 652 P.2d 625, 630 (1982);
Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 85 11. 2d 124, 52 Ill. Dec. 13, 421 N.E. 2d 876, 879
(1981); Petrik, supra note 42, at 590-92; O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416,
390 A.3d 149 (1978); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270, 274
(W. Va. 1978).
85. Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R. Co., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265
N.W.2d 385 (1978).
86. Tameny, supra note 84.
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ployment upon required participation in unlawful conduct by the em-
ployee."8 7 At stake are the employee's interest in a clear conscience
(and a clean record), 88 and the public's interest in a well-functioning
criminal justice system.89 The professional whistleblower can certainly
point to this line of cases for a supportive definition of public policy. On
the other hand, courts have frequently been influenced by the policy
argument that employees must be loyal, and that whistleblowing is dis-
loyal, a form of biting the hand that feeds. Although it could also be
argued that protecting one's employer from the repercussions of illegal
procedures (treble damages in antitrust suits, or personal injury dam-
ages in product liability suits) is real, long-term loyalty, many judges
seem to favor the short-term variety.
It is interesting to examine the decisional law in the light of the
loyalty issue. If we assume that the fewer waves made by the
whistleblower the better, it would make sense for courts to be more
comfortable granting a cause of action for wrongful discharge to pas-
sive whistleblowers, those who merely refuse to cooperate in illegal be-
havior, or merely register internal complaints, than to the more active
variety of whistleblower, those who threaten to rock the corporate boat
more severely by going public with their complaints. The decisions do
not exhibit this logic. For instance, in 1980, a research technician
working for a pharmaceutical manufacturer reported violations of the
FDA's drug safety regulations to his supervisors. He was fired.90 The
Indiana Supreme Court refused to grant a cause of action for merely
doing what public policy encouraged, in light of the competing interest
of an employer to be able to determine whom to employ.9 1 Yet, in Illi-
nois in 1981, where the plaintiff reported crimes of fellow employees to
the police, a cause of action for retaliatory discharge was stated.
"There is no public policy more basic, nothing more implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty than the enforcement of a state's criminal
code." 92
87. Id. at 1136.
88. Harless, supra note 84, at 276; Sheets, supra note 84, at 388-89.
89. Petrik, supra note 42, at 590-92; Palmateer, supra note 85, at 879-80.
90. Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054, 1057 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
91. Id. at 1058.
92. Palmateer, supra note 85, at 878-79. In this case, the employee had worked
for the defendant for sixteen years, and was a manager at the time he was fired. He
was not, however, a "professional." Note that Palmateer was discharged for cooperat-
ing in the criminal investigation of fellow employees. The process would go on with or
without his help. In this sense, although he became involved in a "public" exposure, he
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The case law also does not exhibit uniformity in terms of support-
ing law enforcement by supporting the whistleblower. A comparison
between two cases from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, both in-
volving the reporting of antitrust violations, provides an example of this
sheer inconsistency. In a 1979 decision, the plaintiff refused to partici-
pate in his employer's anti-competitive violations where, for instance,
Food Fair, but not Acme, was given price breaks."3 He claimed he was
fired for refusing to commit a crime. The court held he had a cause of
action for wrongful discharge.94 However, in another case, a dismissal
was granted against another sales manager in 1982, where he objected
to identical illegal discounting and was fired. 3
There is, however, a recognizable trend in the morass of public
policy decisions; that is, to protect whistleblowers who are considered
under an obligation to report wrongdoing. For example, Indiana's Su-
preme Court, in the Campbell case, denied a cause of action to the
mere research technician who reported misconduct in the gathering of
drug safety data for the FDA.96 But a federal court interpreting Indi-
ana law found for a Mr. Perry, who had been fired for refusing to con-
tinue his participation in violations of antitrust law and for delivering
evidence of these violations to his employer.9 Distinguishing Campbell,
the court stated that Mr. Perry was "under a statutory duty to refrain
from engaging in conspiracies in restraint of trade."98
In some cases, the employee's job responsibilities include the re-
sponsibility to report and these whistleblowers are given more protec-
tion. For example, in Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc.," a quality
control director for a frozen food company told his supervisors that cer-
tain meats and vegetables were substandard according to Connecticut
law. Dismissal of his claim was reversed. 100 In Harless v. First Na-
tional Bank in Fairmont,'0' another dismissal was reversed where the
manager of a consumer credit department of a bank reported illegal
overcharging practices on prepayment of installment loans. In Petrik v.
was not the initiator, and might therefore be classified as "passive."
93. McNulty, supra note 84.
94. Id. at 1119-20.
95. Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
96. Campbell, supra note 90, at 1057.
97. Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387, 1388 (S. D. Ind. 1982).
98. Id. at 1389. But see, dissent in Campbell, supra note 90, at 1063.
99. Supra note 84.
100. Id. at 388.
101. Supra note 84.
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Monarch Printing Corp.,102 a vice president of finance reported his sus-
picions of embezzlement of corporate funds. He too stated a claim for
wrongful discharge. Perhaps the tendency to protect this type of
whistleblower exists because, if they fail to object and allow the wrong-
doing to continue, they are, in effect, promoting it in a more active
sense than could a less powerful employee. In any case, these decisions
seem to define public policy as follows: the more job responsibilities
carried by the whistleblower, the greater should be his or her freedom
to raise issues, such as those mentioned above, without risking retalia-
tory firing. This trend is obviously relevant to the dissenting profes-
sional employee.
Consistency is a chimera, however, even as to whistleblowers with
considerable power and responsibility. A federal court in Michigan, for
instance, granted summary judgment for the employer. In Percival v.
General Motors,1 03 plaintiff was a mechanical engineer and an execu-
tive who worked for GM for 25 years. He claimed that he was fired for
his complaint about GM's deceptive practices, his refusal to give the
federal government false information, and his attempts to correct cer-
tain misrepresentations made to the government. Here, plaintiff's status
gave even more weight to the defendant's interests. "A large corporate
employer such as GM ... must be accorded wide latitude in determin-
ing whom it will employ in high and sensitive management positions,
particularly where developments in the field of mechanical engineering
are involved." 1°4
At the losing end of the spectrum are employees who take it upon
themselves to object to an employer's practices which, though not nec-
essarily illegal, may be, in the employee's opinion, dangerous. Mr.
Geary, for example, worked as a salesman of tubular products to the oil
and gas industry, and believed that a certain new product was not ade-
quately tested and, therefore, unsafe. When he told this to his superi-
ors, he was ordered to follow directions and continue selling. Instead,
he went to the vice president with his concerns. The product was even-
tually re-evaluated and withdrawn. In a sense, so was Mr. Geary; he
was fired. 105 Pennsylvania's Supreme Court ruled against him, stating,
"no public policy is violated when a company discharges an employee
who is not qualified to make technical judgments for making a nui-
102. Supra note 42.
103. 539 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1976).
104. Id. at 1130.
105. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
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sance of himself." 0 The court mentioned the employer's legitimate in-
terest in hiring and retaining the best personnel available. The best per-
sonnel, it seemed to say, would be those who understood that employees
should not go over the heads of their immediate supervisors. By doing
just that, Mr. Geary displayed an inability to work effectively with fel-
low employees. An employer should have the right to discharge an em-
ployee for such a reason without worrying about being sued. These too,
stated the court, are public policy concerns."0 7
III. The Professional Whistleblower
In this area of law, there is a special case; that of the professional
employee who feels compelled to blow the whistle in response to the
dictates of a professional ethical code. In such situations, an employer
may not necessarily be violating any law, nor expecting the employee to
participate in doing so. Where this is true, they resemble the Geary
type of whistleblower cases in which the employee may be viewed as a
meddling, inappropriate watchdog, who deserves to be fired. But, they
also strongly resemble the cases in which employees are allowed a
cause of action because their job responsibilities may require them to
be aware of, and responsive to, certain problems. In addition, the pro-
fessional whistleblower situation involves a new factor; that is, the ar-
gument that professional codes of ethics are, in part, designed to be in
the public interest, and, therefore, it may well be an overriding public
policy to encourage the professional to behave in accordance with such
a code.
A. Ethics and Loyalty
The employer does have a legitimate interest in maintaining an
efficient and loyal workforce. Even workers who are protected under
section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act from being discharged
for union organizing are not so protected for activities which are seen
as "disruptive" or "insubordinate". "There is no more elemental cause
for discharge of an employee than disloyalty to his employer." 108
106. Id. at 178-79.
107. Id. at 179.
108. NLRB v. Local 1229, Int'l. Bd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464, 472
(1953). For a recent development, see Pacemaket Yacht Co. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 455,
462-63 (3rd Cir. 1981) (Garth, J., concurring).
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The professional employee, however, owes other loyalties; to the
profession itself, and to the public at large. Ethical codes are the offi-
cial guidelines by which a profession hopes to maintain both actual in-
ternal quality and the public's perception of that quality. They may be
self-serving, but they also serve society as a whole by attempting to
ensure that the power which professionals hold is intelligently and mor-
ally exercised. These codes insist that the professional, above all, re-
spond to that which is best for the public in general. According to the
ethical code of the National Society of Professional Engineers, for ex-
ample, engineers must "use knowledge . . . for the advancement of
human welfare," and where that brings them into conflict with their
employer, they must "regard [their] duty to the public welfare as para-
mount." 109 And, as a legal example, while lawyers are directed to "re-
present a client zealously, they may not counsel or assist a client in
conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent." 1 0 Further:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that: (1) his
client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud
upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to
rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he
shall promptly reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal,
except when the information is protected as privileged
communication."'
Professional ethics codes do not simply urge quality performance;
they clearly link performance with a public trust. These mixed loyalties
of professionals set them apart from ordinary whistleblowers. Profes-
sionals respond, not only to the promptings of good citizenship, but to
the promptings of their codes that direct them to speak out even if they
must step on some important toes by doing so. If ordinary
whistleblowers should not be forced to choose between losing a job and
committing a crime, professionals surely deserve even more protection;
for they are not only pressured to break the law, but also to go against
109. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-1 (1974).
110. Id., DR 7-102
111. Id., DR 7-102. The attorney-client privilege is expressed in Canon 4, but it
extends only to past crimes, not to current or continuing crimes. Hinds v. State Bar, 19
Cal. 2d 87, 92-93, 119 P.2d 134, 137 (1941). Recently, however, the ABA voted to
define "crimes" as crimes of violence. So-called "economic atrocities," such as securi-
ties fraud, which an attorney may know are in the planning stage, do not have to be
reported.
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professional ethical guidelines.
The whole question of loyalty to the employer is further compli-
cated by the fact that a professional employee is frequently in a posi-
tion to envision both the short-term and the long-term consequences of
a course of action. At times, while short-term consequences seem to
work, long-term consequences are worrisome. It is often this sort of
realization that inspires a professional to blow the whistle. And it is
certainly arguable that the employer's interests were best served by
such behavior. For example, in Edwards v. Citibank,112 Mr. Edwards
went to his immediate supervisors, and then to the bank's senior vice
president for foreign exchange, about a practice called "parking." This
involved the bogus transfer of foreign exchange positions to shift profits
to tax havens, like the Bahamas. Edwards was concerned that this was
"just bad business . . . [W]e risk being tossed out on our rear-ends
from some of these countries." 1 3 Similarly, a senior design engineer for
Ford, Frank Camps, believed that the Pinto safety testing program was
inadequate and even illegal. Ford was in a hurry to get federal certifi-
cation for the Pinto, and it had to be cheap enough and light enough to
compete with the VW and Japanese imports. To comply with federal
windshield retention standards, Ford engineers designed the Pinto so
that the energy produced by crash impact would be directed away from
the front of the car towards the gas tank. Mr. Camp's concern, which,
unfortunately, proved to be well-founded, was that his employer's repu-
tation and financial stability would be seriously undermined if it had to
defend this sort of design ploy in personal injury lawsuits. He began
writing letters to management, feeling that he "faced the dilemma of
either serving the best interest of the Ford Motor Company or submit-
ting to the directives of [his] immediate supervisors."14
So, real loyalty to an employer, especially for the professional em-
ployee, may mean taking the long view. Many employers understand
this and provide internal mechanisms for airing complaints and sugges-
tions, no matter how unpopular these might be." 5 A cause of action for
112. 100 Misc. 2d 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269, ajfd 74 A.D. 2553 (1979).
113. Rowan, The Maverick Who Yelled Foul at Citibank, FORTUNE, January
10, 1983, at 49.
114. See Whistleblowing, supra note 1, at 123.
115. For an analysis of the benefits of dissent, and descriptions of how company
policy can make the most effective use of it, see A. URIs, EXECUTIVE DISSENT, 9-14 &
162-79 (1978); Whistleblowing, supra note 1, at 141-51. See also F. FOULKES, PER-
SONNEL POLICIES IN LARGE NONUNION COMPANIES (1980); Rowe and Baker, Are You
Hearing Enough Employee Concerns?, 62 HARV. Bus. REV. 127-35, May-June 1984.
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the wrongfully-dismissed whistleblower then, arguably, could reflect the
employer's interest in loyalty, newly defined as a high-quality, thinking
workforce. As the chief executive officer of the Greyhound Corporation
puts it, "I want spirited managers who will challenge the system ... I
don't warm lukewarm employees. They breed mediocrity and a womb-
to-tomb attitude." ' 6
Another argument for special treatment of the professional
whistleblower is that they are licensed and regulated by the state, sub-
ject to disciplinary actions, both for violations of their own codes or of
external regulations. This fact further illustrates the way in which pro-
fessional employment is intertwined with the public interest. In 1982, a
New Jersey pharmacist was in charge of the defendant employer's
drugstore, which was located inside defendant's grocery store. The
plaintiff's superior told him that on the 4th of July the grocery would
be open, but the pharmacy would be closed. The plaintiff believed that
state regulations required the pharmacy to be open when the store itself
was open. Therefore, acting on his belief, he went to work on July 4th
and was fired. In reversing summary judgment for the pharmacist, the
court saw a public policy issue reflected in the twin elements of state
law and a professional code of ethics.11 7 Mr. Kalman, the plaintiff here,
was not just concerned in case drugs were stolen or wrongly dispensed.
He was also worried that his license might be revoked. L8
Professional whistleblowers are often in a position to be jeopard-
ized, as their employers would be, by repercussions as serious as loss of
employment. In this sense, tob, they are set apart from the ordinary
worker who responds out of concerns of conscience. For example, a su-
perior court in California recently awarded $250,000 to an insurance
company's staff attorney who alleged that he was fired for refusing to
go along with their order that he "not ... disclose to [insureds] offers
to settle within the policy limits." According to the plaintiff, state ethi-
cal rules demanded that he convey such news to policyholders." 9 Law-
yers can be disbarred for unethical handling of a settlement, for set-
Blind loyalty to a corporation has recently been viewed as a liability in some ways; that
is, where it has produced stodgy, plodding, unimaginative management. See McDowell,
Job Loyalty: Not the Virtue It Seems, NEW YORK TIMES, March 3, 1985, at F, ol. 1.
116. McDowell, supra note 115 (quoting J. Teets).
117. Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 183 N.J. Super. 153, 443 A.2d 728, 730
(1982).
118. Id. at 729.
119. Galante, In-House Attorney Wins $250,000 for Wrongful Discharge, NA-
TIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Fall 1984.
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tling a case without a client's permission, or for not telling them about
an offer to settle."' 0 The Ford engineer began a barrage of letters com-
plaining about the Pinto tests, not just out of concern for his employer,
but also because he did not want to be made a scapegoat. He said:
At about this time, the concept that negligence in design as a basis
for liability was taking hold in legal circles, and I was fearful of
the consequences. Therefore, I wrote to management in order to
allay my fears that at some future date I would be held personally
liable for a Pinto fatality.' 21
It has been demonstrated that, if there is any recognizable trend in
the case law dealing with the public-policy exception to employment-at-
will and whistleblowers, it lies in allowing a cause of action where the
whistleblowers' jobs make them responsible for reporting miscon-
duct.122 Engineers, architects, lawyers, accountants, doctors and other
professionals are very often highly-placed, charged with overseeing the
general quality of a project or a series of projects. Since, even more
than the ordinary employee who blows the whistle, these people are
expected to respond using independent judgment and foresight, it
makes particularly good sense to allow them to do so without risking
their jobs.
B. Public Policy and Private Power
That large corporations wield enormous power in American society
is a fact which has been noted and analyzed for decades. 2 The corpo-
120. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-7 (1974); In re
Ilse, 104 Wis. 2d 522, 312 N.W.2d 57 (1981); In re Dobbertin, 458 N.Y.S.2d 775
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983); In re Brown, 104 Ariz. 387, 453 P.2d 958 (1969).
121. Whistleblowing, supra note 1, at 123. See also SETHI, The Expanding
Scope of Executive Liability (Criminal and Civil) For Corporate Law Violations, in
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND PUBLIC PURPOSE 245-74 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Pri-
vate Enterprise].
122. See supra, notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., A. BERLE AND G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRI-
VATE PROPERTY (1932); R. BRADY, BUSINESS AS A SYSTEM OF POWER (1943); G. Mc-
CONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1966); R. NADER AND M.
GREEN, CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA (1973) [hereinafter cited as Corporate
Power]; A. MILLER, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE (1975); R. HARRISON, PLURAL-
ISM AND CORPORATISM (1980); Blumberg, supra note 48, at 299.
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rate giants have tremendous influence on our political system."l 4 Com-
mentators have viewed large corporations as governments themselves,
but governments with a difference, in that they are basically unac-
countable to their constituents, their shareholders. As one scholar put
it: "The official doctrine that the corporate directors are responsible to
the stockholders is so irrelevant as to be ridiculous. The directors are, if
reality is considered, effectively responsible to management, and man-
agement tends to be self-perpetuating."1 25 Whereas the power of gov-
ernment is constitutionally delimited by the system of checks and bal-
ances, by federalism, by the Bill of Rights, and by the electoral process,
the power of private industry is, in the opinion of many, unchecked and
unresponsive to either its shareholders or to the general public.1
26
There is no denying the increasing degree to which these "govern-
ments" make decisions that gravely affect their "citizens." The safety
of the cars we drive, the quality of the air we breathe - from rela-
tively small details to ultimate issues, the large corporations exercise
great power. Federal and state agencies do exist, and do issue regula-
tions. However, they rely for their data on the very private industry
that they aim to control. It is this reliance which makes the role of the
whistleblower, especially the professional whistleblower, so crucial.
When Ford sought federal certification of its Pinto, it expected Frank
Camp to cooperate in feeding the government manipulated safety-test
results.127 Grace Pierce knew that Ortho's recommendations to the
FDA concerning the loperamide formula would probably be accepted,
and although this situation did not involve falsified reports or any out-
right violation of a regulatory scheme, she perceived herself as the last
line of defense precisely because the FDA relies on data provided by
the pharmaceutical industry.1 28 This fact, and the relatively abyssmal
record of the agency was mentioned by the dissent in Pierce:
124. See Harris, The Politics of Corporate Power, in Corporate Power, supra
note 123; Swanson, Corporations and Electoral Activities: The Legal, Political and
Managerial Implications of PACs, in Private Enterprise, supra note 121, at 355-72.
125. See G.MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra
note 123, at 250, quoting A. BERLE, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLU-
TION 51 (1954).
126. Flynn, Corporate Democracy: Nice Work If You Can Get It, in Corporate
Power, supra note 123, at 99-100; Epstein, Societal, Managerial and Legal Perspec-
tives on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1287 (1979).
127. Whistleblowing, supra note 1, at 122.
128. Id. at 116.
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In apparent ignorance of the past failures of official regulation to
safeguard against pharmaceutical horrors, the majority implies
that the necessity for administrative approval for human testing
eliminates the need for active ethical professionals within the drug
industry. But we do not know whether the United States Food and
Drug Administration would be aware of the safer alternative to the
proposed drug when it would pass upon defendant's application for
the more hazardous formula. The majority professes no such
knowledge . . .This highlights the need for ethically autonomous
professionals within the pharmaceutical industry .... 1'9
Whistleblowing, then, is at present perhaps one of the most effec-
tive ways to encourage large corporations to attend to interests beyond
their own. It would seem important that the common law evolve in a
manner that preserves this mechanism. Instead, the doctrine of employ-
ment-at-will allows employers to retaliate freely against its watchdogs.
According to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, Grace Pierce
was, in effect, claiming that she had a right to veto Ortho's develop-
ment of loperamide because, in her opinion, it was too risky. This
would never do: "[c]haos would result if a single doctor engaged in
research were allowed to determine, according to his or her individual
conscience, whether a project could continue." 130
The cases do not suggest that whistleblowers must be fired in order
to free their bosses to continue whatever practices were disturbing to
the complaining employee. Rather, the firings appear to be in retalia-
tion for disruptive disloyal behavior. Grace Pierce was removed from
therapeutic drug research, and eventually made to feel that she had to
leave Ortho. Meanwhile, the loperamide program went on with replace-
ment personnel. Eventually, however, the company decided not to mar-
ket the formula Dr. Pierce had protested. So, in that case, the objec-
tionable project continued while she was reassigned, and ended after
she was fired.13' In the Edwards case, "parking" continued unimpeded,
129. Pierce, supra note 7, at 519. On the ineffectiveness of state and federal
regulatory schemes to ensure compliance, and the need for whistleblowing, see, e.g., C.
STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 209-
14 (1975); BLOWING THE WHISTLE: DISSENT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST (T. Branch and
C. Peters eds. 1972).
130. Pierce, supra note 7, at 514.
131. Whistleblowing, supra note 1, at 116. In other cases, whistleblowers' sug-
gestions for improvements were followed, and then they were fired. For instance, in
Geary, supra note 105, the product complained about was withdrawn from production,
and then Mr. Geary was discharged. In Adams v. Budd Co., 583 F. Supp. 711 (E.D.
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before and after Mr. Edwards expressed his concern over it to his im-
mediate supervisors and then to Citibank's senior vice president for for-
eign exchange. And he was dismissed in a way that clearly indicated
how slight were the effects: "You drew your gun and you didn't shoot,"
said his boss, "now we're going to shoot you." 32
If whistleblowers were able to exercise ultimate control over their
employers' practices, surely they would not bother blowing the whistle
in the first place. It is far more plausible that they are fired, not be-
cause employers were forced to rid themselves of the offending employ-
ees before they could act as they saw fit, but as punishment for making
waves.
IV. Conclusion
Although private employers must be free to fire employees for a
variety of reasons, because of the above-mentioned characteristics dis-
tinguishing the professional employee from any other kind, they should
be protected by the common law for expressing concern over, not just a
present illegal activity, but a potentially illegal or unethical activity. It
is especially important to empower these employees to respond to be-
havior which is not, strictly speaking, illegal, in the light of the fact
that large private employers represent tremendous concentrations of
power, and in the light of the imperfect record of government agencies
to make drugs, cars, and nuclear power plants safe for the American
public. A cause of action based on the public policy exception to em-
ployment-at-will should be available to those whose professional code of
ethics has prompted them to blow the whistle.
Pa. 1984), a railcar was stripped as per Mr. Adams' suggestion, and then, he was fired
seven months later.
132. See FORTUNE, supra note 113, at 52.
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Amendments to the Florida Condominium Act: A
Proposal
John G. Mac'Kie, II1*
On June 4, 1984, pursuant to the creation of the Florida Mobile
Home Act,' the Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums was
redesignated as the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums,
and Mobile Homes. In drafting the Mobile Home Act, the objective of
the Florida Legislature was to strike a balance between the interests of
the park owners and tenants of the mobile home parks. This legislation,
like its Condominium Act2 predecessor, continues the trend toward
consumer protection in the real property area.
While the original Condominium Act provided only a basic frame-
work for the creation and operation of condominiums, amendments
adopted in the early 1970's began increasingly to detail the rights and
duties of developers and unit owners.3 It has been suggested that the
numerous amendments to the Condominium Act are evidence that the
legislature sought to address problems without a clear understanding of
the concept of condominium ownership.4 The view that the frequent
modifications of the Condominium Act is indicative of the legislature's
inability to effectively deal with condominium problems is unwar-
ranted. Certainly, the Florida Legislature has acted frequently to regu-
late the development and operation of residential condominiums. In do-
ing so through amendments to the Condominium Act, however, the
legislature has responded positively to the pleas of constituents for leg-
islation to establish rights and protections for purchasers, developers,
unit owners, lending institutions, and the associations that are estab-
lished to operate the condominiums. Analysis of the Mobile Home Act
suggests two additional amendments to the Condominium Act be
* J.D., University of Mississippi, 1984; LL.M., University of Miami, 1985; B.A.,
Dickinson College, 1976. Mr. Mac'Kie is currently associated with the firm of Forsyth,
Swaim, & Brugger in Naples, Florida, where he specializes in real estate law.
1. FLA. STAT. § 720 (1983).
2. FLA. STAT. § 718 (1983).
3. FLA. STAT. Chs. 711 et seq. and 718 et seq. (1974 & 1979).
4. Andrews, Governmental Considerations: A Proposed Common Interest Com-
munity Act, FLA. BAR J. 144, 145 (Feb. 1981).
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adopted to better serve the interests of both condominium unit owners
and developers. The first amendment would impose, on those condo-
minium associations that have reserved a right-of-first-refusal, a forty-
five day limit 5 in which to decide whether or not to exercise the pre-
emptive right. The amendment is a necessary response to the judicial
enforcement of right-of-first-refusal provisions that chill sales and re-
move property from commerce by granting condominium associations
unreasonably long periods of time to decide whether or not to
purchase.6 The second amendment would require the Condominium Di-
vision to furnish standardized prospectus forms to developers. This
would facilitate compliance with section 718.504 and curtail the per-
petual findings by the Condominium Division that such filings are defi-
cient, causing costly delays to developers.
Amendment One: 45-Day Limit on the Right-of-First-Refusal
During the century and a half that followed the Norman Con-
quest, the landowner who attempted to convey his property might meet
with opposition from his feudal overlord who objected to the transfer
because the proposed transferee was not a suitable person to perform
the feudal services due for the land.7 The enactment in 1290 of the
Statute of Westminster III, commonly known as Quia Emptores, how-
ever, abolished such restrictions on alienation by providing "[t]hat
from henceforth it shall be lawful to every freeman to sell at his own
pleasure his lands and tenements, or part of them ...This statute
extendeth but only to lands holden in fee simple."8 Since the passage of
Quia Emptores, the right of free and unlimited alienation has been
5. The imposition of a 45-day limit on the time condominium associations have
to decide whether or not to purchase would be in keeping with prior legislative expres-
sions of reasonableness concerning the duration of rights-of-first-refusal. Section
720.110 of the Mobile Home Act provides for a 45-day period during which the mobile
home park tenants, through the Homeowners' Association, have the right to purchase
the park before it can be sold to a third party. Additionally, section 718.612 of the
Condominium Act gives a tenant of an apartment being converted into a condominium
a 45-day period within which to exercise a right-of-first-refusal to purchase the unit in
which he resides.
6. Florida courts have consistently upheld right-of-first-refusal provisions without
regard to the duration of the time period granted the association to make its preemp-
tive election. See infra notes 41-61 and accompanying text.
7. FRATCHER, PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS 1 (1954).
8. BARRINGTON, MAGNA CARTA AND OTHER GREAT CHARTERS OF ENGLAND,
279 (2d ed. 1300).
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recognized as an inherent quality of a fee simple estate.9 Today, how-
ever, some condominium owners in Florida are being deprived of this
right by the judicial enforcement of unreasonable right-of-first-refusal
provisions.
A right-of-first-refusal is a covenant often included in the condo-
minium declaration whereby the association is granted the opportunity
to purchase a unit in the project before it can be sold to a third party.
In order to exercise the right, the association must purchase for the
same price and on the same terms that the owner is willing to accept
from a third party in a bona fide offer. Restraints in the form of a
right-of-first-refusal are being upheld by the Florida courts as a legiti-
mate device for association retention of control over unwanted transfer-
ees. 10 As a consequence, a condominium owner in Florida who wishes
to sell his unit may find his conveyance unduly hindered, not by a feu-
dal overlord, but by the condominium association's right-of-first-refusal
that grants the association an unreasonable time period to decide
whether or not to exercise its preemptive option.
The rule against restraints on alienation is designed to free prop-
erty from unjustifiable encumbrances tending to make it less marketa-
ble."1 The policy against such restraints is based on the belief that re-
straints "remove property from commerce, concentrate wealth,
prejudice creditors, and discourage property improvements. 1 2 Clearly,
a right-of-first-refusal which grants the association an unreasonable pe-
riod of time to decide whether or not to exercise its preemptive option
defeats the rule against restraints on alienation by taking property out
of commerce.13 Where such a right-of-first-refusal exists, both the pro-
spective purchaser and the seller must be prepared to wait until the
association decides whether or not to exercise the option. If the right-
of-first-refusal grants an unreasonably long period of time for the asso-
ciation to decide whether or not to purchase, many prospective buyers
9. See, e.g., In re Estate of Dees, 308 P.2d 90; Christmas v. Winston, 67 S.E. 58.
10. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
11. Parker, Right of First Refusal - Homogeniety in the Condominium, 18
VAND. L. REV. 1810, 1816 (1965).
12. CASNER & LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 1008 (1969).
13. FLA. STAT. § 718.104(5) (1983) provides that the rule against perpetuities
shall not be applied to defeat a right given any person or entity by the declaration for
the purpose of allowing unit owners to retain reasonable control over the use, occu-
pancy, and transfer of condominium units. Thus, preemptions, rights-of-first-refusal,
options, and similar devices are exempted from the rule against perpetuities in the con-
dominium context.
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would not make offers because they would not want to be bound for a
long period of time without an assurance that they would get the prop-
erty.14 Thus there definitely would be a restraint on alienation.
The background for the Florida courts' interpretation of the right-
of-first-refusal clauses as reasonable can be found in cases dealing with
cooperatives. 15 In a New York case in 1886,6 the court upheld the
right of the cooperative association to enjoin the tenant's proposed sub-
lease of his apartment."7 In upholding the injunction because the pro-
posed subletting would violate the cooperative's rules and would result
in "an invasion and demolition of the design of construction,"18 the
court intimated that the cooperative apartment was a special arrange-
ment which should be protected by the law.19 Half a century later, in
68 Beacon Street v. Sohier, ° the Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld
a non-assignability clause in a ninety-nine year proprietary lease of a
stock cooperative. 1 The court reasoned that
[t]he rule against restraints on alienation is not violated because an
inalienable estate was not created. The corporation as owner of the
estate could sell the property at any time and such sale could be
authorized by the written consent of the holders of eighty-seven
and one-half percent of the capital stock.2
During the latter years of the depression, Mrs. Belle Harris as-
signed her ninety-nine year lease and shares of stock in 1158 Fifth Av-
enue, Inc. to Penthouse Properties, Inc.' s Mrs. Harris' cooperative asso-
14. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 68 (1981).
15. A cooperative apartment consists of "[d]welling units in a multi-dwelling
complex in which each owner has an interest in the entire complex and a lease of his
own apartment, though he does not own his apartment as in the case of a condomin-
ium." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 302 (5th ed. 1979). See Ross, Condominiums and
Preemptive Options: The Right of First Refusal, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 585 (1967) for a
general discussion of this line of cases.
16. Barrington Apt. Ass'n. v. Watson, 83 Misc. 114, 98 N.Y.S. 132 (1886).
17. Id. at 548.
18. Id.
19. Id. Even from the beginning a distinction was drawn between the coopera-
tive form of ownership and estates in fee simple.
20. 289 Mass. 354, 194 N.E. 303 (1935).
21. 289 Mass. at 361, 194 N.E. at 306-09.
22. Id. The fact that the entire property could be sold on the authorization of
tenants holding 871/2% of the stock does not address that particular tenant's right of
free alienability.
23. Penthouse Properties, Inc. v. 1158 Fifth Ave., Inc., 256 A.D. 685, 11
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ciation refused to accept the transfer, refused to take rental payments
from the assignee, and sued Mrs. Harris for past-due rent.24 The New
York court stated that while there is a rule against restraining the
transfer of property, in the case of a proprietary lease, "the special
nature of ownership of cooperative apartment houses by tenant owners
requires that they be not included in the general rule"2 5 against such
restraints. The court observed that the special nature of cooperative
ownership extends from the fact that the failure of one tenant to pay
his portion of maintenance charges increases the liability of the other
tenant stockholders.26 Another New York case2" in 1959 upheld a stock
cooperative's refusal to consent to an assignment of stock and the lease,
and implied that the discretion of a cooperative corporation based on
non-discriminatory grounds was not reviewable by the courts.2 8
A case that exemplifies the misguided liberality with which the
courts treat right-of-first-refusal clauses is Gale v. York Center Com-
munity Cooperative, Inc.29 The cooperative in this Illinois case took a
curious form. Characteristically, the cooperative housing association
held legal title to the real estate, and the members were entitled to the
perpetual use and occupancy of their respective dwellings. This cooper-
ative, however, was atypical in that it was not an apartment complex,
but consisted of a subdivision of seventy-two single family homes. The
form of ownership was further distinguishable from the traditional
stock cooperative in that the residents, although members of the coop-
erative association, had obtained their own financing, made their own
mortgage payments, arranged and paid for the insurance on their
homes, and otherwise conducted themselves as the owners of the dwell-
N.Y.S.2d 417 (1939).
24. Id.
25. 254 A.D. 692, 11 N.Y.S.2d 423.
26. Id.
27. Weisner v. 791 Park Ave. Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 426, 160 N.E.2d 720, 190
N.Y.S.2d 70 (1959).
28. 6 N.Y.2d at 434, 160 N.E.2d at 724, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
The statute which prohibits discrimination in co-operatives because of
race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry is not involved in this case.
Absent the application of these statutory standards .... there is no reason
why the owners of the co-operative apartment house could not decide for
themselves with whom they wish to share their elevators, their common
halls and facilities, their stockholders' meetings, their management
problems and responsibilities and their homes. Id.
29. 171 N.E.2d 30 (N.Y. 1960).
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ings they occupied.30 The membership contract provided that when a
member sought to withdraw, the association had twelve months in
which to purchase the membership at any of three prices: 1) the sell-
ing price in the seller's notice to the association; 2) an agreed-on price;
or 3) an impartial appraisal. If the association's right was not exercised
within the twelve-month period, the membership could be sold on the
market, but the association still retained a ninety-day right of redemp-
tion.31 These provisions were challenged as unlawful restraints on alien-
ation, and despite the exceedingly long period of time allowed the asso-
ciation to exercise its option, and even though the association was not a
traditional stock cooperative, the Illinois court upheld the restraint on
transfer. 2 In reaching its decision, the court said:
From the authorities ... examined, it would appear that the cru-
cial inquiry should be directed at the utility of the restraint as com-
pared with the injurious consequences that will flow from its en-
forcement. If accepted social and economic considerations dictate
that a partial restraint is reasonably necessary for their fulfillment,
such a restraint should be sustained. No restraint should be sus-
tained simply because it is limited in time, or the class of persons
excluded is not total, or all modes of alienation are not prohibited.
These qualifications lessen the degree to which restraints violate
general public policy against restraining alienation of property and
should be considered to that extent; but they are not, in themselves,
sufficient to overcome it. In short, the law of property, like other
areas of the law, is not a mathematical science but takes shape at
the direction of social and economic forces in an ever-changing so-
ciety, and decisions should be made to turn on these
considerations."3
Thus, in Gale the court balanced the utility of the restraint with
the injurious consequences that flowed from its enforcement and found
the restrictions to be both reasonably necessary to the continuance of
the cooperative association and not productive of injurious conse-
quences since their effect in keeping "property out of commerce was
entirely problematical."3 4 The court's reasoning is unsound. Clearly,
the restrictions were not necessary to the continuance of the coopera-
30. Id. at 32.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 33.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 34.
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tive association. There was no blanket mortgage on the property. In-
stead, each resident procured his own financing. Consequently, the risk
of foreclosure in Gale was individualized. There was no financial inter-
dependence among the members of the cooperative association, and in
the absence of such financial interdependence, the need for the re-
straint simply was not compelling. Further, the injurious consequences
which can flow from enforcement of such restraints are not problem-
atic; they are very real. A prospective buyer faced the possibility of
waiting a year to purchase, finally doing so, and then having the coop-
erative association exercise its right of redemption ninety days later.
Such a prospect has a chilling effect on sales and works to remove
property from commerce.
The approach taken by Florida courts when asked to rule on the
validity of right-of-first-refusal provisions is similar to that taken by the
Illinois Supreme Court in Gale. The test applied by Florida courts with
respect to restraints on alienation is that of reasonableness.3 5 The valid-
ity or invalidity of a restraint is said to depend upon its long-term effect
on the improvement and marketability of the property.36 In practice,
this test of reasonableness involves a balancing of the interests of com-
munal harmony against the policy favoring free alienation and use of
property. It is apparent that, to date, Florida courts find that maintain-
ing a community that is both socially and financially homogenous is of
paramount importance because the close proximity of condominium liv-
ing presupposes social compatibility among tenants.
The Florida courts refuse to address the reasonableness of the du-
ration of the time period within which condominium associations may
exercise the right-of-first-refusal. 1 Like the Illinois Supreme Court in
Gale, Florida courts fail to distinguish between cases involving stock
cooperatives and those involving the condominium form of ownership.
This distinction is critical in order to properly determine whether a par-
ticular restraint is reasonable or unreasonable. A restriction that is
valid for a cooperative may well be an unreasonable restraint on aliena-
tion when applied to condominium ownership. This is due to the special
nature of the cooperative in that it requires permanence of tenancy,
35. Iglehart v. Phillips, 383 So. 2d 610, 614 (Fla. 1980).
36. Id.
37. See Boyer & Spiegel, Land Use Control: Pre-emptions, Perpetuities and
Similar Restraints, 20 U. MIAMI L. REV. 148, 180 (1965) (discusses why the length of
time during which the preemptionor has to decide should be a factor in determining
reasonableness).
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social compatibility, and financial responsibility for its very existence.3"
The policy dictated by the special nature of the cooperative does
not apply to condominiums. The distinctions that demand disparate
treatment are two-fold. First and foremost, there is no financial inter-
dependence of condominium unit owners as there is in cooperative own-
ership. While cooperatives generally have a blanket mortgage on the
entire project, condominium owners finance their units individually.
Therefore, the need for a financial screening device is not crucial for
condominium associations. The objective of obtaining financial com-
patability may adequately be served by setting a sales price that tends
to discourage "undesirables". Secondly, the condominium unit is exclu-
sively a fee interest rather than a hybrid-type leasehold.39 While the
cooperative member occupies his unit as a mere tenant, the condomin-
ium owner acquires a fee simple interest in the real property. Thus, in
cooperatives, restraints on alienation may be more easily upheld, while
restrictions on the transfer of condominium units demand stricter
scrutiny.
Regarding restraints on the alienation of condominium parcels, the
Florida cases may be broken down into two categories; those involving
restraints on leasing which are quite sensibly upheld as partial re-
straints,40 and those granting a right-of-first-refusal to the interested
condominium association, which warrant closer analysis.
A 1961 decision, Blair v. Kingsley,41 illustrates the lengths to
which Florida courts will go to find that restraints on alienation in the
form of preemptive rights are reasonable. In that case, the plaintiffs
alleged that the restrictive covenant in their deed was an unreasonable
restraint upon alienation in that it allowed the grantor a right-of-first-
refusal to purchase the property for one year, should the property be
38. Parker, supra note 11, at 1819.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Pine Island Condominium "F" Ass'n, Inc. v. Waters, 374 So. 2d
1033 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (not unreasonable for association to withhold ap-
proval where owner in default); Seagate Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Duffy, 330 So. 2d
484 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (leasing restrictions not unlimited and, therefore,
reasonable since owners could change restriction by amending declaration); Kroop v.
Caravella Condominium, Inc., 323 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (amend-
ment to declaration allowing owners to rent units no more than once held not an unrea-
sonable restraint); Holiday Out in America at St. Lucie, Inc. v. Bowes, 285 So. 2d 63
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (rental restriction valid since owners could sell at any
time).
41. 128 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
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offered for sale within twelve years of the deed.42 The plaintiffs alleged
several grounds on which they contended the court could find the re-
straint unreasonable,43 including "that the one year allowed to the de-
fendant for the exercise of this covenant would require ... a very pa-
tient purchaser." '44  The defendant-developer offered several
justifications for inclusion of the covenant, indicating that the plaintiffs
had notice of it at the time of purchase and that many of the other
grantees were in favor of the restriction.45 Further, the developer in-
sisted that he would not have sold the land to the plaintiffs without
inclusion of the covenant in the deed.46 In finding the one-year restraint
to be reasonable, the court stated:
We are favored by the citation of numerous cases and annotations,
including several Florida cases. From our study of both the re-
search books and the decisions, we are convinced that the instant
covenant is valid and should be upheld, whether it be called a pre-
emption ... or an option to repurchase. 47
The court offered no further explanation of its reasoning in up-
holding the restraint. If there was any balancing of interests by the
court, the scale was certainly weighted in favor of the developer in find-
42. Id. at 890. The covenant read in pertinent part:
Grantees herein, by acceptance of this deed, and in consideration of the
sale and conveyance of the herein described property, hereby agree and
covenant with the grantor herein, his heirs or assigns, that in the event
grantees, their heirs or assigns, shall offer for sale the above described
property within a period of 12 years from date, that said grantor, his heirs,
assigns or nominee, shall have the first right of refusal to purchase said
property and shall have a period of one year in which to purchase same.
The purchase price shall be the fair market value, which shall be deter-
mined by the owner of the above described property appointing one ap-
praiser, the grantor herein appointing one appraiser, and the two apprais-
ers appointing a third, and the determination of any two of the three
appraisers shall fix a fair value. Id.
43. Id. The other two rationales offered by the plaintiffs were 1) "that the ap-
praisers' valuation will not reflect those subjective factors which influence prospective
purchasers;" and 2) "that a flexible real estate market could easily change values dur-
ing the same one year period." Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. The defendant further pointed out that he had waived his right every
time a grantee had wanted to sell so far. Id.
47. Id. at 891.
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ing that the restraint was reasonable. The court appeared to give little
weight to the fact that if the plaintiff attempted to sell his property, it
was subject to repurchase by the developer for twelve years.
In Chianese v. Culley48 the plaintiffs contracted to purchase a con-
dominium unit from Culley, who refused to close the transaction be-
cause the condominium association asserted its rights under the decla-
ration. The declaration provided that the association had sixty days
within which to either approve of a proposed purchaser or furnish an-
other purchaser on terms equally favorable to the seller.49 The associa-
tion provided an alternate purchaser as provided in the declaration, but
at that point, Chianese, who had originally contracted to purchase from
Culley, brought this lawsuit, alleging that the covenant in the declara-
tion was an "illegal restraint against alienation of property and that the
defendants were discriminating against the plaintiffs on the basis of
their religion or national origin."' 50 Culley then issued a deed to Chi-
anese, but the condominium association refused to recognize the trans-
48. 397 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
49. Id. at 1346. The declaration provided in pertinent part:
Election of Association. Within sixty (60) days after receipt of such notice,
the Association must approve the transaction or furnish a purchaser or
lessee approved by the Association who will accept terms as favorable to
the seller as the terms stated in the notice. Such purchaser or lessee fur-
nished by the Association may have not less than sixty (60) days subse-
quent to the date of approval within which to close the transaction. The
approval of the Association shall be in recordable form and delivered to
the purchaser or lessee.
Id. at 1345.
50. Id. at 1345. This article is not focusing on the discriminatory aspects of
rights-of-first-refusal but on the purely legal question of reasonableness of the restraint
itself, based primarily on the amount of time allowed for exercise of the right-of-first-
refusal.
For a case considering the possible discriminatory results, see Capital Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Smith, 136 Colo. 265, 316 P.2d 252 (1967). The court there stated:
No matter by what various terms the covenant under consideration may be
classified by astute counsel, it is still a racial restriction in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. That this is so has
been definitely decided by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States. High sounding phrases or outmoded common law terms
cannot alter the effect of the agreement embraced in the instant case.
While the hands may seem to be the hands of Esau to a blind Isaac, the
voice is definitely Jacob's. We cannot give our judicial approval or blessing
to a contract such as is here involved.
Id. at 255.
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action. 51 In deciding whether or not the clause constituted an illegal
restraint on alienation, the court held that the provision granting the
association sixty days either to approve the sale or furnish another pur-
chaser on the same terms was a valid right-of-first-refusal. 52 The court
stated that covenants restricting the use of land are not favored, but
that they will be upheld "if they are confined to lawful purposes, are
within reasonable bounds, and are expressed in clear language. '53 De-
spite this language, the court never addressed the issue of whether or
not the sixty-day duration of the preemptive right was reasonable, but
relied instead on the fact that the case did not involve an absolute re-
straint. Under the court's analysis, the restraint was not absolute be-
cause the property could be sold at the close of the period granted the
association to exercise its preemptive right. Presumably, the provision
would be upheld as a valid right-of-first-refusal regardless of whether
the period was of a duration of sixty days or sixty years. It appears that
in balancing the interests represented by this case, the need for a so-
cially homogenous community weighed heavily, while the policy favor-
ing free alienation of property was essentially ignored.
Watergate Corporation v. Reagan" involved a right-of-first-re-
fusal, not in the condominium context, but with respect to a parcel of
raw land. The case merits note, however, in light of the court's cavalier
sanctioning of the preemptive right that was at issue. In fact, neither
the time the right-of-first-refusal was executed, nor the time of its exer-
cise is ever mentioned in the decision. In ruling that the right-of-first-
refusal did not impose an unlawful restraint upon the free alienation of
the property, the court stated its absurd rationale: "[A]lienability is not
restrained at all, but is in fact enhanced because the seller has two
potential buyers instead of one." 55
The Supreme Court of Florida addressed the question of the rea-
sonableness of the right-of-first-refusal in 1980.56 In that case, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals certified questions to the Florida Supreme
Court to determine the state's law concerning whether a repurchase
option in a deed violated the rule against unreasonable restraints on
51. 397 F. Supp. at 1345.
52. Id. at 1347.
53. Id. at 1346 (citing Zoda v. Zoda, 292 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1974)) (emphasis added).
54. 321 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
55. Id. at 136.
56. Iglehart v. Phillips, 383 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1980).
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alienation.57 The deed in question provided that, should the grantee de-
sire to sell his property, he must offer it to the grantor for the price of
the amount paid by the grantee plus the cost of all permanent improve-
ments on the land. The covenant provided the grantor sixty days to
exercise their option, after which the grantee had the right to sell the
property to other parties. 58 The Florida Supreme Court set forth the
policy underlying the rule against unreasonable restraints, stating that
the rule "is principally concerned with the duration of a restraint on
the property. '59 Incongruously, in the next paragraph of the decision,
the court stated that "[i]t is generally agreed that an option restraint is
reasonable if the option price is at market or appraised value, irrespec-
tive of the duration of the option".60 The court's failure to consider the
duration of the preemptive option flies in the face of the court's stated
rule of reasonableness"' in restraint-on-alienation cases.
The position taken by the Florida courts that the duration of re-
straints is immaterial to their validity is untenable. The stubborn fact is
that where a right-of-first-refusal is granted, alienation cannot take
place until either the preemptionor makes the election to purchase or
the time allotted expires. The more extended the preemption period,
the less likely it is that a purchaser will be willing to be bound for the
period of time during which he is committed, but the condominium
association is not. Such a prospect has a chilling effect on sales and
works to remove property from commerce. Despite this, condominium
associations that have included a right-of-first-refusal in the condomin-
ium declaration are presently under no legislative or judicial time con-
straint whatever to decide whether or not to exercise their preemptive
right. As the cases discussed have shown, provisions granting condo-
57. Id. at 611. The Fifth Circuit also questioned whether the covenant violated
the rule against perpetuities, and whether or not the deed could be rescinded if the
covenant was void. Id.
The Florida legislature settled the perpetuities question with regard to condomini-
ums by statute: FLA. STAT. § 718.104(5) (1983). See supra note 5 and accompanying
text.
58. 383 So. 2d at 611.
59. Id. at 614 (emphasis added).
60. Id. (emphasis added). The court noted several Florida decisions that have so
held: Watergate Corp. v. Reagan, 321 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (see
supra notes 48 & 49 and accompanying text); Blair v. Kingsley, 128 So. 2d 889 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (see supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text); and Wing,
Inc. v. Arnold, 107 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
61. 383 So. 2d at 614.
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minium associations unreasonably long periods of time to purchase are
routinely upheld by the courts. The judicial enforcement of these un-
reasonable right-of-first-refusal provisions amounts to the sanctioning
of illegal restraints on alienation.
In the Mobile Home Act, the Florida legislature provided for a
forty-five day period during which the mobile home park tenants,
through the homeowners' association, have the right to purchase the
park before it can be sold to a third party. While this provision may
have little practical significance for mobile home park tenants, who in
most instances will lack the necessary financial resources to exercise the
right-of-first-refusal, the forty-five day limitation lights the path for a
much needed change in condominium law. Since the judiciary declines
to consider the time period during which the condominium association
may decide whether or not to purchase as a factor in determining
whether alienation has been illegally impeded, it is incumbent on the
legislature to redress the injurious effects of restraints. This could be
accomplished by drafting a provision for the Condominium Act limit-
ing the time which the condominium association has to declare its in-
tention to purchase to forty-five days.
Amendment Two: Standardized Prospectus Form
In 1979, the Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums
conducted an in-house review of deficiency letters sent to developers
and found that approximately ninety percent of the filings made with
the Division were deficient.6 2 The majority of the deficiencies related to
the failure of the developer to provide the information required by the
statute;63 only a small percentage of the deficiencies were substantive in
nature. Most of the deficiencies consisted of failure to include required
caveats, improper budgeting or assessment calculations, confusion re-
garding which version of the Condominium Act is current, and a "fail-
ure to properly assimilate the necessary filing materials and organize
those materials in the fashion required by the rules of the Division.""
Clearly, a problem relating to compliance with the non-substantive fil-
ing requirements of the Condominium Act exists. A solution to this
dilemma exists in standardization of forms delineating the items re-
62. Andrews, Governmental Considerations: A Proposed Common Interest Com-
munity Act, FLA. BAR J. 144, 146 (Feb. 1981).
63. FLA. STAT. § 718.504 (1976).
64. Andrews, supra note 62.
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quired by the Condominium Act for inclusion in the prospectus.
A standardized prospectus form could alleviate the plethora of un-
successful though voluminous attempts by developers to comply with
the "laundry list""5 of items required for inclusion in the prospectus.
Condominium documentation is copious enough - it is not uncommon
for offering plans to run over two hundred pages of single-spaced
type.6" The requirement of extensive disclosure by the Bureau of Con-
dominiums often results in "creative drafting. ' 67 While creative draft-
ing is often the hallmark of a good lawyer, it may cause problems when
the project at hand requires strict adherence to statutory requirements.
Creative drafting of documents often produces lengthy, complex, and
unreadable results.68
There is a call within the Real Property Bar for standardization of
a multitude of documents in the condominium field.69 These attorneys
point out that standardization would simplify the various forms re-
quired by the Condominium Act, such as the declaration and bylaws.
One commentator, in calling for a standardized set of condominium
bylaws, equated them with "the procedural requirements for incorpora-
tion and for creation of the bylaws governing the operation of a corpo-
ration once it is legally created. 170 This writer, however, opposes an
across-the-board standardization of all condominium documents, espe-
cially the standardization of bylaws. The day-to-day workings of a con-
dominium cannot be equated to that of a commercial corporation.
Greater flexibility must be allowed in drafting operating rules for unit
owners. The formulation of bylaws is an area of condominium docu-
mentation that often calls for creative drafting on the part of an exper-
ienced real estate attorney. The prospectus, on the other hand, is
65. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 718.504 (1976): "(b) A description of the condomin-
ium property, including, without limitation:
1. The number of buildings, the number of units in each building, the
number of bathrooms and bedrooms in each unit, and the total number of
units," or
"2. A reference to the location in the disclosure materials of the lease or
other agreements providing for the use of those facilities."
66. Rohan, The "Model Condominium Code" - A Blueprint for Modernizing
Condominium Legislation, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 587, 589 n. 13 (1978).
67. Andrews, supra note 62.
68. One enterprising developer went so far as to provide "a translation ... writ-
ten [in] humanese." See Windjammer of Pensacola Beach File, Bureau of Condomini-
ums, Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums.
69. Andrews, supra note 62.
70. Id.
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strictly statutory in its requirements, and those requirements could best
be met by the Bureau of Condominium furnishing standardized forms
for the prospectus.
A former chief of the Bureau of Condominiums 71 called the "filing
of condominium documents with the Division ... the most complicated
and lengthy"72 of the types of filings required by the Condominium
Act. As evidenced by the Division's review of deficiency letters,7 3 nu-
merous errors in filing are made by developers attempting to comply
with the statutory requirements. In an attempt to identify and elimi-
nate these errors, the processing of the prospectus and other documents
is divided into two phases. Initially, the Bureau reviews the documents
to determine whether they have been submitted in the form prescribed
by section 7D-17.05(1) of the Florida Administrative Code. The Bu-
reau is allowed ten business days to make this determination. If the
documents have not been submitted in proper form, the developer is so
notified, and the documents are not reviewed until corrections are
made. Once submitted in proper form, the documents are examined by
the Condominium Division staff, which has another forty-five days in
which to notify the developer of any deficiencies.7 4 It is evident that the
finding of a deficiency results in substantial delays. These delays be-
come significant in light of the fact that closings on contracts are pro-
hibited until the examination process is completed and notification is
received from the Division. The delays are costly in terms of the addi-
tional legal expenses incurred, but much more significantly, in that fail-
ure to adhere to the project's original timetable may well jeopardize the
developer's financing arrangements by cutting off the flow of down pay-
ments received from prospective unit purchasers.
In order to remedy these costly delays, the developer must have a
clear picture of the procedural requirements of the documents he must
file with the Bureau of Condominiums. The Bureau examines a pro-
spectus in order to ensure it meets the statutory requirements of dis-
closure. The examiner also compares the various documents filed with
the Bureau in order to determine any internal inconsistencies or other
deficiencies. From its examination of multitudes of condominium docu-
71. Faye Mayberry, former chief of the Bureau of Condominiums, is now head
of the Mobile Home Division.
72. Mayberry, Governmental Considerations: The Bureau of Condominiums -
Its Function and Goals, FLA. BAR J. 139, 140 (Feb. 1981).
73. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
74. Mayberry, supra note 72, at 141.
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ments, the Bureau compiled a list of common deficiencies found in a
prospectus, all consisting of failure to make required disclosures:
1. Omission of the estimated completion date in the prospec-
tus or the purchase agreement as required by Section
718.504(4)(b)(3), F.S.
2. Failure to provide a description of facilities to be used in
common with other condominiums as required by Section
718.504(7), F.S. and failure to include use agreements or other
documents related to facilities serving unit owners but not owned
by them.
3. Omission in the prospectus of the identity of the supplier
of utilities and other services, as required by Section 718.504(18),
F.S.
4. Omission in the prospectus of the purchaser closing ex-
penses as required by Section 718.504(2)(1), F.S.
5. Omission in the prospectus of the relevant experience of
the developer and chief operating officer as required by Section
718.504(22), F.S.
6. Failure to provide complete disclosure relating to recrea-
tional facilities as required by Section 718.504(6), especially the
number of people the facility will accommodate.
7. Failure to specify the number of buildings, units in each
building, bathrooms and bedrooms and the total number of units as
required by Section 718.504(4)(b)(1), F.S.
8. Failure to explain the manner in which the apportionment
of common expenses and ownership was determined as required by
Section 718.504(19), F.S.7 1
By virtue of its experience and expertise in examination of the con-
dominium prospectus and other documents, the Bureau of Condomini-
ums clearly has the wherewithal to create a prospectus form that would
avoid these common pitfalls. Again, it is the Mobile Home Act 76 that
lights the legislative path. Section 720.302(7) of that Act requires the
Mobile Home Division to provide a form prospectus which may be pre-
pared and filed by park owners. The form allows the park owners to
adhere to the disclosure requirements of section 720.303 by responding
75. MAYBERRY, AVOIDING PITFALLS IN FILING WITH THE DIVISION (available
upon request from the Bureau of Condominiums, Division of Florida Land Sales and
Condominiums, Tallahassee).
76. FLA. STAT. § 720 (1976).
[Vol. 10
46
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss1/1
Fla. Condominium Act
to questions and requests for specific information to be provided.7 7 A
similar form, provided by the Bureau of Condominiums, could alleviate
the deficiencies in the filing of prospectus requirements for condomin-
ium developers, thereby eliminating delay and waste in the develop-
ment of condominium projects.
Conclusion
It is incumbent on the Florida legislature to act once again to im-
prove the Condominium Act. The solution to the two problem areas
discussed in this article is found in the Mobile Home Act. In that Act,
a forty-five day time limit was placed on the preemptive right of mobile
home park tenants to purchase a park before it can be sold to a third
party. Such a limitation is reasonable in its duration and recommends
itself for adoption into the Condominium Act. In order to protect con-
dominium owners and purchasers, a forty-five day limit, similarly,
should be imposed on the time period that condominium associations
have to decide whether or not to exercise their rights-of-first-refusal.
This limitation would redress the judicial sanctioning of preemptive op-
tions that are unreasonable in duration and chill sales, removing prop-
erty from commerce. Finally, the Mobile Home Act requires that park
owners be provided a form prospectus. An amendment to the Condo-
minium Act should similarly require the Condominium Division to fur-
nish standardized prospectus forms to developers in order to facilitate
compliance with the extensive disclosure requirements of section
718.504 and eliminate costly delays that result from deficient filings.
77. FLA. STAT. § 720.320(7) (1976).
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When Open-Meeting Laws Confront State
Legislatures: How Privacy Survives in the Capitol
I. Introduction
The relationship between Florida legislators and the Tallahassee
press corps deteriorated during the 1981 session as blue-coated guards
stood watch to prevent reporters from entering private meetings dealing
with the state budget." At one point sergeants at arms evicted reporters
from the Speaker of the House's office when reporters refused to leave
a leadership negotiating session.2
Battle lines formed. Legislators wanted privacy to ensure effective
negotiating on the major issues affecting state government. Media in-
terests argued that Florida's liberal open-meeting law3 granted them
access to back-room bargaining sessions, the traditional smoke-filled
rooms where significant political deals often take place.
The outgrowth of the discontent took the form of a suit by thirteen
newspapers seeking declaratory relief that Florida's Legislature cannot
hold secret committee meetings.4 The suit bounced through Florida's
court system for two years before reaching the Florida Supreme Court.
The court declared that the judiciary did not have jurisdiction to inter-
vene in the Legislature's rule-making powers. 5
The case illustrates how friction develops between legislators and
media interests over the meaning of open-meeting laws and court chal-
1. Telephone interview with Larry Lipman, Reporter with the Orlando Sentinel
Tallahassee Bureau from 1978-1984. (Aug. 21, 1985).
2. Telephone interview with John Van Gieson, Bureau Chief of the Orlando Sen-
tinel Tallahassee Bureau from 1969-1983. (Aug. 13, 1985).
3. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011(1) (West 1974 & Supp. 1985). In pertinent part
the Statute reads:
All meetings of any board or commission of any state agency or authority
or of any agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation, or
political subdivision, except as otherwise provided in the Constitution, at
which official acts are to be taken are declared to be public meetings open
to the public at all times, and no resolution, rule, or formal action shall be
considered binding except as taken or made at such meeting.
4. Complaint at 1, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Haben, No. 82-84 (Fla. 2d
Cir. Ct. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Moffitt v. Willis, 459 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1984).
5. Id.
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lenges. Legislators require some opportunity for private give and take.'
Resourceful legislators wishing to skirt open-meeting requirements can
defeat the intent of even the most stringent statute by avoiding diligent
reporters.7 Yet persistent efforts by media or the public can drive legis-
lators to fairly extraordinary measures to achieve private discussions.
"All you accomplish is to drive it into obscure places like a fishing
camp or the board room of some state university," one long-time ob-
server of legislative behavior remarked. "It's a question of where do
you want to have it."8
Open-meeting laws are earning acceptance as a visible part of the
process under which all state legislatures become more open to public
scrutiny.9 But logical limits develop peculiar to each state's open-meet-
ing regime as to just how far the wary adversaries among the political
and journalistic ranks will go.10
This Note examines the history of open-meeting statutes in state
legislatures and explores the impact of the laws on the legislatures.
Leading cases on the subject illustrate a judicial temperament of reluc-
tance to interpose restrictions on legislators who meet secretly. Finally,
the paper isolates factors crucial to establishing a healthy climate in
which the public can gain the greatest benefit from open-meeting laws.
II. Openness and State Legislatures: A Brief Historical
Perspective
The public's ability to attend legislative meetings was not a com-
mon-law right." The Constitutional Convention met privately, a re-
6. Telephone interview with Alan Rosenthal, Director, Rutgers University,
Center for Legislative Research and Service. (Aug. 12, 1985).
7. Telephone interview with Ralph Haben (Aug. 31, 1985). Haben was defen-
dant in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Haben, No. 82-84 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 1982),
rev'd sub nom. Moffitt v. Willis, 459 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1984). Haben said at no time
during his term as speaker did the Florida open-meeting law prevent him from meeting
privately with his lieutenants or Senate counterparts to discuss critical legislation. "We
always found a way," Haben said. "We'd meet late at night, early in the morning.
We'd get it done." See also Wickam, Let the Sun Shine In: Open-Meeting Legislation
Can Be Our Key to Closed Doors in State and Local Government, 68 Nw. U.L. REV.
480 (1973).
8. Telephone interview with Allen Morris, Clerk of the Florida House of Repre-
sentatives. (Aug. 12, 1985).
9. Rosenthal, supra note 6.
10. Palm Beach Post, Apr. 28, 1985, at F7, col. 3.
11. H. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT To KNOW, at 180-2 (AMS Press ed., 1971).
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quirement considered crucial by one political historian. 2 The impetus
for much of the public's right to attend legislative meetings comes from
the various state constitutions."3 These constitutional rights usually al-
low the public to attend legislative sessions,' 4 and leave undefined
whether committee meetings or informal gatherings are subject to pub-
lic purview. The provisions may allow a legislature to call secret ses-
sions for the welfare of the state as it sees fit,' 5 or may specify closed-
meeting exceptions.' 6
The last major phenomenon in the field of open government as
applied to state legislatures and lower levels of government stems from
the passage of open-meeting laws. Developed primarily since the end of
World War II, the wave of sunshine legislation' 7 affords the public ac-
cess to government in nearly every state.' 8
12. J. BRYCE, I THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH, 22 (New ed. 1914).
13. Cross, supra note 11, at 182.
14. Id. at 183.
15. See VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 8.
16. See FLA. CONST. art. 3, § 4(b).
17. Sunshine law is a popular name for open-meeting laws.
18. See e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310 (1984); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-
431.01 (West 1974 & Supp. 1975-84); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2805 (1979); CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 11120 (Deering 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-402 (1973); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21 (West 1969 & Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10004
(1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011 (West 1974 & Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-
14-1 (1982 & Supp. 1985); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 92-3 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 67-
2342 (1980 & Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102 § 42 (Smith-Hurd 1967 & Supp.
1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-3 (Bums Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 21.3
(West 1978 & Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4318 (1984); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 61.810 (1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.5 (West Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 1, § 403 (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41 § 14 (1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 30A, § 11A1/- (West 1979 & 1985); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 15.263
(West 1981 & Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.705 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-41-5 (1972 & Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 610.010 (1979
& Vernons 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-203 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1408
(1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 241.020 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:2 (1978 &
Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-12. (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-15-1.
(1978); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 103 (McKinney 1952 & Supp. 1984-85); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 143-318-10 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-19 (1978); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 121-22 (Page 1984); OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 301 (West 1955 & Supp. 1984-
85); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.630 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 262 (1959 & Purdon
Supp. 1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-46-3 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-60 (1977 &
Supp. 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-25-1 (1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-44-
102 (1980); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 6252-17 (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1985); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 52-4-3 (1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 312 (1972); VA. CODE § 2.1-343
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III. Scope of State Statutes
Many open-meeting laws employ policy statements to create a
philosophical justification for the statute. The statement may recognize
the value of an informed electorate in a functioning democracy, 19 or it
may use more elaborate phraseology to extol how the public delegates
but does not yield their sovereignty to the government decision-mak-
ers.2° That popular theme, that government exists to serve the public,2 '
may also lead to enumerated rights of public participation. The statute
may require that a member of the public need not register to attend a
meeting, shall have opportunity under legislative rules to address the
body and won't face expulsion unless he commits a breach of the
peace.22
The policy statements generally aim at all public agencies that fall
under the ambit of the open-meeting statute. Although they acknowl-
edge the benefits of openness, the statutes allow legislators a variety of
means to negotiate with one another privately. A few statutes exclude
the legislature from the provisions of the open-meeting law. 3 Others
recognize the right of the legislature to create its own procedures and
rules.2 4 This approach short-circuits disputes on the separation-of-pow-
ers issue that has spawned a major portion of open-meeting litigation. 5
One narrowly crafted statute keeps only political party meetings
and legislative rules or sifting committees out of the Sunshine.2 6 Such
limitations, like one that precludes open discussion of possible violations
on disclosure documents signed by legislative members, can become
fairly esoteric.27 Another statute shields impeachment proceedings from
public scrutiny.28 Whatever the laudable motives behind protecting the
(1979 & Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.30.030 (1972 & Supp. 1986); W.
VA. CODE § 6-9A-3. (1979); WIsC. STAT. ANN. § 19.83 (West 1972 & Supp. 1973-
84); WYo. STAT. § 9-11-103. (1977).
19. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4317 (1984).
20. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11120 (Deering 1982).
21. NEV. REv. STAT. § 241.010 (1979).
22. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 15.263 (West 1981 & Supp. 1985).
23. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-15-l.A (1978); WYO. STAT. § 9-11-102(a)(ii)
(1977).
24. HAWAII REv. STAT. § 92-10 (1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4318 (1984);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 309 (West 1955 & Supp. 1984-85).
25. See infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
26. UTAH CODE ANN. § 52-4-2.(2) (1981).
27. VA. STAT. ANN. § 2.1-344.(10) (1979 & Supp. 1985).
28. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4318 (1984).
[Vol. 10
51
: Nova Law Review 10, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1985
Open-meeting Laws
legislative membership in provisions dealing with possible wrongdoings,
such strictures create a dangerous precedent. Open-meeting statutes
are designed by nature to put a spotlight on the people who voluntarily
seek public office. Legislatures should not use those statutes as a tool
for deflecting possible criticism of their conduct.
Legislators gain protection for secret meetings in a number of
states by virtue of party affiliation. Several states exempt party
caucuses from open-meeting requirements. 29 Alaska protects the party
membership meetings which select leadership candidates under a provi-
sion that allows secret votes to organize the legislature.30
Without question, the most extensively used method of allowing
secret meetings is the executive session. In most states, with Florida
and North Dakota as exceptions,31 executive sessions exclude the pub-
lic. 32 Typically the meeting law specifies that the legislature must call
for a closed session during an open meeting and must ratify the secret
decisions in a later open meeting.33 Where the statute requires a public
vote to hold an executive session, the majority may be a simple34 or an
extraordinary majority.35
One group of activities covered by many executive sessions relates
to matters where disclosure of the state's position harms the public in-
terest. One such exception pertains to collective bargaining, allowing
secret discussions over negotiating strategy, while perhaps allowing for
the bargaining sessions to take place in a public forum.36 A number of
states authorize secret meetings discussing pending governmental real
property purchases. 37 A third category relates to personnel decisions.38
A fourth category specifies that a governmental body may meet with
29. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-46-2.(b) (1984).
30. ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310(a) (1976).
31. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.705(1) (West 1984). However, § 471.705(1)(a)
does provide for closed meetings pertaining to labor negotiating strategy; FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 286.011 (West 1974 & Supp. 1985), and N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-19
(1978).
32. See IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-3(5)(f) (Burns Supp. 1983).
33. Iowa CODE ANN. § 21.5.2-3 (West 1978 & Supp. 1985).
34. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § llA1/2 (West 1979 & 1985).
35. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 405.3 (1979). An extraordinary majority
means a 3/5 majority in the Maine statute. The percentage may vary from state to
state, but in any event an extraordinary majority refers to a vote total higher than the
simple 50 percent plus one majority.
36. Id. tit. 1, § 405.6D.
37. IOWA CODE ANN. § 21.5.1.6) (West 1978 & Supp. 1985).
38. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-12b(8) (West 1976).
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counsel to discuss litigation, sometimes even anticipated litigation.39 A
fifth type of covered subject matter deals with private meetings con-
cerning criminal investigations.40 All of these categories express a
sound reservation: Open-meeting laws that purport to aid the public
should not have the opposite effect. Statutes creating these types of ex-
ceptions should contain safeguards for keeping a record of the outcome
of the meetings. Arguably, the most desirable method would provide
the fullest disclosure of the proceedings at a later date when there is no
longer any adverse effect on the public.
Even if the legislature's role in these types of issues remains at the
policy-making level rather than the actual negotiating stage, the events
are matters of public interest. The monetary and emotional components
of these areas of subject matter render them pertinent to a wide cross
section of the public as well as providing grist for innumerable media
reports.
A number of legislatures allow secret meetings out of a sense of
fairness to individuals involved. Typical language may allow private
meetings for the "prevention of needless injury to the reputation of an
individual. '41 The relevant New Hampshire statute provides a safe-
guard against abuse by officials. The law requires that the threatened
reputation be that of a person "other than a member of the body or
agency itself." 42 Many statutes of this type permit the individual to call
for an open meeting.43 Determining whether debate will enhance or
harm a reputation at times requires a level of clairvoyance not usually
available except through hindsight. Thus, executive sessions based on
reputation are an area open to abuse. Despite the wisdom of not wish-
ing to bloody anyone's nose needlessly, matters of personal character
and fitness may be important. Obviously a state would not want to hire
a convicted embezzler to revise its banking laws, and the qualifications
of a consultant to fill that position would be a matter of vital public
interest that should receive public debate.
Exceptions for individuals may be so broad as to allow closed
meetings for "matters of individual privacy. '4 4 Even though that par-
ticular section requires a balancing test that "individual privacy must
39. Id., § 10:4-12b(7).
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.11(15) (1983).
41. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1410(1) (1976).
42. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:311.(c) (1978 & Supp. 1983).
43. Id.
44. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-203(2) (1983).
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clearly exceed the merits of public disclosure,"' 5 potential for abuse
exists. One additional type of individuality exception allows for secret
meetings when a donor requesting anonymity wishes to make a
bequest.4 6
Another group of executive-session grounds applies to specific
boards or commissions and is not likely to pertain extensively to legisla-
tures. A number of states allow for closed meetings covering student
disciplinary matters, 47 parole boards48 and grand juries.4  In earth-
quake-prone California there is even a provision that seeks to prevent
panic from disclosure of alarming predictions of future shocks.50
One unusual approach seeking accommodation between the need
for privacy counterposed to a desire for public awareness arises in Ore-
gon's statute. That law provides reporters access to any executive ses-
sion other than collective bargaining strategy sessions, provided that
legislators may require the reporters not to write about meeting specif-
ics.5 1 While the approach offers opportunity for background informa-
tion, the method contains less than effective means to ensure that the
public learns about the discussion.
Broadly phrased exceptions to open-meeting requirements allow
executive sessions that are in the public interest52 or are in the best
interest of the state.5 3 Catch-all clauses justifying secrecy on national
security grounds exist in California 4 and Washington,5 5 while West
Virginia allows secret meetings in the event of threatened foreign
attack.5 8
Legislatures express concern that incidental contact between mem-
bers does not constitute a sunshine-law violation even if the members
talk shop when they meet. Usually the statutes allow for chance meet-
ings,57 or provide that the law does not apply to legislators attending
45. Id.
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.11(2) (1983).
47. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10004(b)(7) (1984).
48. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-8a. (West 1976).
49. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 6252-17(d) (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1985).
50. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11126(y) (Deering 1982).
51. OR. REV. STAT. § 192.660(3) (1983).
52. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1410(1) (1976).
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.11.(b) (1983).
54. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11126(e) (Deering 1982).
55. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.30.110 (1972 & Supp. 1986).
56. W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-4(1) (1979).
57. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1410(d)(5) (1976).
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conferences where no formal business will take place. 8 Providing this
leeway creates the necessary framework for friendships and the type of
social fabric inherent in a healthy legislative environment. Some states
guard against persons disguising meetings as chance meetings by warn-
ing against using the privilege to circumvent the open-meeting law."
This survey of statutory provisions shows that legislators retain
ample opportunity for private discussion of legislative matters. While
no state embraces all the statutory schemes to allow needed private
conversations, each state does provide avenues for private conversa-
tions. Even in a state such as Florida, where no statutory exceptions
exist,60 legislators still hold extensive conversations on the floors of both
the House and Senate as well as in the "bubble" passageway between
the chambers. 6 1 Phones are available on the rostrum of each chamber,
allowing leadership to deal and compromise during sessions.6 2 Addi-
tionally, legislators may assign their staffs to talk to other members.13
The exceptions show that open-meeting statutes merely provide a
frame inside of which lawmakers can hash out issues privately. No
study exists that examines all the ways legislators can meet secretly."
The situation is so extensive that one observer of legislative behavior
remarked, "The really big decisions are reached off the floors."
5
IV. Case Law Analysis
Commentary directed at Florida's sunshine law6 criticizes the
statute for providing too few private-meeting exceptions.6 7 After its
passage in 1967, the Florida statute quickly gained broad impact in a
series of decisions relating to local school boards and a town council.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, in a case challenging
the authority of a school board to hold private meetings, wasted little
58. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. art. 6252-17, § l(a) (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1985).
59. S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-70.(c) (1977 & Supp. 1984).
60. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011 (West 1974 & Supp. 1985).
61. Telephone interview with Barry Richard, attorney representing media and
legislative interests (Aug. 1, 1985).
62. Van Gieson, supra note 2.
63. Id.
64. Rosenthal, supra note 6.
65. Morris, supra note 8.
66. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011 (West 1974 & Supp. 1985).
67. Sloat, Government in the Sunshine Act: A Danger of Overexposure, 14
HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 620 (1977).
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time in dispensing prior case law which required that only formal meet-
ings be open to the public. 68 The case established that every step in the
decision-making process amounts to an indispensable requisite to for-
mal action within the meaning of the statute.6 9 "Every thought, as well
as every affirmative act . . . is a matter of public concern .... 70
Soon after that decision, the Florida Supreme Court banned an-
other school board's practice of convening privately to discuss personnel
and real estate matters and lawyer-client consultations. 71 "Regardless
of their good intentions, these specified boards and commissions,
through devious ways, should not be allowed to deprive the public of
this inalienable right to be present and to be heard at all deliberations
wherein decisions affecting the public are being made. ' 72
In a third case, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that a zoning
advisory board appointed by a town council must adhere to the provi-
sions of the statute. 3 A purpose of the sunshine law "was to prevent at
non-public meetings the crystallization of secret decisions to a point
just short of ceremonial acceptance." 74 The message to public officials
was clear; when in doubt, keep the meeting open.7
Whether the vigorous interpretations of the open-meeting act ap-
ply to the Florida Legislature remains a matter of conjecture. Ironi-
cally, no written records exist of the committee meetings which dis-
cussed the law and there was little debate on the Senate floor76 that
would suggest whether the Legislature intended to include itself in the
coverage. Although remarks by the bill's sponsor indicate that the leg-
islation included the Senate,7 7 the matter remains unsettled. One cir-
cuit court decided that the Legislature did not intend to include itself.78
68. Turk v. Richard, 47 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1950) (as construed in Times Publish-
ing Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470, 473 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969)).
69. Williams, 222 So. 2d at 473.
70. Id.
71. Board of Pub. Instruction of Broward County v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla.
1969).
72. Id. at 699.
73. Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974).
74. Id. at 477.
75. Id.
76. Kraemer, Exemptions to the Sunshine Law and the Public Records Law:
Have They Impaired Open Government in Florida?, 8 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 265, 267
(1980).
77. 118 Cong. Rec. 26912 (1972).
78. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Defendant, at 8, Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Haben, No. 82-84 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 1982), rev'd sub nom.
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The Senate later tabled a bill that specifically included itself under the
sunshine law.79
Legal sentiment that would include legislative matters under the
law persisted. The Attorney General reported that two or more legisla-
tors could not hold a secret meeting with respect to legislative matters
if they intended to violate the sunshine law.80 A later opinion holding
that the Legislature came under the act reasoned that the act con-
tained substantive matter and went beyond the rule-making powers of
the Legislature.""
Despite the debate whether the law affected the Legislature, it ap-
pears that Florida's lawmakers provided a relatively high degree of ac-
cess to the public - at least through their representatives in the media
- all during the life of the sunshine law.82 In at least one instance a
nationally acclaimed newspaper dispatched a reporter to Tallahassee to
record the Legislature's workings as a model for reform efforts in the
paper's home state.8 3 The situation was so conducive to openness that
at times in 1979 and 1980 during Hyatt Brown's term as Speaker of
the House, reporters had access to the daily morning strategy sessions
between House leaders.8 4
That press paradise did not continue under the leadership of
Speaker Ralph Haben and Senate President W.D. Childers in the term
beginning in 1981. Near the end of the legislative session in May, lead-
ership in both the House and Senate met privately to discuss the im-
portant education, transportation and tax issues vital to the appropria-
tions bill. Reporters were upset at their exclusion from the meetings as
well as decisions to post sergeants at arms to bar entry to Senate meet-
ings.8 5 While the relative openness continued, dissatisfaction mounted.
A group of thirteen newspapers sued Haben and Childers in circuit
court seeking a declaratory judgment whether the Legislature could ex-
clude the public from meetings the newspapers alleged to be committee
Moffitt v. Willis, 459 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1984), citing City of Safety Harbor v. City of
Clearwater, No. 40,269 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. 1974).
79. J. of the [Fla.] Senate 371 (1976).
80. Annual Report of the [Fla.] Att'y Gen. 25 (1972).
81. Annual Report of the [Fla.] Att'y Gen. 17, 20 (1977).
82. Van Gieson, supra note 2.
83. Id.
84. Lipman, supra note 1.
85. Id. Lipman recalls that one "blue-coat" guard stationed at Childers' office
often carried a handgun, further increasing tensions.
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meetings.86 After an initial finding by the circuit court that it had juris-
diction over the matter,8 7 the Florida Supreme Court eventually re-
versed the decision and dismissed the case.88 The verdict did not decide
to whom the law applies.89 Rather the majority relied on the separa-
tion-of-powers doctrine under the Florida Constitution. The Constitu-
tion's grant of power to each chamber to set its own rules9' circum-
scribed the court's authority to intervene in only those cases in which
the constitutionality of legislative enactments was at issue.92 Two dis-
sents, joined variously by three of the seven-member panel, urged juris-
diction on allegations that the meetings violated statutes and the fed-
eral and state constitutions.93
Analysis of pertinent cases testing the applicability of open-meet-
ing laws to legislatures in various states shows the separation-of-powers
argument to be highly convincing. And, as shown in the forthcoming
cases, exceptions for secret meetings provided legislators with addi-
tional weapons sufficient to defeat many allegations that they violated
open-meeting requirements.
In News-Journal Co. v. Boulden,94 a Delaware newspaper sought
injunctive relief under the state open-meeting statute against legislators
belonging to the majority party who caucused privately.95 The chancery
judge found that while the legislature and caucuses fell under the am-
bit of the open-meeting act, the plaintiff, in suing a majority of the
House of Representatives, in effect, sued the House.96 In dismissing the
case, the court ruled that the House had authority to set its own rules
86. Complaint at 1, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Haben, No. 82-84 (Fla. 2d
Cir. Ct. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Moffitt v. Willis, 459 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1984).
87. Moffitt v. Willis, 459 So. 2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 1984).
88. Id. at 1022. H. Lee Moffitt and Curtis Peterson succeeded to the positions of
House Speaker and Senate President, respectively, by the time the Supreme Court ren-
dered its decision on Oct. 18, 1984. They substituted as parties for their predecessors.
89. Id. at 1021.
90. Id. at 1021, 1022; see also FLA. CONST. art. 2, § 3.
91. FLA. CONST., art. 3, § 4(a).
92. Moffitt, 459 So. 2d, at 1021.
93. Id. at 1022, 1023. The newspapers asserted that the legislators violated FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 286.011 and 11.142 (West 1974 & Supp. 1985) and FLA. CONST. art.
1, §§ I and 4; art. 2, § 8; and art. 3, § 4(a) and (b). The newspapers also alleged a
violation of U.S. CONST. amend 1.
94. News-Journal Co. v. Boulden, No. 5406 (Del. Ch. May 24, 1978) (Available
May 24, 1978, on LEXIS, Del. Gen. file).
95. Id.
96. Id.
1985]
58
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss1/1
Nova Law Journal
and govern its own proceedings.97
A former Speaker of the House of Alaska argued that his ouster
by a dissident majority was invalid, in part because the group allegedly
violated that state's notice provisions for open meetings. 8 While finding
the proceedings raucous, the Supreme Court of Alaska found nonjusti-
ciable the question whether the prevailing membership had given rea-
sonable notice under state statute. 99 Not only was the controversy a
matter of internal House organization, but the statute also specifically
exempts organizational meetings from open-meeting requirements.100
A case reaching the opposite conclusion on the separation-of-pow-
ers issue found that the Wisconsin Supreme Court had jurisdiction to
hear a district attorney's allegations seeking declaratory relief when
legislators met privately to discuss state financial matters."' Because
all the members cited by plaintiff belonged to the same political party,
however, the court held that they enjoyed protection for the secret
meetings based on the state exception allowing closed partisan
caucuses.10 2
Justices in the Colorado Supreme Court did not rely on separa-
tion-of-powers arguments in a case alleging that a state Senate com-
mittee chairman failed to list only those bills that his committee might
reasonably expect to discuss on a given day and thus did not supply
proper notice for a public meeting. 0 3 The majority of the court found
the chairman's customary listing of all bills pending before the commit-
tee sufficient to supply notice, adding that, "The Open Meetings Law,
however, was not intended to interfere with the ability of public offi-
cials to perform their duties in a reasonable manner."104
The Colorado Supreme Court later held that legislative caucuses
must take place in the sunshine.'0 5 Although the state Constitution
granted the Legislature the right to set its own rules, the court found
no violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine. 0 6 The per curiam de-
cision noted that the Legislature had adopted the open-meeting law as
97. Id.
98. Malone v. Meekins, 650 P.2d 351 (Alaska 1982).
99. Id. at 359.
100. Id.
101. State ex rel. Lynch v. Conta, 239 N.W.2d 313 (Wis. 1976).
102. Id. at 337.
103. Benson v. McCormick, 578 P.2d 651 (Colo. 1978).
104. Id. at 653.
105. Cole v. State, 673 P.2d 345 (Colo. 1983).
106. Id. at 349.
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its internal rule and had not set any other standards for caucuses.1"7
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided that when legislative
committees discuss policy-making business they are subject to open-
meeting requirements.108 The court found, however, that a complaint
alleging a failure to provide adequate notice for a meeting in which the
committee voted to send the Senate a nomination for membership on
the state Public Utility Commission did not violate that state's open-
meeting statute. 0 9 The vote pertained to an executive nomination
which, the court decided, was an allowable exception as specified in the
statute." 0 Notwithstanding arguments based on separation of powers
or exemptions, legislators have also argued successfully that an open-
meeting statute did not pertain to the legislature.""
V. Toward the Future
Debate over the limits of open-meeting laws as they pertain to
state legislatures appears to be widespread. The question remains as to
the forum and nature of efforts to refine the meanings of the laws. In a
state such as Florida, which has an expansive sunshine law, the opin-
ions vary widely. One aggressive member of the Tallahassee press corps
seeks a court challenge to the present regime under which leadership in
both chambers hold secret strategy sessions. "The newspapers should
just flat sue on the basis of the sunshine law and decide it.""' A for-
mer speaker of the House holds firm convictions that only the meetings
formally required by the Florida Constitution - from committee meet-
ings to daily legislative sessions - should take place in the sunshine.113
In his analysis, informal meetings between leaders may require
privacy. 14
The diversity of opinion suggests that incidents and personalities
may play a major role in refining an understanding of the limits of
Florida's and other states' sunshine laws. During the 1984 Florida leg-
islative session sergeants at arms evicted a small contingent of reporters
107. Id.
108. Consumers Educ. and Protective Ass'n v. Nolan, 368 A.2d 675 (Pa. 1977).
109. Id., at 684.
110. Id.
111. Coggin v. Davey, 211 S.E.2d 708 (Ga. 1985).
112. Telephone interview with Brian Crowley, Tallahassee Bureau Chief of the
Palm Beach Post (Aug. 1, 1985).
113. Haben, supra note 7.
114. Id.
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from a conference room where a handful of legislative leaders prepared
to discuss legislation to control growth in Florida.115 Recognizing the
potential for friction, the Senate President apologized'1 6 and all partici-
pants avoided such confrontations for the remainder of the session."'
Whether that spirit of accommodation continues as the membership of
the Legislature and of the press corps changes remains open to
conjecture.
Past efforts at compromise created a "pool" system whereby one
reporter attends a meeting and shares his notes with other reporters
after the meeting. 1" 8 That system, in place for several sessions, appears
workable. 119 Not only does the news reach the public, but the press
maintains a watchdog role in regard to the Legislature. Still, the sys-
tem has shortcomings. Members of the public cannot attend those
meetings.'2 0 Reporters may eventually tire of a managed news system
that curtails their ability to develop exclusive stories.
A large membership and a broad range of duties make a legisla-
ture a significantly more complex body of government than a local
school board or town council. 2 ' The formalities of the legislative pro-
cess and fights between parties or power blocs add to the difficulty a
legislature has in finishing its business. The whole process requires
strategy, negotiation and notification of other legislators once the lead-
ers reach tentative decisions.
The need for open government, then, may revolve around expedi-
ency. Applying open-meeting laws to each informal meeting may work
against good government.' 22 There are too many meetings to cover, and
mandating public attendance at every informal gathering might ensure
that "the whole process would grind to a halt."'23 That argument leads
to the conclusion that making decisions privately eventually leads to a
better-informed legislature, a legislature that serves the public better.
The counter argument maintains that secret decisions by legislative
leadership lead to a largely uninformed legislature, and that the public
115. Crowley, supra note 112.
116. Palm Beach Post, Apr. 26, 1985, at A12, col. 1.
117. Crowley, supra note 112.
118. Morris, supra note 8.
119. Lipman, supra note 1.
120. Crowley, supra note 112.
121. Van Gieson, supra note 2.
122. Haben, supra note 7.
123. Id.
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suffers as a result.124
Any analysis of legislative secrecy should ask: Is a legislature a
fundamentally different enough creature to justify private discussion
when other governmental bodies don't enjoy that protection? One the-
ory affirming that proposition points to the bicameral nature of nearly
every state legislature. 125 This theory finds an inherent need for privacy
in the give-and-take between the two branches of the legislature.126
While the argument has surface appeal, the concept suffers from two
weaknesses. First, the negotiating process between the two houses
doesn't have essentially different qualities that separate it from debate
in either chamber. Second, the inter-house wrangling constitutes only a
portion of a legislature's work, typically concentrated at the end of the
session. Relatively little of a legislature's work could qualify for special
privacy needs based on those grounds. In the end, the bicameral theory
does not present an independent need for private legislative meetings.
An attempt to reconcile the ideals of open-meeting laws with the
practicalities of legislative life should consider the following proposals:
Legislatures should refrain from those devices that create one standard
of openness for them and another for other governmental units and
agencies. The separation-of-powers doctrine that shields lawmakers
from unwarranted intrusions into the political process suffers from
abuse when legislatures invoke the doctrine attempting to deflect public
scrutiny of the process. Legislatures should eliminate exceptions that
exempt them from sunshine laws. The same fate should await those
exceptions that bless secrecy for legislative party caucuses, rule-making
sessions, impeachment proceedings and the like. Such sessions are vital
to organizing a government and thus engender a significant public
interest.
Second, legislatures should gut overly broad exceptions that allow
secrecy based on the interest of the individual, the public interest or the
security of the state. That type of catch-all clause generates such lati-
tude for secrecy as to leave the remainder of the statute hollow.
Third, legislatures should allow themselves exceptions for secret
meetings in those areas where private discussions can save the public
money and advance state policies. Examples are exceptions to discuss
pending state purchases and personnel decisions. Other needs exist to
allow private discussions of litigation affecting specific state policies,
124. Crowley, supra note 112.
125. All states except Nebraska have bicameral legislatures.
126. Haben, supra note 7.
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strategy sessions for labor negotiations or meetings pursuing criminal
investigations. Common features of this type of exception are: the state
as participant in an adversarial process, a temporary and pending na-
ture of the process, and jeopardy to a narrowly defined public interest
through premature disclosure. Exceptions for this type of proceeding
should contain provisions for disclosure of the substance of the meet-
ings as well as the conclusions reached as soon as practical after the
adversary role ends.
Even in a situation where a state open-meeting law contained a
small number of narrowly crafted exceptions, the primary participants
in the struggle for public access to government decision-making - the
press and the legislature - should realize that legislators will maintain
substantial opportunities for private talks and meetings on sensitive
governmental issues. Even in populous states which have large capitol
press corps, the sheer size of the legislature ensures that most legisla-
tors will have relatively free reign to go about their affairs with little
public scrutiny. Those legislators adroit enough to command highly vis-
ible leadership positions commonly possess sufficient resourcefulness to
hold secret talks when they need to do so. Therefore, legislators should
realize that they can grant meaningful public access to the governing
process while enjoying the opportunities to hold private conferences.
Media interests should focus attention on violations of sunshine
laws and demand access to all non-exempt meetings. They should stress
the need for robust debate of open-meeting issues and confrontations.
They should realize their limitations in manpower suggest their most
valuable weapon may be through their editorial pages, particularly in
states where courts adopt a separation-of-powers philosophy regarding
intervention in open-meeting disputes.
If legislatures and the press vie as champions of sometimes con-
flicting public interests, surely the public can provide leadership in de-
termining how much the nation values open meetings.
During the Vietnam War and Watergate eras, public sentiment
demanded greater scrutiny of the governing process."2 7 The mood of
the population, then, may be the final arbiter in how legislators and the
media interests view open-meeting laws.
VI. Conclusion
Open-meeting laws extend the ability of the public to watch the
127. Consumers Educ. and Protective Ass'n v. Nolan, 368 A.2d at 682-83.
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decision-making process in state legislatures. Just how far that power
extends remains open to debate.
Legislatures retain significant opportunities to meet privately, ei-
ther as a whole, or in smaller groups. Most open-meeting statutes guar-
antee private meeting time, often by allowing for closed executive ses-
sions. Additionally, chance social encounters between legislators seem
beyond the reach of most every open-meeting law.
Court decisions establish further precedent for closed meetings.
Courts may recognize state constitutional rights under the separation-
of-powers doctrine that allow legislatures to create their own rules and
procedures. Courts also may hold that meetings that are under attack
may fall within exceptions written into the pertinent statute.
The volume of litigation regarding sunshine laws and their appli-
cability to state legislatures remains relatively small. Appearances sug-
gest that legislators and media interests find compromises such as pool
reporting systems to abide by the spirit of sunshine laws without resort-
ing to court action. While the compromises can be effective, the long-
term answer to establishing effective sunshine laws include the elimina-
tion of statutory exceptions granting legislatures greater latitude for se-
cret sessions than other governing bodies possess. Legislatures also
should eliminate overly broad exceptions in favor of narrowly crafted
private meetings designed to save the public money and advance spe-
cific state goals. Ultimately, the future of open-meeting laws may rest
with the public rather than their elected representatives or their de
facto media watchdogs.
John Peterson
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Solar Access Rights in Florida: Is There a Right to
Sunlight in the Sunshine State?
I. Introduction
The Florida legislature has declared, "[E]xisting domestic conven-
tional energy resources will not provide sufficient energy to meet the
nation's future needs. ... 1 Therefore, they enacted numerous stat-
utes "to encourage the development of an alternative energy capability
in the form of incident solar energy."'2 Solar energy offers an attractive
alternative to traditional energy resources such as oil, natural gas and
coal because it is environmentally safe and virtually unlimited in
supply.
This article will focus on Florida Statutes Section 704.071, one of
1. FLA. STAT. § 377.705(2)(a) (1983). This realistic appraisal of our nation's fu-
ture energy needs is as valid today as it was ten years ago when the Florida legislature
announced its findings. Traditional energy resources will not last forever, despite their
present availability.
2. Id. Some of the statutes enacted by the Florida legislature to encourage solar
energy use are: FLA. STAT. § 163.04 (1983) (prohibits anti-renewable resources ordi-
nances); FLA. STAT. § 196.012(13)(a) (1983) (tax exemption status for solar energy
collectors); FLA. STAT. § 212.08(7)(p) (1983) (sales tax exemption for solar energy
systems and components); FLA. STAT. § 255.254 (1983) (state-financed and leased
buildings to incorporate the use of solar energy systems); FLA. STAT. § 366.80-366.85
(1983) and FLA. STAT. § 403.519 (1983) (The "Florida Energy Efficiency and Conser-
vation Act" enacted to encourage the development of solar energy plans by public
utilities).
3. FLA. STAT. § 704.07 (1983). This statute only applies to easements which are
obtained to maintain exposure of a solar energy device to sunlight. A solar collection
system is virtually useless without unobstructed access to sunlight. There are approxi-
mately eighty-seven thousand active solar units in use in Florida. This data is provided
by the Governor's Energy Office, State of Florida, 301 Bryant Building, Tallahassee,
Florida 32301; as reported in 1973-1983: Florida Energy Data.
The Governor's Energy Office data explains that an active system circulates a fluid
for heating and cooling purposes. The typical active system is comprised of a collector,
a heat transfer fluid, thermal storage, and a distribution and control system. Active
systems in Florida produced 1.9 trillion BTU of energy in 1983. Estimates for passive
solar applications in which a building's structural design is used to heat, cool or light
its interior are impossible to measure but they are a significant factor in Florida's re-
newable energy scheme. The author offers special thanks to Harold M. Draper, govern-
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the measures taken by the legislature to promote solar energy use in
the Sunshine State. This statute provides landowners with guidelines by
which they can garner solar access easements for solar energy purposes.
Clearly, a solar collection system is virtually useless without access to
sunlight and the legislature's acknowledgment of this fact is laudable.
However, the legislature assumes that potential solar energy users and
adjoining landowners will always be able to negotiate solar access
agreements voluntarily.4 There are no provisions within the statute to
assist a solar energy user if his or her neighbor refuses to negotiate a
solar access easement.
Currently in Florida, absent a contractual or statutory obligation
to the contrary, a landowner does not have a legally enforceable right
to the free flow of light and air across the adjoining land of his neigh-
bor.5 Thus, if an adjoining landowner refuses to negotiate a solar access
easement, a potential solar energy user is without legal recourse.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has taken a unique approach to-
wards resolving this solar access issue. In the landmark decision of
Prah v. Maretti,6 it held that private nuisance law could adequately
balance these opposing interests. Several state legislatures have also ad-
dressed the solar access issue. This article will discuss the various ap-
proaches taken by other jurisdictions, and then suggest how Florida can
best balance the equities in its solar access disputes.
II. The Judicial Approach
A. Early Judicial Approaches
Courts have balanced the rights of solar energy users with the
mental analyst at the Governor's Energy Office, for his assistance in obtaining this
information.
For further data on solar energy systems the reader should contact either: 1) The
Conservation and Renewable Energy Inquiry and Referral Service, toll-free at: 1-800-
523-2929; or 2) The Florida Solar Energy Center, 300 State Road 401, Cape Canav-
eral, Florida 32920.
4. For a discussion of alternative approaches to this issue see supra notes 85-143
and related text.
5. Fountainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357,
359 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959), cert. denied, 117 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 1960). See also
Town of Indialantic v. Nance, 400 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Calusa
Golf, Inc. v. Carlson, 464 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
6. 108 Wis. 2d 223, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982).
[Vol. 10
66
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss1/1
Solar Access in Florida
rights of adjoining landowners for centuries.7 Legally enforceable solar
rights were common in Rome during the second and third centuries
A.D." Many landowners used solar energy as an alternative source of
heat, as well as a source of illumination.' A severe shortage of timber
spawned this development in land-use. 10
Given the Roman community's desire to promote solar energy use,
courts often concluded that a landowner's need for solar access out-
weighed a neighbor's right to build on adjoining property." Some
courts went so far as to make adjoining landowners tear down a new
structure if the structure left his neighbor without a reasonable amount
of sunlight.12
Roman solar access litigation continued until the fall of the em-
pire.13 Centuries later, English courts adopted a similar attitude toward
protecting solar access rights.' 4 The most interesting development in
English solar access law was the emergence of the doctrine of "ancient
lights." 5 Under this doctrine, a landowner could acquire a legally en-
forceable right to solar access even though an express agreement had
not been made with an adjoining landowner.' 6 The party seeking to
establish the solar access right merely had to show that he enjoyed the
benefit of light upon his windows for a required period of time. 7 Origi-
nally, the party seeking to establish the solar access right was required
to show that he enjoyed his use "from time whereof the memory of
man runneth not to the contrary."' Eventually, the prescriptive period
7. Jordan & Perlin, Solar Energy Use and Litigation in Ancient Times, 1 SOLAR
L. REP. 583 (1979).
8. Id. at 594.
9. Id. at 590.
10. Id. at 588.
11. Id. at 593.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 594.
14. See generally Seeley, Comparative Aspects of Access to Sunlight: The
United States, Great Britain, and Japan, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 687 (1980).
15. Ancient lights refers to the English doctrine under which a landowner could
acquire, via uninterrupted use, an easement or right by prescription over adjoining land
for the unobstructed passage of light and air. See Clawson v. Primrose, 4 Del. Ch. 643
(1873) for an interesting and thorough discussion of this doctrine.
16. Id.
17. See generally Seeley, supra note 14 for a discussion of the amount of time
that was required in various periods of English history.
18. See generally Clawson v. Primrose, 4 Del. Ch. 643, 655 (1873); Seeley,
supra note 14 at 690-91.
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was reduced to twenty years.19
The doctrine of ancient lights is still viable in England, although
its applicability appears limited to disputes regarding protection of so-
lar access for illumination only.20 One commentator notes that even if
the prescriptive period in England were shortened to benefit solar col-
lection systems, it is unlikely that this doctrine would produce the de-
sired results.21 Under current English law, the owner of a servient par-
cel 22 can prevent the running of the statute by simply filing notice
under the required registration procedures.13 Therefore, a potential so-
lar energy user in England is well-advised to acquire an express ease-
ment 4 before installing a solar collection system.2 5
B. The American Judicial Approach
1 Ancient Lights Doctrine
Several American courts in early decisions adopted the ancient
lights doctrine when first confronted with right to light cases.2 6 These
courts held that the doctrine was part of the English common law in-
corporated by their individual state constitutions.2 However in 1838,
when the New York Supreme Court rejected the ancient lights doctrine
in Parker v. Foote,28 the majority of U.S. courts soon followed. 29 Even-
19. See generally Seeley, supra note 14 at 694-97.
20. Id. at 698.
21. Id.
22. Servient parcel refers to an estate which is burdened with a servitude for the
benefit or advantage of another estate. The estate which receives the benefit of the
servitude is called the dominant estate. See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1228
(5th ed. 1979).
23. See generally Seeley, supra note 14, at 698.
24. An easement is the right of one or more persons to have use over the prop-
erty of another. Solar access easements are generally described as negative easements
because the owner of the servient estate is prohibited from doing something that would
otherwise be lawful upon his estate. In the solar access context, a servient estate owner
is prohibitted from interrupting the light and air to his neighbor's dominant estate. See
generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 458 (5th ed. 1979).
25. See supra note 3 for a brief explanation of the primary components required
for a solar energy collection system.
26. See, e.g., Clawson v. Primrose, 4 Del. Ch. 643 (1873); Gerber v. Gerbel, 16
Ill. 217 (1854); Story v. Odin, 12 Mass. 157 (1815); Robeson v. Pittenger, 1 N.J. Eq.
57 (1838).
27. See generally Clawson v. Primrose, 4 Del. Ch. 643, 669 (1873).
28. 19 Wend. 309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838).
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tually even those states which had originally accepted the doctrine, re-
pudiated it.30 Delaware, the last state to enforce the doctrine, finally
repudiated it in 1939.31
In Parker v. Foote, the owner of two village lots sold one and kept
the other.32 The purchaser constructed a home on the adjoining prop-
erty line, with windows overlooking the seller's lot. The seller, in the
same year, built an addition within sixteen feet of the purchaser's new
home. Twenty-four years later, the seller erected a store between the
two original structures. New owners of the property originally conveyed
by the seller, brought an action for "stopping the lights." 33
In reviewing the dispute, the trial court judge instructed the jury
that the plaintiffs were entitled to their verdict.34 The judge held that
whether there was or was not a grant in writing as to the windows, 5
the law presumed it from the user, and it could not be rebutted by
proving that no grant had in fact been executed.3 6 The defendant ap-
pealed to the New York Supreme Court, alleging that the jury should
have had an opportunity to determine whether a prescriptive right to
light had been created.37
The appellate court agreed with the defendant. The decision was
reversed on the ground that the question of whether a prescriptive ease-
ment had been created should have gone to the jury.38 In dicta, the
Parker court criticized the doctrine's applicability to the American vi-
sion of unbridled growth.39 Speaking for the majority of the court, Jus-
29. See, e.g., Ward v. Neal, 37 Ala. 500 (1861); Robinson v. Clapp, 65 Conn.
365, 32 A. 939 (1895) (dicta); Keiper v. Klein, 51 Ind. 316 (1875); Lapere v. Luckey,
23 Kan. 534 (1880); Haverstick v. Sipe, 33 Pa. 368 (1859) (dicta); Hubbard v. Town,
33 Vt. 295 (1860).
30. See, e.g., Lynch v. Hill, 24 Del. Ch. 86, 6 A.2d 614 (1939); Guest v. Reyn-
olds, 65 III. 478 (1873) (dicta); Rogers v. Sawin, 76 Mass. (15 Gray) 387 (1860); King
v. Miller, 8 N.J. Eq. 559 (Ch. 1851).
31. Lynch v. Hill, 24 Del. Ch. 86, 6 A.2d 614 (1939).
32. Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838).
33. Id. at 310. "Stopping the lights" refers to the blockage of illumination by one
party against the wishes of another party.
34. Parker, 19 Wend. at 310.
35. See supra note 15 for a discussion of the "ancient lights" doctrine. Under the
doctrine it had to be alleged that the "windows" through which the light came, over-
looked the defendant's property.
36. Parker, 19 Wend. at 310.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 316.
39. Id. at 317.
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tice Bronson declared,
There is, I think, no principle upon which the modern English doc-
trine on the subject of lights can be supported. It is an anomaly in
the law. It may do well enough in England . . . [b]ut it cannot be
applied in the growing cities and villages of this country, without
working the most mischievous consequences. It has never, I think
been deemed a part of our law.40
Numerous courts throughout the United States cited this dicta
from Parker v. Foote, even though the New York court rested its hold-
ing expressly upon its finding that the lower court erred in withholding
a question that should have gone to the jury.41 America's need to pro-
mote growth was superior to the relatively small benefits afforded soci-
ety by the ancient lights doctrine. If the state legislatures were to re-
main silent on the issue, then the courts would deal the ancient lights
doctrine its fatal blow. 42
Since courts throughout the United States have repudiated the an-
cient lights doctrine, it is unlikely that this doctrine will ever assist a
contemporary solar energy user.43 Therefore, a more viable judicial
remedy is in order. The following section will analyze the private nui-
sance doctrine as it applies to the solar access issue.
2. Private Nuisance Doctrine
Twenty-six years ago the Third District Court of Appeal of Flor-
ida decided Fountainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five,
Inc.," in which a plaintiff sought judicial relief under the private nui-
sance maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.43 In Fountainebleau,
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Lynch v. Hill, 24 Del. Ch. 86, 90, 6 A.2d 614, 618 (1939). See also
Gergacz, Solar Energy Law: Easements of Access to Sunlight, 10 N.M. L. REV. 121,
140 n. 65 (1980).
42. Lynch v. Hill, 24 Del. Ch. 86, 6 A.2d 614 (1939).
43. See Pfeiffer, Ancient Lights: Legal Protection of Access to Solar Energy, 68
A.B.A.J. 288, 289 (1982).
44. 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959), cert. denied, 117 So. 2d 842
(Fla. 1960).
45. Id. at 359. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas means use your own property
in such a manner as not to injure that of another. See generally BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 1238 (5th ed. 1979). Note that an analogous property doctrine, cujus est
solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos (to whomsoever the soil belongs, he
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the owner of the Eden Roe, a beachfront hotel, sought to enjoin its
neighbor the Fountainebleau Hotel from building a fourteen story addi-
tion.46 If constructed, the addition would cast a shadow upon the Eden
Roe's cabana, swimming pool and sunbathing areas each winter after-
noon at about two o'clock.47
The Florida court refused to recognize the Eden Roc's right to
unobstructed sunlight.48 The court reasoned that the maxim sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas does not mean that a landowner must never
use his property in such a way as to injure his neighbor.49 Instead, the
maxim only requires that a landowner must use his property so as not
to injure the lawful rights of another.50 Because there was no lawful
right to the free flow of light and air from adjoining land, and because
the Fountainebleau addition would itself be beneficial, 51 the court re-
fused to enjoin construction under private nuisance doctrine.5 2
The Wisconsin Supreme Court severely criticized the
Fountainebleau decision in Prah v. Maretti.53 The Prah majority opin-
ion declared,
We do not find the reasoning of Fountainebleau persuasive.
The court leaped from rejecting an easement by prescription (the
doctrine of ancient lights) and an easement by implication to the
conclusion that there is no right to protection from obstruction of
access to sunlight. The court's statement that a landowner has no
right to light should be the conclusion, not its initial premise. The
court did not explain why an owner's interest in unobstructed light
owns also the sky and to the depths), has been narrowed by U.S. courts. See, e.g.,
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). In Causby, the Supreme Court declared
that this doctrine has no place in our modem world.
46. Fountainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357,
358 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959), cert. denied, 117 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 1960).
47. Id. The Miami Beach city council had failed in an earlier attempt to prevent
the construction of the Fountainebleau addition. The Third District Court of Appeal
held that the council's "emergency" amendment to the city's building code was im-
proper because the council failed to provide notice and a public hearing on the amend-
ment, as required by the Miami Beach Zoning Enabling Act. See City of Miami Beach
v. State ex reL Fountainebleau Hotel Corp., 108 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, Ill So. 2d 437 (Fla. 1959).
48. Fountainebleau, 114 So. 2d at 361.
49. Id. at 360.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 361.
53. 108 Wis. 2d 223, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982).
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should not be protected or in what manner an owner's interest in
unobstructed sunlight differs from an owner's interest in being free
from obtrusive noises or smells or differs from an owner's interest
in unobstructed use of water. The recognition of a per se exception
to private nuisance law may invite unreasonable behavior.54
In Prah v. Maretti, the owner of a solar-heated residence sought to
enjoin his neighbor from constructing a home which would obstruct the
solar energy user's access to sunlight.5 The solar energy user alleged
that the chimney from the proposed structure would cast a shadow
upon the solar collection system, rendering it less efficient and possibly
causing the system to become inoperable.56 The circuit court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant, and the solar energy user
appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.57
The Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that earlier American judi-
cial decisions regarding solar access rights were based on three policy
considerations. 8 First, society vigorously protected the right of land-
owners to use their property as they wished, as long as they did not
cause physical damage to a neighbor.5 9 Second, earlier solar access dis-
putes generally involved only illumination or aesthetic enjoyment mat-
ters, on which society placed little value.60 Third, society's interest in
encouraging land development was significant." In reviewing these
considerations, a majority of the Prah court found them to be
obsolete.6 2
Citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,"3 the court noted that modern
society has increasingly regulated the use of land for the general wel-
fare.64 The Prah court also acknowledged that the development of solar
energy as an alternative energy source has given the solar access issue
54. Id. at 239, 321 N.W.2d at 191 n. 13 (emphasis in original).
55. Id. at 223, 321 N.W.2d at 182.
56. See Prah v. Maretti, No. 80-CV-2399 (Cir. Ct. Wis., Nov. 13, 1980), re-
ported in 2 SOLAR L. REP. 1013, 1014 (1981).
57. Prah, 108 Wis.2d 223, 321 N.W.2d 182.
58. Id. at 235, 321 N.W.2d at 189.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The Euclid decision held that a zoning ordinance which
restricted the location of apartment houses, trades, industries, single-family houses and
other land uses was a valid exercise of the police power.
64. Prah, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 236, 321 N.W.2d 182, 189.
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new significance. 5 Furthermore, the policy favoring unhindered private
development is no longer in harmony with the realities of our society.66
The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that private nuisance law
could equitably balance the needs of a landowner seeking solar access
with an adjoining landowner's right to develop his land.6 7
The court applied the definition of private nuisance found in Sec-
tion 821D of the Second Restatement of Torts which declares that a
private nuisance is "a nontresspassory invasion of another's use and en-
joyment of land."68 The Prah court held that this doctrine could pro-
tect a landowner's private use and enjoyment of a solar energy system.
Therefore, the court concluded that the dispute required further factual
development to determine if the Prah solar energy user should be enti-
tled to judicial relief.69 The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed and
remanded, instructing the trial court to determine: 1) the extent of
harm to the solar energy user; 2) whether the use of solar heat in that
neighborhood is appropriate; 3) the availability of other remedies to the
solar energy user; and 4) the costs to the adjoining landowner of avoid-
ing the harm to the solar energy user.70
It is worth noting, however, that the trial court never had an op-
portunity to decide whether this particular solar energy user would
have prevailed under the Wisconsin Supreme Court's guidelines.7 1 The
Prah lawsuit was dismissed without further costs to either party.7 2 The
lower court took judicial notice that the dispute had continued for over
three years, and that it had become a "substantial burden on each of
these parties. '73 Thus, in an effort to promote harmony between the
litigants and their respective families and neighbors, the court dis-
missed the case and ordered that neither party comment further on the
matter.74
The plaintiff in Prah may himself have failed to secure solar ac-
cess rights from his neighbor under the guidelines established by the
65. Id.
66. Id. at 237, 321 N.W.2d at 190.
67. Id. at 240, 321 N.W.2d at 191.
68. Id. at 231, 321 N.W.2d at 187 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§ 821D (1977)).
69. Id. at 242, 321 N.W.2d at 192.
70. Id.
71. See Prah v. Maretti, No. 80-CV-2399 (Cir. Ct. Wis., Jan. 17, 1984).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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Wisconsin Supreme Court. If the lower court had determined that the
extent of the harm to the plaintiff was minimal, it could have denied
the plaintiff relief.75 The lower court also could have concluded that the
use of solar heat was not appropriate for that neighborhood.7 6 Lastly,
the lower court could have determined that other remedies were availa-
ble to the solar energy user and denied judicial relief on that basis."
Thus, despite its widespread acclaim in the solar access field, 78 the
Prah decision fails to offer a potential solar energy user much of a
guarantee that he or she will successfully garner solar access rights via
private nuisance law. No other jurisdiction has chosen to follow the
Prah court's lead, so its remedies are available only within Wisconsin.
Furthermore, even those Wisconsin decisions which have cited to Prah
have not done so to reaffirm its importance as a solar access landmark
decision. Instead, they merely cite to Prah to reaffirm that under Wis-
consin law, summary judgment requires a court to decide whether a
complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted."
Justice Callow's dissenting opinion in Prah points to further
problems in using the private nuisance doctrine in solar access dis-
putes.8" He notes that under Section 821F of the Second Restatement
of Torts, "[t]here is liability for a nuisance only to those to whom it
causes significant harm, of a kind that would be suffered by a normal
person in the community or by property in normal condition and used
for a normal purpose." '' Justice Callow concludes that the solar energy
user in Prah maintained "an unusually sensitive use"8' 2 and therefore
the defendant's construction of his new residence did not create a cause
75. Prah, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 240, 321 N.W.2d 182, 191. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court states, "Nonetheless we do not determine whether the plaintiff in this case is
entitled to relief."
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Comment, Wisconsin Recognizes the Power of the Sun: Prah v.
Maretti and the Solar Access Act, 1983 Wis. L. R. 1263 (1983); Note, A Private
Nuisance Remedy for Obstruction of Solar Access, 48 Mo. L. REV. 769 (1983); Char-
ter, Wisconsin Supreme Court Sees the Light: Nuisance Remedy Granted for Obstruc-
tion of Solar Access, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 47 (1983).
79. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984). In this
action plaintiff sought recovery for injuries allegedly stemming from her mother's in-
gestion of diethylstilbestrol (DES).
80. 108 Wis. 2d at 243-57, 321 N.W.2d at 193-99 (Callow, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 252, 321 N.W.2d at 197 (Callow, J., dissenting) (referring to RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (1977)).
82. Id.
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of action for nuisance. Thus, even if jurisdictions outside of Wisconsin
were willing to apply private nuisance law to solar access disputes,
courts could easily conclude that the use of a solar collection system
was "an unusually sensitive use" and thereby deny a solar energy user
the right to garner solar access for the collection system.
Justice Callow also raises the issue that perhaps the solar energy
users, themselves, are really the nuisance in many circumstances.
This makes me wonder if we are examining the proper nuisance in
the case before us. In other words, could it be said that the solar
energy user is creating the nuisance when others must conform
their homes to accomodate his use? I note that solar panel glare
may temporarily blind automobile drivers, reflect into adjacent
buildings causing excessive heat, and otherwise irritate neighbors.
Certainly in these instances the solar heating system constitutes the
nuisance.83
Justice Callow's remarks suggest that absent a clear mandate from the
legislature, many courts may find the use of solar collection systems to
be more harmful than beneficial. Furthermore, when examining the
overwhelming rejection of the ancient lights doctrine 84 by United
States courts, it becomes clear that legislative action is necessary if
states wish to promote the use of solar energy as a viable alternative
energy source. Therefore, the remaining sections of this article will fo-
cus on how states which have sought to promote solar energy use have
done so through their legislatures.
III. The Legislative Approach
A. Solar Access as a Property Right: New Mexico and Wyoming
Perhaps the most controversial approach taken by lawmakers to
protect solar access rights for solar energy purposes is that taken by
New Mexico in 1978 and later adopted by Wyoming in 1981.85 The
legislatures of both states have declared that the beneficial use of solar
energy is a "property right."8 6 The statutes define "beneficial use"87 in
83. Id. at 248, 321 N.W.2d at 195, n. 3 (Callow, J., dissenting).
84. See Fountainebleau, 114 So. 2d at 359.
85. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-3-1 to 47-3-5 (1978); Wyo. STAT. §§ 34-22-101
to 34-22-106 (Supp. 1983). See also Note, The Allocation of Sunlight: Solar Rights
and the Prior Appropriation Doctrine, 47 U. COLo. L. REv. 421 (1976).
86. N.M. STAT. ANN §§ 47-3-4 (1978); Wyo. STAT. §§ 34-22-103 (Supp. 1983).
1985]
75
: Nova Law Review 10, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1985
Nova Law Journal
almost identical language.
Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of the
solar right, except as otherwise provided by written contract. If the
amount of solar energy which a solar collector user can beneficially
use varies with the season of the year, then the extent of the solar
right shall vary likewise.""
Each statute also declares that "priority in time shall have the better
right" subject only to the other provisions within the statute 9 Thus, if
a solar energy user establishes a solar collection system on his property,
he is immediately vested with a legally enforceable "solar right." 90
Since "priority in time shall have the better right," a solar user can
prevent an adjoining landowner from obstructing his solar access once
the "solar right" has vested.
Critics have suggested this approach may be unconstitutional.91
Since the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution declares
that: "No person shall be . . .deprived of. . .property, without due
process of the law; nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation," it has been suggested that the "taking" of
an adjoining landowner's "private property" requires "just compensa-
tion."' 92 Proponents of the New Mexico and Wyoming statutes argue,
however, that they do not create an unreasonable regulation or a "tak-
ing" of private property which requires "just compensation. '93 Citing
the United States Supreme Court case of Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
87. N.M. STAT. ANN §§ 47-3-4 (1978); WYo. STAT. §§ 34-22-103 (Supp. 1983).
The New Mexico version of this definition includes the phrase "solar collector user"
rather than Wyoming's "solar user" terminology.
88. N.M. STAT. ANN §§ 47-3-4 (1978). See also WYo. STAT. §§ 34-22-103
(Supp. 1983).
89. N.M. STAT. ANN §§ 47-3-4 (1978); WYO. STAT. §§ 34-22-103 (Supp. 1983).
90. N.M. STAT. ANN §§ 47-3-4 (1978); Wyo. STAT. §§ 34-22-103 (Supp. 1983).
91. See Comment, Access to Sunlight: New Mexico's Solar Rights Act, 19 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 957, 959 (1979); Hillhouse & Hillhouse, New Mexico's Solar Rights
Act: A Cloud over Solar Rights, 1 SOLAR L. REP. 751, 752 (1979); Kerr, New Mex-
ico's Solar Rights Act: The Meaning of the Statute, 1 SOLAR L. REP. 737, 748 (1979);
Comment, Solar Access Rights in Wyoming, 19 LAND & WATER L. REv. 419, 424
(1984); Gergacz, Legal Aspects of Solar Energy: Statutory Approaches for Access to
Sunlight, 10 ENVTL. AFF. 1, 15 (1982).
92. See, e.g., Gergacz, Legal Aspects of Solar Energy: Statutory Approaches for
Access to Sunlight, 10 ENVTL. AFF. 1, 15 (1982).
93. See Comment, Solar Access Rights in Wyoming, 19 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 419, 437 (1984).
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New York City,9 one commentator suggests that in certain circum-
stances the impact upon some adjoining landowners will be more severe
than upon others, but this in and of itself does not mean the statute
effects a "taking. 95
It has also been suggested that since a private individual can ac-
quire the immediate benefit of his neighbor's land, the "taking" which
results is for a "private use" rather than a "public use." 96 The merit of
this position has been subject to criticism because the reduction of each
solar energy user's energy needs arguably benefits the public as a
whole. The more energy the private solar energy users garner from
non-traditional energy sources, the more the public will be able to use
traditional energy sources, such as oil and gas, for other purposes.9 7
In response to criticisms of the New Mexico approach,9 which
fails to restrict the location of the solar collection systems or place limi-
tations on their duration, the Wyoming legislature has modified its "so-
lar right" statute by declaring that: 1) The solar access right is only
effective from 9:00 a.m. until 3:00 p.m. each day;99 2) If the "solar
right" is not applied to a "beneficial use" for a period of five or more
years, it shall be deemed "abandoned and without priority;" 100 and 3)
Solar collection systems must not unreasonably or unnecessarily restrict
the uses of adjoining property; thus no solar right attaches to a solar
collector which would be shaded by a hypothetical ten foot wall on the
property line between the two parcels.101
The New Mexico and Wyoming statutes have clearly acknowl-
94. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The Penn Central decision held that a city could re-
strict development of individual historic landmarks without payment of "just compen-
sation" for the "taking" of private property.
95. See Comment, supra note 93 at 428.
96. See generally Gergacz, supra note 92 at 23.
97. See Comment, supra note 93 at 433. The "public use" clause has been inter-
preted quite broadly by the United States Supreme Court. See Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26 (1954); where an urban renewal plan in Washington, D.C. was held to be a
"public use" even though some of the property taken by eminent domain would eventu-
ally be conveyed to private individuals. See also Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S.
Ct. 2321 (1984); where Hawaii's Land Reform Act was found to satisfy "public use"
requirements notwithstanding the fact that private individuals would ultimately acquire
title to land obtained via eminent domain proceedings.
98. See generally, Gergacz, Legal Aspects of Solar Energy: Statutory Ap-
proaches for Access to Sunlight, 10 ENVTL. AFF. 1, 17 (1982).
99. See Wyo. STAT. §§ 34-22-104 (Supp. 1983).
100. Id.
101. Id.
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edged the value of protecting solar access rights for solar energy pur-
poses. However, most commentators agree that some type of legal chal-
lenge is inevitable. 10 2 It is arguable whether or not a legal challenge to
the New Mexico-Wyoming approach will be successful. It is the au-
thor's opinion that this enthusiastic approach is unconstitutional. Spe-
cifically, the failure of either statute to provide "just compensation" for
the taking of an adjoining landowner's property seems to defy constitu-
tional requirements. Therefore, it may be prudent for Florida and other
state legislatures to refrain from adopting statutes which go to the ex-
tremes that these laws do to promote solar access protection. In the
following sections the focus will be upon statutes which promote solar
access protection in a less controversial manner.
B. California's Solar Shade Control Act
California has taken a unique approach toward promoting solar
access rights for solar energy users. A California statute known as the
California Solar Shade Control Act' 0 declares that in certain instances
the blockage of solar access by a landowner constitutes a public nui-
sance.104 The statute applies only to solar obstruction caused by vegeta-
tion. 105 Furthermore, the statute only applies if the solar energy user's
collector has at least ten percent of its absorption area obstructed. 06
The California Solar Shade Control Act has been criticized be-
cause it requires the district attorney or city attorney to prosecute all
persons guilty of violating the statute's provision.' 0 7 Critics claim that
this system may lead to frivolous complaints and harassment of neigh-
boring landowners since solar energy users must merely submit a com-
plaint to the prosecutor. 08 An adjoining landowner on the other hand
must pay all the costs involved in refuting the complaint. 0 9
Perhaps a more obvious criticism of the statute is its failure to
provide a solar energy user relief if the blockage is caused by some-
102. See supra note 91.
103. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 25980 (Deering Supp. 1985).
104. Id. at § 25983.
105. Id. at § 25980.
106. Id. at § 25982.
107. See Gergacz, Legal Aspects of Solar Energy: Statutory Approaches for
Access to Sunlight, 10 ENVTL. AFF. 1, 25 (1982).
108. Id. at 27-28.
109. Id. at 26-27.
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thing other than vegetation. 110 If an adjoining landowner constructed
an addition to his residence, a solar energy user could not use this stat-
ute to protect the solar access for his system."' The solar energy user
would be forced to negotiate a solar access easement or relocate his
collection system, assuming that this were even feasible." 2 On the one
hand, the adjoining landowner may refuse to negotiate a solar access
easement." 3 Should this happen the California solar energy user is
without recourse." 4 On the other hand, even if the size of the solar
energy user's property is large enough to make relocation of the system
feasible, it is probable that the new location will be less favorable for
solar energy collection since it is likely the user would have placed it in
the most advantageous location when he first set up the unit." 5
The California Solar Shade Control Act declares that the state
intends to encourage "the planting and maintenance of trees and
shrubs to create shading, moderate outdoor temperature, and provide
various economic and aesthetic benefits."" 6 Since Florida is located in
a tropic region where shading can substantially reduce the need for
energy usage for cooling purposes, the Florida legislature should also
seek to promote "shading" rather than solar access in certain circum-
stances."17 At least one federal government study has suggested that
110. Id. at 22.
111. Id.
112. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 801.5 (Deering Supp. 1985). California has enacted
a statute similar to Florida's solar easement statute. The statute merely sets the guide-
lines by which a landowner may obtain a solar access easement which is recordable
with other servitudes upon a particular piece of land. It may not be feasible to negoti-
ate a solar access easement because an adjoining landowner is asking an unreasonable
amount of money for the easement or the adjoining landowner may refuse to negotiate
altogether.
113. Id.
114. There are no provisions in the California statutes for alternative methods of
garnering a solar access easement when a neighbor refuses to negotiate an easement
voluntarily.
115. If the solar energy user used reasonable care when selecting the location for
his solar collection system, it is arguable that he first placed the collector in the most
favorable location rather than a less favorable one. Therefore, the overall efficiency of
the system will likely be affected if the collection system must be moved to a less
favorable location. If no other feasible location is available, a solar energy user may
have to abandon the idea altogether.
116. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 25980 (Deering Supp. 1985).
117. See D. ERLEY & M. JAFFE, SITE PLANNING FOR SOLAR AccEss: A GUIDE-
BOOK FOR RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPERS AND SITE PLANNERS (American Planning Ass'n
1980). This guide and other solar related information is available from The Conserva-
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the promotion of "mature shade trees [in Florida is] .. .more impor-
tant than solar access." 118
Therefore, if an adjoining landowner is using large mature trees to
shade his residence or business, his use of this foilage should be en-
couraged by any new legislation enacted regarding the solar access is-
sue. If, however, an adjoining landowner can not demonstrate a signifi-
cant use of the foilage on his property for shading and cooling
purposes, then the legislature should promote his neighbor's access to
sunlight for solar energy purposes. In the following section the focus
will be upon current statutes which allow a solar energy user to seek
relief when an adjoining landowner refuses to negotiate a solar access
easement.
C. Solar Access Permits: Iowa and Wisconsin
Iowa and Wisconsin have each enacted statutes allowing solar en-
ergy users to seek recourse with administrative review boards when ad-
joining landowners refuse to negotiate solar access easements.,, 9 The
two statutes are distinguishable. Iowa's law provides that the local dis-
trict court will receive and act upon applications for solar access rights
if the local governing body has failed to designate a solar access regula-
tory board. 20 The Wisconsin statute leaves the establishment of a re-
view board to the discretion of the local municipalities.' 2' If the local
governing body does not provide for a solar access review board, then
the potential solar energy user is without recourse.
Each statute defines the various terms associated with the permit
procedure.'22 Thus, the guidelines are easy to understand and apply."21
tion and Renewable Energy Inquiry and Referral Service, call toll-free: 1-800-523-
2929.
118. Id. at 29.
119. IowA CODE ANN. § 564A (West Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.032
(West Supp. 1985). See also Danielson, Iowa: State Passes Unique Solar Access Mea-
sure, 3 SOLAR L. REP. 747 (1982); Wisconsin: State Adopts Novel Solar Access Stat-
ute, 3 SOLAR L. REP. 906 (1982).
120. IOWA CODE ANN. § 564A.3 (West Supp. 1985).
121. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.032(2) (West Supp. 1985).
122. IOWA CODE ANN. § 564A.2 (West Supp. 1985); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 66.032(1) (West Supp. 1985).
123. By contrast FLA. STAT. § 704.07 (Florida's solar easement statute) does not
define any of the solar-related terms within the statute. Arguably, if the solar-related
terms were defined in the statute, the statute would be less ambiguous and more
functional.
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Both statutes try to promote voluntary agreements between adjoining
landowners and solar energy users. The Iowa approach requires the ap-
plicant to declare that he "has done everything reasonable. . . to mini-
mize the impact on the development of . . . [adjoining property]. ' '124
Furthermore, the applicant must state that he has attempted to negoti-
ate a solar access easement with his neighbor.125 The Wisconsin and
Iowa legislatures have each enacted solar easement statutes which pro-
mote the use of voluntary agreements exclusive of the permit system.126
Under these "solar easement" statutes, neighbors are free to negotiate
the terms of a solar access right without administrative intervention. 27
Perhaps the most unique part of the Iowa and Wisconsin statutes
is that each authorizes the solar energy review boards to require an
applicant to pay compensation to the owner of the property over which
the solar access easement will run.128 Arguably, this is an attempt by
the Iowa and Wisconsin legislatures to provide just compensation for
the taking of an adjoining landowner's property as required by the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution. 29 Although the appli-.
cant may incur an additional financial burden because of this provision,
at least the solar energy user has some opportunity to garner solar ac-
cess rights for his solar energy system. If the cost of the easement is
prohibitive, then the potential solar energy user must accept the fact
that a solar energy device is not feasible for his property. If, on the
other hand, the compensation owed to the adjoining landowner is not
prohibitive, then the potential solar energy user has garnered the right
to solar access despite his neighbor's refusal to negotiate.
Compared to the relief available to a Florida landowner who is
unable to negotiate a solar access easement, this approach arguably
124. IOWA COrE ANN. § 564A.4(1)(f) (West Supp. 1985).
125. Id. § 564A.4(1)(h).
126. Id. § 564A.7; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 700.41 (West Supp. 1985).
127. IOWA CODE ANN. § 564A.7 (West Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 700.41
(West Supp. 1985).
128. IowA CODE ANN. § 564A.5(3) (West Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
66.032(5)(b) (West Supp. 1985).
129. See Gergacz, Legal Aspects of Solar Energy: Statutory Approaches for
Access to Sunlight, 10 ENVTL. AFF. 1, 31 (1982); discussing the constitutional issues
involved with Iowa's approach toward protecting solar access rights. The terms just
compensation and taking are used in the context of the United States Constitution's
meaning of them as declared in the fifth amendment: No person shall be. . .. deprived
of. . .property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation.
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represents a vast improvement. Although it may appear that the cost of
securing a solar easement may cause some solar energy users to aban-
don the idea, the real advantage of adopting an approach like Iowa's or
Wisconsin's is that an equitable remedy is available where previously
none existed. 130
The Wisconsin statute has gone further than the Iowa approach to
minimize the "taking" of the adjoining landowner's property by limit-
ing the "collector use period" 13' from 9 a.m. to 3 p.m. daily.'32 The
Iowa statute merely authorizes the solar regulatory board or district
court to modify the solar access easement as they see fit to minimize
the impact upon the adjoining landowner.'33
Both Iowa and Wisconsin allow for the removal of the solar ease-
ment if the solar collection system is not operational within two years
of the recording of the solar access easement.13  A solar access ease-
ment can also be removed if it ceases to be used for more than one year
in Iowa 13 5 or two consecutive years in Wisconsin. 1' 6 The major distinc-
tion between the removal of a solar easement in Iowa and a solar per-
mit in Wisconsin is that in Iowa the adjoining landowner must apply to
the board to have the easement removed. 3 7 In Wisconsin the permit
terminates if the reviewing agency determines that the solar access has
not been in use for two or more years. 38 Thus, in Iowa the burden is
upon the adjoining landowner to come forward and submit a removal
application,'3 9 where an adjoining landowner in Wisconsin is not under
130. Attorney Virginia Poffenberger was co-sponsor of the Iowa solar access leg-
islation. In a telephone interview with Ms. Poffenberger on Aug. 13, 1985, she indi-
cated that one of the primary effects of Iowa's solar access statute was that it en-
couraged voluntary agreements between solar energy users and their neighbors. The
Iowa approach requires solar energy users to make a good faith effort to obtain a vol-
untary agreement with neighbors. Most neighbors prefer to resolve their differences
with solar energy users instead of going through the solar access regulatory board's
review procedure. However, the ability of solar energy users to seek review of the dis-
pute, in and of itself, greatly enhances the ability of solar energy users to obtain solar
access easements from their neighbors.
131. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 66.032(1)(e) (West Supp. 1985).
132. Id.
133. IowA CODE ANN. § 564A.5(1) (West Supp. 1985).
134. Id. § 564A.6 (1); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 66.032(9)(a)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
135. IOwA CODE ANN. § 564A.6(2) (West Supp. 1985).
136. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 66.032(9)(a)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
137. IOWA CODE ANN. § 564A.6 (West Supp. 1985).
138. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.032(9)(a)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
139. IOWA CODE ANN. § 564A.6 (West Supp. 1985).
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such a duty. 40
One shortcoming with Iowa's approach is that the statute requires
a solar access application "to be filed before installation or construction
of the solar collector.' 4 ' Thus, an Iowa landowner who has installed a
solar energy system before securing a solar easement from an adjoining
landowner or the regulatory board, technically would not be eligible to
use the remedies declared in the statute. 42 The Wisconsin statute ex-
pressly allows owners of currently operating solar collectors, as well as
potential solar energy users to apply for permits. 43
The Iowa and Wisconsin legislatures should both be commended
for establishing mechanisms which promote solar energy use, while still
balancing the equities between neighboring landowners. The concluding
section of this article will describe Florida's present solar access statute
and then suggest how Florida legislators might adopt the best features
from the various approaches discussed within this article.
D. Florida's Approach: Improving Florida's Solar Access
Law. 44
In 1976, the Florida legislature enacted the "Solar Energy Stan-
dards Act,"' 45 declaring:
The Legislature recognizes that if present trends continue, Florida
will increase present energy consumption six-fold by the year 2000.
Because of this dramatic increase and because existing domestic
conventional energy resources will not provide sufficient energy to
meet the nation's future needs, new sources of energy must be de-
veloped and applied. One such source, solar energy, has been in
limited use in Florida for 30 years. Applications of incident solar
energy, the use of solar radiation to provide energy for water heat-
ing, space heating, space cooling, and other uses, through suitable
absorbing equipment on or near a residence or commercial struc-
ture, must be extensively expanded. . . . It is the intent of the
Legislature in formulating a sound and balanced energy policy for
140. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.032(9) (West Supp. 1985).
141. IOWA CODE ANN. § 564A.4(1) (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
142. Since Florida has approximately eighty-seven thousand active solar collec-
tion systems, a provision which allows current solar energy users to use the statute
guidelines is therefore recommended. See supra note 3.
143. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.032(3) (West Supp. 1985).
144. FLA. STAT. § 704.07 (1983).
145. FLA. STAT. § 377.705(2)(a) (1983).
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the state to encourage the development of an alternative energy
capability in the form of incident solar energy.""
In keeping with this finding, the legislature enacted Section
704.07147 of the Florida Statutes. This statute sets forth the process by
which solar energy users and adjoining landowners can create legally
enforceable solar easements. Specifically, the statute requires the ease-
ment to be in writing and include an adequate description of the ease-
ment's dimensions.'48 Furthermore, the easement must be properly
recorded.49
Unlike the Iowa or Wisconsin statutes, the Florida approach fails
to set-out definitions of the various terms used within the statute. For
instance, the Iowa statute describes the term "solar collector" as "a
device or structural feature of a building that collects solar energy and
that is part of a system for the collection, storage, and distribution of
solar energy. . . . [A] greenhouse is a solar collector.' 150 Florida, by
its failure to define a "solar collector" leaves solar energy users unsure
if a greenhouse is viewed as a collector under the statute. Thus poten-
tial solar energy users may fail to secure a solar easement for their
greenhouses because they think that the statute is inapplicable.
More importantly, the Florida approach toward protecting solar
access rights for solar energy users fails to offer an alternative when an
adjoining landowner refuses to negotiate a solar access easement. Com-
pared to the Iowa and Wisconsin solar access statutes, Florida's solar
access statute is inadequate. If Florida desires to promote the use of
solar energy in a fair and equitable manner, it should adopt an ap-
proach similar to that used in Iowa and Wisconsin.
If local zoning boards, city councils, county courts or circuit courts
are empowered with a solar regulatory review board status, the adop-
tion of the Iowa-Wisconsin system should not prove too burdensome in
Florida. Furthermore, by delegating the ultimate decisions to the local
officials, this system promotes the use of local expertise in the decision-
making process. This is an important feature of this approach because
northern Florida communities could conceivably have different solar
access needs than southern Florida communities. Specifically, in Flor-
146. Id.
147. FLA. STAT. § 704.07 (1983).
148. Id. § 704.07 (1),(2)(a)-(f).
149. Id. § 704.07 (1); see also FLA. STAT. § 712.05 and FLA. STAT. § 712.06.
150. IOWA CODE ANN. § 564A.2(3) (West 1985).
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ida's southern communities, the need to promote energy efficiency
through the shading of residences may be superior to the need to pro-
mote solar access rights. 151
Florida should adopt the best features of the Iowa and Wisconsin
statutes. The legislature should: 1) set up an administrative agency
which is competent to hear solar access disputes; 2) authorize this
agency to grant a solar energy user a solar access easement or permit,
if the situation warrants doing so; 3) authorize the agency to require an
applicant to pay compensation to an adjoining landowner if the taking
of the easement is such that equity demands that it be paid; 4) estab-
lish guidelines by which a solar easement can be removed for non-use
over two or more years; 5) set out clear definitions of the terms used
within the solar access statute; 6) require the applicant to declare that
he had done everything reasonable to minimize the harm upon an ad-
joining landowner and furthermore that he has tried in good faith to
secure a voluntary agreement with his neighbor; and 7) to minimize the
harm to an adjoining landowner, limit the solar collection period to
those hours when the availability of sunlight is greatest, and the likeli-
hood of shadowing is at a minimum, from nine a.m. to three p.m. daily.
IV. Conclusion
Courts and legislatures have tried for generations to balance the
competitive needs of landowners regarding solar access rights. 152 Con-
temporary needs have brought the solar access issue full cycle. Where
ancient Roman courts once enforced solar access rights for solar energy
purposes, 53 today we must again enforce solar access rights for our
society's growing solar energy needs.154
The courts are a weak ally to the contemporary solar energy user.
Florida's Fountainbleau decision is perhaps the most glaring exam-
ple.1 55 Although this decision involved the right to sunlight for illumi-
nation purposes rather than solar energy purposes, there is nothing to
indicate that absent an express contractual or statutory obligation to
the contrary that solar energy users will receive more favorable treat-
151. See supra note 118.
152. See supra note 7 and text for notes 7-13.
153. Id.
154. See supra notes 144-49 and related text.
155. See supra notes 44-52 and related text.
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ment by Florida courts.156
The ability of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's Prah v. Maretti de-
cision to assist the contemporary solar energy user is also question-
nable. At present, the private nuisance approach adopted by the Prah
court has failed to garner support in courts outside of Wisconsin.
Therefore, non-Wisconsin courts are not obligated to adopt the Prah
approach to solar energy disputes. Furthermore, even if non-Wisconsin
courts chose to apply the private nuisance approach, a solar energy user
does not have the comfort of knowing that another solar energy user
has ever succeeded via this doctrine. In Prah, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court remanded the case to the trial court but the trial court never had
the opportunity to apply the private nuisance approach to the facts of
that dispute.'58 The case was dismissed by the trial court.1 59 Therefore,
it is merely speculative as to whether the Prah solar energy user would
have succeeded even if the guidelines set by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court had been used.16 0
In light of the general reluctance by the courts to assist solar en-
ergy users in their efforts to protect their solar access rights, it is neces-
sary for those legislatures which seek to encourage solar energy use in
their states to enact new laws which allow solar energy users legal re-
course when neighbors refuse to negotiate solar access easements.'
The Iowa, Wisconsin and California legislatures have taken commend-
able approaches toward balancing the rights of solar energy users with
adjoining landowners. 6 2 The Florida legislature should enact a new so-
lar access statute which adopts the best features of these approaches.6 3
Kenneth James Potis
156. See supra note 5 and related text.
157. See supra notes 53-83 and related text.
158. See supra notes 68-79 and related text.
159. See supra notes 72-74 and related text.
160. See supra notes 68-79 and related text.
161. The relunctance of the federal government to continue the use of residen-
tial renewable energy source tax credits, also suggests that state legislatures will have
to take a more active role in the solar energy field, if it is to remain viable. In a Nov.
22, 1985 telephone interview with Stacy Lupton (a legislative aide to Florida's U.S.
Senator, Paula Hawkins), she indicated that federal bills regarding renewable energy
tax credits are unlikely to pass in the near future. See S. 1201, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985); H.R. 1272, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
162. See supra notes 103-143 and related text.
163. The author wishes to thank the Nova Law Library staff and the Nova Law
School faculty for their ready support of this project. I would especially like to ac-
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APPENDIX
Florida Statutes Section 704.07 Solar easements; creation; remedies.
(1) Easements obtained for the purpose of maintaining expo-
sure of a solar energy device shall be created in writing and shall
be subject to being recorded and indexed in the same manner as
any other instrument affecting the title to real property. Solar
easements may be preserved and protected from extinguishment
by the filing of a notice in the form and in accordance with the
provisions set forth in §§ 712.05 and 712.06.
(2) In addition to fulfilling the requirements of law relating
to conveyance of interests in land, the instrument creating the
solar easement shall include:
(a) A description of the properties, servient and dominant.
(b) The vertical and horizontal angles, expressed in degrees,
at which the solar easement extends over the real property sub-
ject to the solar easement.
(c) A description of where the easement falls across the ser-
vient property in relation to existing boundaries and various set-
backs established by the local zoning authority.
(d) The point on the dominant property from where the an-
gles describing the solar easement are to be measured.
(e) Terms or conditions under which the solar easement is
granted or will terminate.
(f) Any provisions for compensation of the owner of the
property benefiting from the solar easement in the event of inter-
ference with the enjoyment of the solar easement or compensa-
tion of the owner of the property subject to the solar easement for
maintaining the solar easement.
(3) No structure under construction on October 1, 1978,
shall be subject to any solar easement recorded pursuant to this
section.
knowledge the interesting classroom discussions by Professor Anthony Chase and Pro-
fessor Ronald B. Brown as the inspiration for this article.
This article is dedicated to the loving memory of my grandfather, James Simpson.
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Iowa Code Annotated Chapter 564A.
Access to solar energy 564A.1. Purpose
It is the purpose of this chapter to facilitate the orderly de-
velopment and use of solar energy by establishing and providing
certain procedures for obtaining access to solar energy.
564A.2. Definitions
As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise
requires:
1. "Solar access easement" means an easement recorded
under section 564A.7, the purpose of which is to provide contin-
ued access to incident sunlight necessary to operate a solar
collector.
2. "Solar energy" means energy emitted from the sun and
collected in the form of heat or light by a solar collector.
3. "Solar collector" means a device or structural feature of a
building that collects solar energy and that is part of a system for
the collection, storage, and distribution of solar energy. For pur-
poses of this chapter, a greenhouse is a solar collector.
4. "Development of property" means construction, landscap-
ing, growth of vegetation, and other alteration of property that
interferes with the operation of a solar collector.
5. "Dominant estate" means that parcel of land to which the
benefits of a solar access easement attach.
6. "Servient estate" means land burdened by a solar access
easement, other than the dominant estate.
7. "Solar access regulatory board" means the board desig-
nated by a city council or county board of supervisors under sec-
tion 564A.3 to receive and act on applications for a solar access
easement or in the absence of a specific designation, the district
court having jurisdiction in the area where the dominant estate is
located. Notwithstanding chapter 602 the jurisdiction of the dis-
trict court established in this subsection may be exercised by dis-
trict associate judges.
564A.3 Designation
The city council or the county board of supervisors may des-
ignate a solar access regulatory board to receive and act on appli-
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cations for a solar access easement. The board designated by the
city council may be a board of adjustment having jurisdiction in
the city, the city council itself, or any board with at least three
members. The board designated by the county board of supervi-
sors may be a board of adjustment having jurisdiction in the
county, the board of supervisors itself, or any other board with at
least three members. The jurisdiction of a board designated by
the city council extends to applications when the dominant estate
is located in the city. The jurisdiction of a board designated by
the county board of supervisors extends to applications when the
dominant estate is located in the county but outside the city lim-
its of a city. In the absence of the designation of a specific board
under this section; the district court having jurisdiction in the
area where the dominant estate is located shall receive and act on
applications submitted under section 564A.4 and to that extent
shall serve as the solar access regulatory board for purposes of
this chapter. Notwithstanding chapter 602 the jurisdiction of the
district court established in this section may be exercised by dis-
trict associate judges.
564A.4 Application for solar access easement
1. An owner of property may apply to the solar access regu-
latory board designated under section 564A.3 for an order grant-
ing a solar access easement. The application must be filed before
installation or construction of the solar collector. The application
shall state the following:
a. A statement of the need for the solar access easement by
the owner of the dominant estate.
b. A legal description of the dominant and servient estates.
c. The name and address of the dominant and servient estate
owners of record.
d. A description of the solar collector to be used.
e. The size and location of the collector, including heights,
its orientation with respect to south, and its slope from the hori-
zontal shown either by drawings or in words.
f. An explanation of how the applicant has done everything
reasonable, taking cost and efficiency into account, to design and
locate the collector in a manner to minimize the impact on devel-
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opment of servient estates.
g. A legal description of the solar access easement which is
sought and a drawing that is a spatial representation of the area
of the servient estate burdened by the easement illustrating the
degrees of the vertical and horizontal angles through which the
easement extends over the burdened property and the points from
which those angles are measured.
h. A statement that the applicant has attempted to volunta-
rily negotiate a solar access easement with the owner of the servi-
ent estate and has been unsuccessful in obtaining the easement
voluntarily.
i. A statement that the space to be burdened by the solar
access easement is not obstructed at the time of filing of the ap-
plication by anything other than vegetation that would shade the
solar collector.
2. Upon receipt of the application the solar access regulatory
board shall determine whether the application is complete and
contains the information required under subsection 1. The board
may return an application for correction of any deficiencies.
Upon acceptance of an application the board shall schedule a
hearing. The board shall cause a copy of the application and a
notice of the hearing to be served upon the owners of the servient
estates in the manner provided for service of original notice and
at least twenty days prior to the date of the hearing. The notice
shall state that the solar access regulatory board will determine
whether and to what extent a solar access easement will be
granted, that the board will determine the compensation that
may be awarded to the servient estate owner if the solar access
easement is granted and that the servient estate owner has the
right to contest the application before the board.
3. The applicant shall pay all costs incurred by the solar ac-
cess regulatory board in copying and mailing the application and
notice.
4. An application for a solar access easement submitted to
the district court acting as the solar access regulatory board
under this chapter is not subject to the small claims procedures
under chapter 631.
[Vol. 10
90
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss1/1
Solar Access in Florida
564A.5 Decision
1. After the hearing on the application, the solar access reg-
ulatory board shall determine whether to issue an order granting
a solar access easement. The board shall grant a solar access
easement if the board finds that there is a need for the solar col-
lector, that the space burdened by the easement was not ob-
structed by anything except vegetation that would shade the solar
collector at the time of filing of the application, that the proposed
location of the collector minimizes the impact of the easement on
the development of the servient estate and that the applicant
tried and failed to negotiate a voluntary easement. However, the
board may refuse to grant a solar access easement upon a finding
that the easement would require the removal of trees that provide
shade or a windbreak to a residence on the servient estate. The
board shall not grant a solar access easement upon a servient es-
tate if the board finds that the owner, at least six months prior to
the filing of the application, has made a substantial financial
commitment to build a structure that will shade the solar collec-
tor. In issuing its order granting the solar access easement, the
board may modify the solar access easement applied for and im-
pose conditions on the location of the solar collector that will
minimize the impact upon the servient estate.
2. The solar access regulatory board shall grant a solar ac-
cess easement only within the area that is within three hundred
feet of the center of the northernmost boundary of the collector
and is south of a line drawn east and west tangent to the north-
ernmost boundary of the collector.
3. The solar access regulatory board shall determine the
amount of compensation that is to be paid to the owners of the
servient estate for the impairment of the right to develop the
property. Compensation shall be based on the difference between
the fair market value of the property prior to and after granting
the solar access easement. The parties shall be notified of the
board's decision within thirty days from the date of the hearing.
The owner of the dominant estate shall have thirty days from the
date of notification of the board's decision to deposit the compen-
sation with the board. Upon receipt of the compensation, the
board shall issue an order granting the solar access easement to
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the owner of the dominant estate and remit the compensation
awarded to the owners of the servient estate. The owner of the
dominant estate may decline to deposit the compensation with
the board, and no order granting the solar access easement shall
then be issued.
4. When the order granting the solar access easement is is-
sued, the owner of the dominant estate shall have it recorded in
the office of the county recorder who shall record the solar access
easement and list the owner of the dominant estate as grantee
and the owner of the servient estate as grantor in the deed index.
The solar access easement after being recorded shall be consid-
ered an easement appurtenant in or on the servient estate.
564A.6. Removal of easement
The owner of a servient estate may apply to the solar access
regulatory board or may petition the district court for an order
removing a solar access easement granted by a solar access regu-
latory board under this chapter under any of the following
conditions:
1. If the solar collector is not installed and made operational
within two years of recording the easement under section 564A.5.
2. If the dominant estate owner ceases to use the solar col-
lector for more than one year.
3. If the solar collector is destroyed or removed and not re-
placed within one year.
The procedure for filing an application with the solar access
regulatory board under this section and for notice and hearings
on the application shall be the same as that prescribed for an
application for granting a solar access easement. An order issued
by the district court or a solar access regulatory board removing
a solar access easement may provide for the return by the servi-
ent estate owner of compensation paid by the dominant estate
owner for the solar access easement after the deduction of rea-
sonable expenses incurred by the servient estate owner in pro-
ceedings for the granting and removal of the easement.
564A.7. Solar access easements
1. Persons, including public bodies, may voluntarily agree to
create a solar access easement. A solar access easement whether
[Vol. 10
92
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss1/1
Solar Access in Florida
obtained voluntarily or pursuant to the order of a solar access
regulatory board is subject to the same recording and conveyance
requirement as other easements.
2. A solar access easement shall be created in writing and
shall include the following:
a. The legal description of the dominant and servient estates.
b. A legal description of the space which must remain unob-
structed expressed in terms of the degrees of the vertical and hor-
izontal angles through which the solar access easement extends
over the burdened property and the points from which these an-
gles are measured.
3. In addition to the items required in subsection 2 the solar
access easement may include, but the contents are not limited to,
the following:
a. Any limitations on the growth of existing and future vege-
tation or the height of buildings or other potential obstructions of
the solar collector.
b. Terms or conditions under which the solar access ease-
ment may be abandoned or terminated.
c. Provisions for compensating the owner of the property
benefiting from the solar access easement in the event of interfer-
ence with the enjoyment of the solar access easement, or for com-
pensating the owner of the property subject to the solar access
easement for maintaining that easement.
564A.8. Restrictive covenants
City councils and county boards of supervisors may include
in ordinances relating to subdivisions a provision prohibiting
deeds for property located in new subdivisions from containing
restrictive covenants that include unreasonable restrictions on the
use of solar collectors.
564A.9. Assistance to local government bodies and the public
The energy policy council shall make available information
and guidelines to assist local government bodies and the public to
understand and use the provisions of this chapter. The informa-
tion and guidelines shall include an application form for a solar
access easement, instructions and aids for preparing and record-
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ing solar access easements and model ordinances that promote
reasonable access to solar energy.
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Caselaw Development
I. Introduction
In 1978, the Florida Legislature enacted section 57.105 of the
Florida Statutes, providing, "The court shall award a reasonable attor-
ney's fee to the prevailing party in any civil action in which the court
finds that there was a complete lack of justiciable issue of either law or
fact raised by the losing party."1 In so doing, it encroached on the
"American rule" that, absent a statute or contractual provision to the
contrary, each party bears the expense of his own legal representation.'
Although there already existed statutes allowing for an award of attor-
ney's fees in several specific areas of law, this was the first time that a
Florida law stretched across the range of civil litigation, so as to poten-
tially allow a recovery of fees in any lawsuit, if a party assumes a posi-
tion determined by the judge to be groundless.3
Even as the proposal was being debated in the legislature, it was
recognized that such a law must apply narrowly, lest it have a "chilling
effect" on potential litigants and, in effect, deny access to the courts to
those without the means to gamble whether a trial judge might disa-
gree with their assessment of the worthiness of their claims and allow a
potentially devastating award of fees to the other party. As originally
proposed, the language "no genuine issues of law or material fact in
dispute" lent itself to an interpretation justifying an award of fees in
any case subject to a motion for summary judgment. After substantial
debate, the legislature tightened up the language to allay those con-
cerns expressed. What remains, then, is a statute which was designed
to be of limited application, restricted to cases where litigants abuse
their opponents and the courts by pressing palpably baseless claims, or
interposing groundless or dilatory defenses.
It is not the purpose of this article to trace the background of the
1. FLA. STAT. § 57.105 (1979).
2. Note, Attorney's Fees: Florida Statute 57.105, 5 NOVA L.J. 89 (1980).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 90-95.
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enactment of section 57.105 or to provide a comparison of Florida's
statute with those in other states;5 rather, the intent here is to trace the
development of the caselaw which has emanated from section 57.105,
showing how the courts have limited its applicability, and providing a
practical analysis of how it is applied in specific situations, including
apparent conflicts in existing precedent among the various district
courts of appeal. In short, although the original purpose of the statute
may have been to eliminate needless litigation, almost two hundred ref-
erences to section 57.105 have found their way into recorded decisions,
and these go far to flesh out the bare bones of its text: This article will
provide a more-complete portrait of its present effect.
II. Preliminary Matters
"The court shall award. . . to the prevailing party ...in any civil
action .... .
Before delving into the specific circumstances which call for an
award of attorney's fees under section 57.105, brief consideration
should be given to the following basic questions: (1) Which courts are
authorized to make such an award?; (2) Is the authority to make such
an award merely an extension of the courts' discretionary power?; (3)
To whom is suchan award authorized?; and (4) To what actions does
it apply?
The answer to the first inquiry, "Which courts are authorized to
make such an award?," is fairly straightforward: Any court operating
under the laws of Florida may, under appropriate circumstances, grant
attorney's fees to the prevailing party.
As the trial court of general jurisdiction, the circuit court has this
authority, as was to have been expected, and this was recognized in the
very first appellate decision concerning the statute.' Further, precedent
allows a grant of fees by the county court.7 Similarly, several decisions
recognize the authority of the district courts of appeal to
award-again, under the appropriate circumstances - fees to parties
5. This was already admirably accomplished in these pages in the 1980 article
cited in note 2, supra.
6. MacBain v. Bowling, 374 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
7. See, e.g., Don Mowery, Inc., v. Hill, 453 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (also noting that grant or denial of fees in county court is appealable to circuit
court); Summit Group, Inc., v. Consultants to Indus., Inc., 4 Fla. Supp. 2d 106 (11th
Cir. Ct., App. Div., 1982).
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who have been subjected to unjustified appeals.8 Although this power
has not yet been exercised, not only it is logical that the Supreme
Court of Florida should also have this prerogative, but, indeed, this
court has at least twice considered grants of fees, but refused them, as
circumstances were not proper."
Somewhat less obvious is that federal courts sitting in Florida also
have authority under section 57.105 to award fees to prevailing parties.
It should be noted that this authority is in addition to the federal
courts' general authority to award attorney's fees in cases of "bad
faith," a basis not recognized by the courts of Florida.10 Consequently,
awards of fees have been held proper in diversity actions and cases of
bankruptcy,1" although the propriety of such awards in admiralty cases
has been questioned.12 Even though the issue has not presented itself in
a "federal question" action, application of the statute in such circum-
stances would not appear appropriate, since the Florida venue would be
basically adventitious, so that federal courts hearing cases under fed-
eral law should confine themselves to remedies available under their
own law.13
It might be asked whether courts of other states are empowered to
apply section 57.105 in actions arising in Florida, but momentary re-
flection reveals that the gist of the statute is misconduct in the course
of litigation; since, as postulated, the litigation would be taking place
8. See, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Gelfand, 477 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Pollock v. Morton, 455 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984);
Hodge v. Department of Professional Regulation, 432 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1983); Cicenia v. Mitey Mite Race Tracks, Inc., 415 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1982); Ferguson v. Estate of Ferguson, 410 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1982).
9. See, e.g., Williams v. 51 Island Way Condominium Ass'n, 476 So. 2d 676
(Fla. 1985); Continental Cigar Corp. v. Edelman & Co., 411 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1981)
(each declining discretionary jurisdiction and refusing to grant fees-as reported in
LEXIS, States, Fla file).
10. Perkins State Bank v. Connolly, 632 F.2d 1306, 1311 (5th Cir. 1980); De-
partment of Revenue v. Arga Co., 420 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
11. Interstate Pipe Maintenance, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir.
1985); Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1983); see Perkins
State Bank, 632 F.2d at 1314 (diversity actions); In re North American Mktg. Corp.,
24 Bankr. 16 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
12. Philip Morris v. American Shipping Co., 748 F.2d 563 (11th Cir. 1984).
13. See Avey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc., 758 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir.
1985) (while affirming complete denial of attorney's fees, considering grounds for fees
under Sherman Antitrust Act separately from § 57.105 as related to state antitrust
portion).
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elsewhere, recourse to the statute would, a priori, be improper.
As to the second inquiry, it is clear that the statute does not
merely add to the court's discretionary authority, such as that allowed
under the Rules of Civil Procedure in disputes over discovery. 14 Rather,
once appropriate grounds have been found, a grant of attorney's fees is
not merely discretionary, but mandatory, 15 although it appears still in
conflict whether this may be sua sponte or whether the prevailing party
must affirmatively move for an award of fees. 6
Next arises the question of who, indeed, is a "prevailing party,"
one entitled to seek fees from the opposition. There are few cases di-
rectly on point decided under the statute. Generally, courts have held
that there must have been an actual judicial determination of the case
on the merits, either by judgment or by order:17 A favorable settlement
does not qualify. 8 Aside from these fundamentals, one must look for
guidance to principles applied in similar areas.
First, the victory must be total: A mere denial of a foreclosure of a
14. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.380(a)(4). See Village of Palm Springs v. Retirement
Builders, Inc., 396 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (district court quotes with
approval and at length trial court's comparison of discretionary power to grant fees
under utilities litigation statute with, among others, mandatory grant under § 57.105).
15. Debra, Inc., v. Orange County, 445 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1984)("Once the determination has been made by the trial court that there is a com-
plete absence of a justiciable issue of law or fact, the award of attorney's fees to the
prevailing party who properly moves for such fees is required." Id. at 405.); Wright v.
Acierno, 437 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (even when award constitutes a
windfall, as public officials were provided defense by city).
16. Compare Debra, 445 So. 2d at 405 ("prevailing party who properly moves
for such fees"), with Smyth v. Smyth, 417 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(appeals court granting fees sua sponte). Also, compare Autorico, Inc., v. Government
Employees Ins. Co., 398 So. 2d 485, 486 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (may grant fees
"so long as a motion requesting such fees is filed at the conclusion of the litigation and
is thereafter heard by the trial court upon proper notice"), with O'Brien v. Brickell
Townhouse, Inc., 457 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984) ("There is no require-
ment that a trial court must take evidence to determine whether a matter is frivolous, it
may do it on the record alone." Id. at 1123.).
17. Outdoor Concerts, Inc., v. Friedman, 438 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Steinhardt v. Seals, 412 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982). In Simmons
v. Schimmel, 476 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985), the court indicated that a
voluntary dismissal without prejudice, taken just before trial, was not sufficient to pro-
vide such an adjudication; there, the suit could have been refiled, whereas a second
voluntary dismissal would have operated as an adjudication on the merits.
18. See Steinhardt v. Eastern Shores White House Assn., 413 So. 2d 785 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) ("In order that there be a prevailing party, there must neces-
sarily be a disposition of the case or controversy as by judgment or order." Id. at 786.).
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mechanic's lien is not enough when a judgment at law is still ob-
tained.1 9 On the other hand, an award of fees is proper, even though a
defendant, successful in the original action, still has an unrelated coun-
terclaim outstanding.20
Since the courts have frequently taken note of the fact that section
57.105 was enacted as an adjunct to code provisions relating to the
awarding of costs, 21 general principles defining a "prevailing party" for
the purpose of receiving costs should also apply. So, looking beyond
precedent specifically relating to section 57.105, victory in what was
merely a preliminary skirmish, with the ultimate decision having the
opposite effect, should not, for instance, entitle one to a grant of fees.22
Finally, in this preliminary consideration, is the question of what
manner of actions are subject to section 57.105. That the statute, in its
very words, is confined to "civil actions" should have been simple
enough, but the Fourth District Court of Appeal first stumbled, al-
lowing fees under section 57.105 in a case involving a criminal appeal,
then recovered, noting that this was clearly improper.23 Otherwise, its
application has run the gamut of civil litigation, including cases based
on specific performance, 24 declaratory judgment,25 probate,28 domestic
relations,27 civil contempt, 28 replevin,29 ejectment,30 paternity, 1 and un-
19. Midway Shopping Mall, Inc., v. Airtech Air Conditioning, Inc., 253 So. 2d
900 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (Decided under § 713.29, FLA. STAT. (1969), this
case allows fees to the prevailing party in a mechanic's lien suit.).
20. See McKelvey v. Kismet, Inc., 430 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(actually decided under contract, but, as noted by dissent, "For purpose of this analysis
it would make no difference whether the attorney's fee entitlement emanates from stat-
ute or contract." Id. at 923 n.4.).
21. E.g., Allen v. Estate of Dutton, 384 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1980).
22. Kirou v. Oceanside Plaza Condominium Assn., 425 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1983).
23. State v. LoChiatto, 381 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979). Applica-
tion of the statute was, however, discussed, although rejected under the facts, in an
action for a civil forfeiture. In re Forfeiture of a 1978 Green Datsun pickup truck, 475
So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 2d. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
24. E.g., Hernandez v. Leiva, 391 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
25. E.g., Klein v. Layne, Inc., 453 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
26. E.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 468 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
27. E.g., Salyers v. Good, 443 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Cannon
v. Morris, 407 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
28. E.g., Columbo v. Legendre, 397 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
City of Miami v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 380 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1980).
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fair competition,3 2 as well as garden-variety tort33 and contract34
claims.
Although it is to be hoped that this additional observation is of
only academic interest at this late date, it should also be noted that the
statute has been held to have created a substantive right, so its effect is
prospective only, not retroactive.3 5
III. The Standard to be Applied
" . a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either fact or
law. . . ."
It must first be emphatically stated that merely losing is not
enough to subject a party to the peril of being assessed attorney's fees
under section 57.105. This is true, although he defaulted, 3  although
29. E.g., Friedman v. Backman, 453 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984);
Wolf v. Buchman, 425 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
30. E.g., Gordon v. Bartlett, 452 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
31. E.g., Florida Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Cisneros, 446 So. 2d 727
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
32. E.g., Castaway Lounge of Bay County, Inc., v. Reid, 411 So. 2d 282 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
33. E.g., Wall v. Department of Transp., 455 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (alleged improper traffic signal); Cohen v. General Motors Corp., 444 So. 2d
1170 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (products liability); Russell v. State, 417 So. 2d
1119 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (wrongful death against state for not detaining
decedent's husband). But not for actions before previous medical mediation panels,
Morgan v. Boca Raton Community Hosp., Inc., 49 Fla. Supp. 46 (15th Cir. Ct. 1979),
and grounds not found in paternity action, Florida Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v.
Cisneros, 446 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984) ("good faith" reliance on
mother's statement).
34. E.g., American Glass Indus., Inc., v. Allstate Ins. Co., 441 So. 2d 672 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Quinlivan v. United Business Invs., 420 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1982). Including third-party actions, see Angora Enters. v. Condomin-
ium Assn. of Lakeside Village, Inc., 432 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983), and
non-meritorious counterclaims arising from the same contract sued on, Williams v.
Steward, 424 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
35. Guthartz v. Lewis, 408 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Porteous v.
Fowler, 394 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Love v. Jacobson, 390 So. 2d
782 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (only applies to actions commenced after effective
date of statute).
36. Fritillary Holdings, Inc., v. Pat & Mae's Danceland Club, 443 So. 2d 506
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Sachs v. Hoglund, 397 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1981). But see Castaway Lounge, 441 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(persistent refusal to respond to orders in unfair competition case held sufficient to
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his case may have been dismissed, either voluntarily or involuntarily,3 7
although he lost on a motion for summary judgment,38 although the
other party was granted a directed verdict (even if the judge had previ-
ously warned of the possibility),3 9 or, for that matter, although he
failed to bear his burden of proof at trial.4 0 Again, simply stated, mere
losing is not enough.
Some early cases suggested a broad application of the statute,41
but the Fifth District Court of Appeal, in its seminal decision in Allen
v. Estate of Dutton,'2 articulated a restricted range for the applicabil-
ity of the statute, and the Florida Supreme Court accepted its reason-
justify award for expense caused).
37. E.g., Vogel v. Allen, 443 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Angora;
Strothman v. Henderson Mental Health Center, Inc., 425 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1983); Merrill Enters., Inc., v. Barkett Oil Co., 421 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1982); Executive Centers of America, Inc., v. Durability Seating & Interiors,
Inc., 402 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981); see Tucker v. Bray, 458 So. 2d 841
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (award of fees fell as district court found that trial court
abused discretion in not allowing at least one chance to amend dismissed complaint).
But see Niki Unlimited, Inc. v. Legal Servs., No. 85-813, slip op. (Fla. 3d DCA, de-
cided January 14, 1986) (fees granted defendant after action for interference of busi-
ness relationship dismissed for lack of prosecution; plaintiff did not respond and was
denied motion under Rule 1.540(b), F. R. Civ. P., to set aside judgment for fees); P.J.
Constructors, Inc., v. Carter Elec. Co., 410 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(two dismissed complaints, motion for rehearing, and appeal justified award).
38. E.g., St. Regis Paper Co. v. Williams, 475 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1985); Cohen v. General Motors Corp., 444 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1984); Russell v. State, 417 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
39. A.M. Shandloff, Inc., v. Richter, 445 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1984).
40. E.g., Sims Creek Homeowners' Assn. v. Van Kirk, 464 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Snow v. Rosse, 455 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(even when the trial judge thinks party was lying); see Byam v. Klopcich, No. 82-376,
slip op. (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App., decided Feb. 8, 1984) (not frivolous when lack of issue
only because plaintiff failed to plead and prove foreign law); Suwanee County v. Garri-
son, 417 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (reluctant to assume that trial
judge would submit frivolous claim to a jury; found not so anyway); cf. Southeast
Growers, Inc., v. Designed Facilities, 49 Fla. Supp. 160 (Broward County Ct. 1979)
(fees not allowed if claim defeated by affirmative defense). But see Kisling v. Wool-
dridge, 397 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (grant of fees affirmed when
plaintiff failed to prove any of elements of tortious interference with business
relationship).
41. E.g., Castaway Lounge, 411 So. 2d at 285; MacBain v. Bowling, 374 So. 2d
75 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
42. 384 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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ing unreservedly in Whitten v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co.,4
the only decision in which the high court has directly addressed the
effect of the statute. The Dutton court first noted that attorney's fees
are not ordinarily recoverable as costs, unless so provided by statute,
then held that the statute's being placed in Chapter 57 empowered the
trial court to make the award while appeal was pending.44 Then, re-
jecting the estate's contention that the non-existence of justiciable is-
sues of law or fact should entitle it to a recovery of attorney's fees, the
Dutton court focused on the statute's term "complete absence" to im-
port a requirement of "a total or absolute lack" of any justiciable is-
sue, and found this tantamount to a finding that the action was "frivo-
lous."'4 5 Proceeding from this, the Fifth District analogized the
standard for an adequate finding under section 57.105 to an earlier
Florida Supreme Court definition of a "frivolous appeal":
A frivolous appeal is not merely one that is likely to be unsuccess-
ful. It is one that is so readily recognizable as devoid of merit on
the face of the record that there is little, if any, prospect whatso-
ever that it can ever succeed. It must be so clearly untenable, or
the insufficiency of which is so manifest on a bare inspection of the
record and assignments of error, that its character may be deter-
mined without argument or research. An appeal is not frivolous
where a substantial justiciable question can be spelled out of it, or
from any part of it, even though such question is unlikely to be
decided other than as the lower court decided it, i.e., against appel-
lant or plaintiff in error.46
The Dutton court concluded that an award required a finding that an
action be "so devoid of merit both on the facts and the law as to be
completely untenable," and, on this basis, reversed the circuit court's
award of fees, despite its affirmance of the judgment on the merits.4 It
43. 410 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1982).
44. 384 So. 2d at 175.
45. Id. (emphasis in original). Cf United Cos. Fin. Corp. v. Hughes, 460 So. 2d
585 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (trial court's determination that it was "75% con-
vinced" that there was no issue was not sufficient to sustain a grant of fees).
46. Treat v. State ex rel. Minton, 121 Fla. 509, 510, 163 So. 883, 883 (1935)
(citations omitted). This quotation is related at length, not only because it served to
establish the tenor of subsequent decisions, but also because its use changed the very
terminology used in most of them: No longer did the courts look for a "complete ab-
sence" of an issue, but, rather, for "frivolousness," as defined here.
47. Dutton, 384 So. 2d at 175 (emphasis in the original).
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is clear, therefore, that to be burdened with an award of fees, merely
losing is not enough.
As noted above, the Florida Supreme Court adopted the Fifth Dis-
trict's reasoning without reservation, noting that it, and other decisions
which followed, "comport with the intent of the legislature in adopting
the statute."4 8 In the Whitten decision, the Supreme Court stated,
"The purpose of section 57.105 is to discourage baseless claims, stone-
wall defenses and sham appeals in civil litigation by placing a price tag
through attorney's fees awards on losing parties who engage in these
activities." '49 The Supreme Court continued, "Such frivolous litigation
constitutes a reckless waste of judicial resources as well as the time and
money of prevailing litigants." 50 After specifying that a mere loss
under several of the circumstances enumerated in the first paragraph of
this section is not sufficient to justify an award of fees,51 the Supreme
Court went further to impose a technical requirement that there be a
specific written finding of "a complete absence of a justiciable issue"
before a grant of fees under section 57.105 could be sustained. 2
A few subsequent decisions have articulated the standard in some-
what different terms-an action must be "spurious,"5 3 an award is un-
justified if "a plausible argument can be made .... [that there was] an
honestly debatable question of law"5  - but the preponderance con-
forms with the above: "Complete absence of a justiciable issue" has
been transformed into a test of "frivolousness," and this even when the
48. Whitten, 410 So. 2d at 505.
49. Id.; see Ferrara v. Caves, 475 So. 2d 1295 (Fla 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
("[P]unishment is what the subject statutory section is about." Id. at 1299.).
50. Whitten, 410 So.2d at 505.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 506. There is precedent to the effect that an award is always improper
if summary judgment was avoided in the court below, City of Deerfield Beach v. Oli-
ver-Hoffman Corp., 396 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Denes and Denes
& Assocs. v. Walter E. Heller & Co. of Fla., Inc., 396 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1981); contra Puder v. Raymond Int'l Builders, Inc., 424 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1982), or if the party against whom fees are claimed won below, Enoch As-
socs., v. Moult Invs., Ltd., 404 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981) cf. Schultz v.
Williams, 472 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (award of fees against property ap-
praisee reversed when assessments had been upheld by property appraisal board); but
fees were held to be properly awarded if the court below was mislead, Department of
Revenue v. Gurtler, 381 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
53. Nicholason v. Bryant, 468 So. 2d 311, 312 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
54. Bull v. City of Atlantic Beach, 450 So. 2d 570, 572 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1984).
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substituted terminology is more clumsy than the original would have
been.55
IV. Specific Applications of Section 57.105
Possibly somewhat hyperbolically, it used to be said, "Sue every-
body in sight; let them figure their way out!" The clearest sequence of
cases decided under section 57.105 shows this dictum not to have
whatever validity that it once may have had.
The most obvious example was an instance in which the plaintiff
joined a city attorney in a squabble over the placement of a road when,
if anyone, the city engineer would have been the proper party defen-
dant.56 Accomodatingly, the plaintiff's lawyer, at deposition, admitted,
"I have no idea who is responsible for this,"57 that he had no idea who
built the project, but would like to get the name of the proper party.58
The Fourth District Court of Appeal found that the suit against the
city attorney was "begun recklessly, without investigation, and without
a good faith belief that [the city attorney] had any involvement with
the construction," 59 then cited other authority to the effect that the
purpose of the statute was "to place a pricetag upon such unwarranted
litigation," 60 and affirmed the lower court's grant of attorney's fees.
Similar are cases in which the plaintiffs assumed that documents
which they were seeking were in the offices of the defendants' attor-
neys. Suits to replevy these files, joining the lawyers, resulted in grants
of fees to them when it turned out that the attorneys did not, indeed,
have the desired material."1
Grants of attorney's fees under section 57.105 have also been af-
firmed when discovery clearly showed that the wrong party had been
sued, but the plaintiff persisted in his error,62 and where it appeared
55. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Brickell Townhouse, Inc., 457 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1984) (relitigating issues already decided in federal court "frivolous").
56. Galbraith v. Inglese, 402 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
57. Id. at 575 (emphasis in reported decision).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id., citing Hernandez v. Leiva, 392 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
61. See, e.g., Friedman v. Backman, 453 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1984).
62. Keen v. Bernardo, 452 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding
discussed in n. 79, infra); see Parrino v. Ayers, 469 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (suing former neighbor for ejectment of fence justified grant of fees when no
[Vol. 10
104
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss1/1
57.105 Attorney's Fees
that the joinder of a party in his individual capacity was pursued only
to gain a tactical advantage.6 3
This does not, however, suggest that misjoinder is, ipso facto, an
adequate ground for an award of attorney's fees. The failure of an at-
tempt to "pierce the corporate veil" has been found inadequate to jus-
tify an award of fees," as has been a suit against a life tenant in an
action for the foreclosure of a mortgage.65 Also, as will be discussed
further below, a misjoinder, the existence of which did not become ap-
parent until the completion of discovery, does not constitute grounds
for a grant of fees under section 57.105.16
On the other hand, there is a consistent string of precedent to the
effect that it is not the intent of the statute to deter exploration of new,
unsettled areas of the law, and that attorney's fees are not to be
awarded if the position asserted is novel, yet sufficiently plausible as to
represent a reasonable effort to expand, move, modify, or clarify the
common law as it exists.6 7 Consequently, a suit for group defamation 8
and another seeking to make manufacturers of prescription drugs re-
sponsible for failure to provide warnings directly to consumers69 re-
sulted in reversals of grants of fees. Similarly, denial of fees has been
affirmed when the subrogability of PIP benefits was unclear,70 when the
law of shoreline accretion was unclear,71 when the plaintiff sued the
state for wrongful death for failure to detain a husband who subse-
quently killed his wife,7 2 and when punitive damages were sought for
attempt to ascertain present ownership).
63. Puder v. Raymond Int'l Builders, Inc., 424 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1982).
64. Bacon v. August, 407 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
65. Brady v. Myers, 413 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
66. McHan v. Huggins, 459 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Green-
berg v. Manor Pines Realty Corp., 414 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
67. See T.I.E. Communications, Inc., v. Toyota Motors Center, 391 So. 2d 697
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (articulating a narrow scope of applicability of statute
before itself granting fees).
68. Scott v. Durling, 471 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
69. Buckner v. Allergan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 400 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1981).
70. Molyett v. Society Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 452 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984).
71. Ferm v. Saba, 444 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983); see Lake
Coway Shores Homeowners Assn. v. Driscoll, 476 So. 2d 1306 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (littoral rights following accretion).
72. Russell v. State, 417 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982); see Cate v.
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violation of federal housing regulations.73 It was, nevertheless, held that
a recent Supreme Court mandate denying a plaintiff's position - when
plaintiff was aware of it - was sufficient to justify an award of fees.74
This all affirms the formulation that a position is "frivolous" - lacking
of a justiciable issue - if it flies in the face of established and current
precedent, but that it is not the purpose of the statute to stultify the
natural development of the common law, or to penalize ventures into
genuinely gray areas.76
As noted above when discussing the effect of misjoinder, one is not
liable for an assessment of fees when the lack of substance of the action
only becomes apparent during the course of the suit. This is the situa-
tion when it turns out that the wrong person was sued,76 or that the
defendant no longer intends to pursue the course of conduct com-
plained of.77 However, timely action to terminate a course of litigation
may be necessary to avoid an assessment based on one's persisting in
his error, even after it has become apparent. 8
Interestingly, the fact that a defendant had a privilege against lia-
bility does not automatically expose the plaintiff to an assessment of
fees,79 although the indications are that this would be a consideration
Oldham, 450 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 1984).
73. Guthartz v. Lewis, 408 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
74. American Glass Indus., Inc., v. Allstate Ins. Co., 441 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
75. Builders Shoring & Scaffolding v. King, 453 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1984); Parkway Gen. Hosp., Inc., v. Stern, 400 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1981) (wife disputing responsibility for husband's medical expenses).
76. McHan v. Huggins, 459 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Wall v.
Department of Transp., 455 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Greenberg v.
Manor Pines Realty Corp., 414 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
77. Klein v. Layne, Inc., 453 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (declara-
tory judgment on right to construct building). Or if lack of substance becomes appar-
ent only at trial. Reynolds v. Happ, 6 Fla. Supp. 2d 124 (Lake County Ct. 1984).
78. Friedman, 453 So. 2d 938 (continued in suit to replevy file from lawyer, even
after it became apparent that he did not have it); Keen v. Bernardo, 452 So. 2d 1133
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (persisted in suit against Bernardo, Jr., after it became
apparent that borrower was Bernardo, Sr.); Adcast v. Nour, 3 Fla. Supp. 2d 180 (Vo-
lusia County Ct. 1982) (defendant not principal of corporation sued). But see Steven-
son v. Rutherford, 440 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that party is
not at own peril to determine when suit becomes "frivolous"; was no great imposition
after fact came out).
79. Bull v. City of Atlantic Beach, 450 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(declaratory judgment filed also against city officials as individuals); Freeman v.
Valdez, 393 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (suit against sheriff in individ-
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in determining whether the case was wholly frivolous.80 It has also been
specifically held that recourse to needlessly dilatory tactics will justify
an assessment of fees under section 57.105,81 and, also, that raising
only a sham issue will not suffice to avoid an award. 2
V. Procedural Aspects
In addition to the numerous decisions relating to the substantive
question of what circumstances justify a grant of fees under the statute,
the courts have frequently been called upon to delineate the procedural
requirements for granting an award of fees. Specifically, questions have
arisen as to when the court has jurisdiction to grant fees, whether and
in what manner the pleadings must request fees, when a request for
fees is timely, what are adequate findings to support an award of fees,
whether fees may be granted when only a portion of an action is found
to be frivolous, and how what are "reasonable" fees is to be deter-
mined. This section will consider these technical aspects.
Jurisdiction to grant fees and costs remains in the trial court even
after the filing of an appeal of a final judgment, since it "would not
affect or interfere with the subject matter of the appeal and thus im-
pinge on the appellate court's power and authority to decide the issues
presented to it by the appeal."8 3 The logic of such power is questiona-
ual capacity for information published in line of duty). See Ferrara v. Caves, 475 So.
2d 1295 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (in suit on recall petition, initiant/intervenor
not subject to assessment when he stipulated defects in petitions when they became
apparent, the court recognizing "historical inartfulness of recall petitions").
80. Salfi v. Ising, 464 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (suit for injunc-
tion against circuit court judge; fees not granted, as Attorney General defended for free
and personal attorney added nothing).
81. Hatcher v. Miller, 427 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (district
court granted fees on appeal to attorney whose client was obstructing collection of ear-
lier fee); Ruby Mountain Constr. & Dev. Corp. v. Raymond, 409 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (judgment creditor filed dilatory discovery and motions).
82. Di Salvatore v. Curreri, 50 Fla. Supp. 106 (Broward County Ct. 1980); see
Thornton v. Desjardin, 6 Fla. Supp. 2d 50 (11th Cir. Ct., App. Div., 1983); cf. Quinli-
van v. United Business Invs., Inc., 420 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (de-
nial of fees to defendant reversed when plaintiff's lawyer admitted existence of oral side
agreement on brokerage contract); Nottingham Assocs. v. City of Miami, 410 So. 2d
214 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (defendant's lawyer admitted in oral argument
before appeals court that arguments for withholding documents were invalid).
83. Ruby Mountain, 409 So. 2d at 527. But see AlI-Brite Sales Co. v. Roderick,
416 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding retaining jurisdiction for fee
award improper, but decision probably based on determination that award would not
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ble in light of the fact that the conclusion of the appeal would weigh
heavily on the question of whether an action was "frivolous." Also, as
discussed above, the appeals court may itself award fees or remand
with instructions that this be done.8 4
It was early recognized that it is not necessary for the prevailing
party to have previously included a demand for attorney's fees for the
trial court to have jurisdiction to grant them. 85 This is clearly logical,
as "[t]here is certainly no way for a litigant to know in advance
whether the adverse party will raise nothing but frivolous issues in a
civil case and, therefore, to plead in good faith [for an assessment of
fees under the statute]."86
As regards the question of timeliness, one should note that fees
may not be awarded until there has been an adverse final judgment.87
Further, the trial court's reserving jurisdiction to consider an award of
fees is not ripe for review in the appeal of the final judgment on the
merits. 88 Beyond these limitations, it appears that the trial court's juris-
diction continues until the time for rehearing has passed, at which time
the judgment becomes final.8"
Before the Supreme Court spoke in the Whitten decision,90 the dis-
trict courts of appeal were divided as to whether an award of fees
under section 57.105 required a written finding of the fact that there
was a complete lack of any justiciable issue,9 or, on the other hand,
that such a finding could be inferred from the trial court's granting of
be justified, anyway).
84. E.g., Pollock v. Morton, 455 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (Other
authorities in this area are cited supra, n. 8.).
85. Ocala Music & Marine Center v. Caldwell, 389 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1980).
86. Autorico, Inc., v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 398 So. 2d 485, 487 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
87. Outdoor Concerts, Inc., v. Friedman, 438 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1983).
88. Steinhardt v. Seals, 412 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. 1982); Moore v. Flor-
ida State Bank, 386 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980); cf. Grasland v. Taylor
Woodrow Homes Ltd., 460 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that
reservation of jurisdiction to grant fees does not affect finality of underlying judgment,
so appeal taken too late).
89. Delray Plants v. De Young, 3 Fla. Supp. 2d 158 (15th Cir. Ct. 1983).
90. 410 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1982).
91. City of Miami Beach v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 380 So. 2d 1112 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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fees and did not have to be explicitly stated.92 The Supreme Court's
decision specifically noted, "Without such a finding, an order assessing
attorney's fees is technically deficient and must be reversed." 9 3 This
should have finally resolved the question, and largely has, but there are
nevertheless recent decisions in which a district court has itself granted
fees without stating requisite findings94 or suggested that a grant of
fees implies appropriate findings.9 5
With few exceptions, courts have ruled that fees may not be
granted when only part of the action was frivolous. In an early case
involving the seller's "frivolous" refusal to perform a real estate sales
contract, the Third District Court of Appeal approved of the trial
court's bifurcating the trial, then awarded fees only for the portion de-
termining liability, as there were always substantial questions as to
damages.9" Also, the First District Court of Appeal reversed a denial of
fees to the plaintiff on two of four counts of a suit filed by a teacher
against her school board, but it was unclear whether the case was de-
cided under section 57.105 or one of two other statutes authorizing a
grant of fees. 97 Other than these two decisions, Florida courts have
been consistent in holding that the entire action must be "frivolous" for
fees to be recoverable.98 However, one federal court decision suggests
that a minor percentage of a complicated case was unfounded, so fees
relating to that portion should be calculated and an award be made in
the resulting amount. 99
92. Autorico; see also West Flagler Assocs. v. Associated Int'l Ins. Co., No. 81-
282, slip op. (Fla. 3d Dist Ct. App., decided Dec. 8, 1981).
93. Whitten, 410 So. 2d at 506; accord, e.g., Fox v. Loeffier, 434 So. 2d 2 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Sheriff of Alachua County v. Hardie, 433 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Apgar & Markham Constr. Co. of Fla., Inc., v. Macasphalt,
Inc., 424 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
94. Hackenberg v. Artesian Pools of East Fla., Inc., 440 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1983); see Miller & Squire v. Hall, 475 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
95. Wright v. Acierno, 437 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
96. Hernandez v. Leiva, 391 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
97. Doyal v. School Board, 415 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
98. See, e.g., St. Regis Paper Co. v. Williams, 475 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); Greater Clearwater Chamber of Commerce v. Modem Graphic Arts, Inc.,
464 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (not separate out period after found
unsustainable); Glover v. School Board, 462 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(school board's defense of writ of mandamus not groundless); Klein v. Layne, Inc., 453
So. 2d 203 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (whether frivolous judged at time of filing).
99. Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480 (11th Cit. 1983).
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Finally, in this consideration of technical factors posed by the stat-
ute is the basic question, "What is the 'reasonable attorney's fee' which
can be recovered?" The answer is most easily given by stating what it
is not: A "reasonable attorney's fee" is not necessarily what was actu-
ally contracted for or paid. In a subrogation case in which the attorney
was on a contingency, what was determined to be "reasonable" (and
was granted) turned out to be more than twice what was contracted for
and over eighty percent of the amount recovered.' 0 When a city was
defended by the city attorney, it was allowed the going rate for his
time, rather than a pro rata portion of his salary and expenses."0 ' In
another case, city officials who had been sued as individuals were
granted "reasonable" fees, even though they had been defended for
free by a salaried attorney provided by the city.102 Also, attorneys rep-
resenting themselves have been granted fees for their own time, over
and above expenses actually incurred. 0 3 This judicial largesse is justi-
fied on a collateral source theory and a determination that the policy of
section 57.105 is to punish frivolous litigants.0
Courts in a less-generous mood have referred to the Florida Code
of Professional Responsibility as the source of those factors to be con-
sidered in determining what is "reasonable."'' 05 Generally, one court
observed
100. Autorico v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 398 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1981).
101. City of Boca Raton v. Faith Baptist Church, 423 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
102. Wright, 437 So. 2d 242 ("[W]e find it highly improbable that any honora-
ble or forthright public officer would personally seek a profit from any such award
when the cost of his or her defense had been borne by the taxpayers .. " Id. at 244.).
But see Salfi v. Ising, 464 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (decision discussed
in n. 80, supra).
103. Friedman v. Backman, 453 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984);
Hatcher v. Miller, 427 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983). But see Burger King
Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1983) (fees not allowed for house counsel
who served only liaison function).
104. Wright, 437 So. 2d at 244. See also Autorico, Inc., v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
400 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (left open the question of whether insurer
wrongfully refusing to provide defense is responsible for fees awarded against insured).
105. Travieso v. Travieso, 447 So. 2d 940, 943 n.2 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(quoting DR 2-106); see also Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.
2d 1145 (Fla. 1985) (discussing "reasonable fees" in medical malpractice appeal); Cis-
neros v. Tarafa, 418 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (mere stipulation of
what was "reasonable" does not prevent appeal of propriety of award).
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Lawyers are officers of the court. The court is an instrument of
society for the administration of justice. Justice should be adminis-
tered economically, efficiently, and expeditiously. The attorney's
fee is, therefore, a very important factor in the administration of
justice, and if it is not determined with proper relation to that fact
it results in a species of social malpractice that undermines the
confidence of the public in the bench and bar. It does more than
that; it brings the court into disrepute and destroys its power to
perform adequately the function of its creation. 06
How the specific cases referred to above correlate with this expression
of purpose is less than clear.
VI. Section 57.105 Considered in a Broader Context
In addition to cases relating specifically to the application of sec-
tion 57.105, numerous references to this statute are found in decisions
in which it is compared to, or contrasted with, other principles of law.
These are of interest, not only as they tend to further define the extent
of its applicability, but also as they suggest the courts' attitudes as to
how it may be applied in the future.
Most frequent are comparisons with the law of malicious prosecu-
tion. The cases hold that conduct must be more egregious to sustain a
malicious prosecution suit than to justify an award of fees under the
statute.107 On the other hand, section 57.105 is suggested as an alterna-
tive to malicious prosecution when the latter is inappropriate,108 espe-
cially when a public official is constitutionally barred from maintaining
such an action.109
The standard for recovery under section 57.105 has been held to
be similar to that required for assessment of fees for filing a "frivolous"
complaint before the Ethics Commission,"0 and, like a similar provi-
sion for hearings before the Career Service Commission, does not re-
quire that the matter be heard on its merits, but will allow a grant of
106. Travieso, 447 So. 2d at 944 (quoting Baruch v. Giblin, 122 Fla. 59, 63, 164
So. 831, 833 (1935)).
107. Wright v. Yurko, 446 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Central
Fla. Mach. Co. v. Williams, 424 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
108. McMurray v. U-Haul Co., 425 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
109. Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1983).
110. Taunton v. Tapper, 396 So. 2d 843 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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fees, even if the action is dismissed."1" Also, its operation has frequently
been seen as analogous to the attorney's fees provision of Florida's con-
sumer protection statute."'
Perhaps most significant are judicial suggestions of future uses of
the statute, and of problems for which it might serve as the preferred
remedy. The Fifth District Court of Appeal has served notice that fu-
ture failure by appellants to provide a proper record on appeal will re-
sult in summary dismissal of the appeal, and that motions for attor-
ney's fees under the statute "will be favorably entertained."" 3 In a
special concurrence recommending a broadening of landlords' liability
for accidents on leased premises, Judge Glickstein of the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal recognizes that such change might lead to abuse,
but points to section 57.105 as the remedy.114 It has also been sug-
gested that the statute, not petitions for prohibition or certiorari to ap-
peals courts, is the remedy for a party's attempt to relitigate matters
decided by an administrative board,"15 and that it would be the proper
remedy if, in a contribution action, a joint tortfeasor pleads settlement
and release in bad faith." 6 Similarly, while the court's majority dis-
posed of the matter by finding that the plaintiff had no standing to sue,
Judge Lehman of the Second District Court of Appeal, dissenting, ar-
gued for a broader ability to sue public officials, with the statute stand-
ing as a defense against frivolous actions." 7
As can be seen from the above, the statute has influence beyond
111. Department of Health & Rehab. Serv. v. Hall, 409 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1982). But see Bailey v. Bailey, 392 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1981) (noting by contrast that no final action is necessary in alimony action).
112. See, e.g., Nolan v. Altman, 449 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(decided on FLA. STAT. § 501.2105 (1983)).
113. Beasley v. Beasley, 463 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985); see
Nicholason v. Bryant, 468 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (fees granted by
appeals court when husband failed to provide proper record in appeal over increase of
support payments).
114. Klatman v. Barnett, 458 So. 2d 806, 807 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(Glickstein, J., concurring specially).
115. Board of Trustees v. Ray, 444 So. 2d 1110, 1113 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1984). But cf. Harris v. Haught, 435 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (finding
that only trying to relitigate arbitration decision not sufficient to support assessment of
fees).
116. Concrete Sciences, Inc., v. Bassett, 449 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1984).
117. Godheim v. City of Tampa, 426 So. 2d 1084, 1096 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (Lehman, J., dissenting).
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the scope of its own applicability, and may in the future find itself used
creatively to resolve problems which are now without convenient
solutions.
VII. Conclusion
The primary purpose for the enactment of section 57.105 was to
deter unfounded litigation. Especially since it has itself presented such
fertile ground for litigation, it has not yet achieved this end. As, how-
ever, its proper scope becomes more clearly delineated by the courts,
the volume of cases - the preponderance of which result in denial of
fees - should subside. Already in the books is a case adumbrating the
possibility that one who frivolously seeks fees from the opposition may
himself be assessed fees.118 One earnestly hopes that this statute, in-
tended to eliminate needless litigation, is not fated to itself become a
basis for intramural squabbling over who has better grounds for assess-
ing fees against the other.
Section 57.105 was intended to have a narrow scope, and this is
how it has been interpreted. With only few disparate exceptions, prece-
dent consistently requires that an actual finding of "frivolousness" be
made before the court awards fees. When, however, that "frivolous-
ness" is found - and found to apply to the entire action - an award is
mandatory. The statute authorizes only a "reasonable" award of fees,
but existing precedent does not always hew closely to this principle.
The restrictive requirements of the statute are not intended as a shield
to protect delay or abuse, but do seek to preserve the citizen's right of
access to the courts, even when his action is only barely tenable. This
statute, as construed, is a good piece of legislation which should in the
future lend itself to a more-creative, yet narrow, application.
Phillip H. Snaith
118. Nunes v. Margate General Hospital, Inc., 435 So. 2d 916, 918 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
1985]
113
: Nova Law Review 10, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1985
Bowers v. Hardwick: The Extension of the Right to
Privacy to Private Consensual Homosexual Conduct*
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................... 175.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ........................ 178
III. THE SUPREME COURT ON PRIVACY ................... 180
IV. THE SUPREME COURT ON HOMOSEXUAL RIGHTS ..... 182
V. SINCE Doe: CONFUSION IN THE LOWER COURTS ..... 187
VI. Hardwick v. Bowers ............................. 195
A. Hardwick's Standing to Sue ................. 196
B. The Precedential Effect of Summary Affirmances 202
C. The Issues Decided in Doe .................. 204
D. Doctrinal Developments Since Doe ............ 206
E. The Extension of the Right to Privacy to Private
Consensual Homosexual Conduct ............. 210
VII. CONCLUSION ....................................... 214
I. Introduction
On August 3, 1982, a Fulton County, Georgia, police officer went
to the apartment of Michael Hardwick on a routine matter., Hard-
wick's roommate let the officer into the apartment. The officer, through
the partially opened door to Hardwick's bedroom, saw Hardwick and
another man engaged in a homosexual act. The officer's subsequent ar-
rest of Hardwick for violating the,Georgia sodomy statute2 was the ori-
gin of what may be the most important homosexual rights lawsuit in
* In the district and circuit courts the case was styled Hardwick v. Bowers. This
Note shall follow the styling of the lower courts. In the Supreme Court, however, the
case is Bowers v. Hardwick.
1. The facts of the case are gleaned from the Circuit Court decision, Hardwick v.
Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, reh'g en banc denied, 765 F.2d 1123 (11th Cir.), cert. granted,
106 S. Ct. 342 (1985); National Law Journal, June 17, 1985, at 10, col. 1; and The
Advocate, June 25, 1985, at 17, col. 1.
2. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1982). "A person commits the offense of sodomy
when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person
and the mouth or anus of another .... A person convicted of the offense of sodomy
shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years." Note
that the statute is not limited to homosexual acts.
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American history. The perfect test case was born: A man was arrested
for engaging in consensual sexual acts with another adult in the privacy
of his own bedroom. While the Fulton County District Attorney later
dropped the charges unless further evidence developed,3 Hardwick's
travail was sufficient to gain him standing to sue for a declaratory judg-
ment that the statute was a violation of a fundamental constitutional
right. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Hardwick,'
and the stage was set for a decision by the United States Supreme
Court on an issue which the Court has steadfastly avoided for the last
decade.5
Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have statutes
making certain homosexual acts a crime.6 While prosecutions under
sodomy statutes are rare, the laws remain on the books and therefore
enforceable. This is important for two reasons.
First, sodomy laws stigmatize homosexuals. The sodomy statutes
make homosexuals, as well as heterosexuals, aware that the law brands
3. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1204.
4. Id. at 1212.
5. Arguing the case for the State of Georgia will be Georgia Senior Assistant
Attorney General Michael Hobbs. Kathleen L. Wilde was Hardwick's attorney in the
lower courts; joining her and handling the argument in the Supreme Court will be Prof.
Laurence H. Tribe. The Court is expected to hand down a decision in June or early-
July of 1986.
6. The following sodomy statutes prohibit sexual acts by homosexuals: ALA.
CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1411 (1978); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 41-1813 (1977); D.C. CODE ANN. §22-3502 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02
(West 1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1982); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1979); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.010(1), .100(1) (Baldwin
1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.89 (West Supp. 1983); MD. ANN. CODE art. 17, §
554 (1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.158 (West 1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
609.293 (West Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972); Mo. REV. STAT. §§
566.010(2), .090(3) (Supp. 1977); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-101(20). -5-505 (1983);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.190 (1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1981); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. §
16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-612 (1982); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-403 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 18.2.361 (1982). The Arkansas, Kansas,
Kentucky, Montana, and Nevada laws apply only to acts between members of the same
sex; the others apply equally to homosexual and heterosexual conduct.
The Florida statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West 1981), states that
"[w]hoever commits any unnatural and lascivious act with another person shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree .. " See infra note 62. See also
Meyer, A Survey of the Criminal Laws of the United States Affecting Homosexuals:
Florida, 1985 LESBIAN/GAY LAW NOTES (November 1985).
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gay people as criminals. The psychological results of this and other
forms of oppression can be devastating.7
Second, sodomy laws are often used as justification for more com-
mon yet equally severe forms of discrimination against homosexuals.
For example, an Oklahoma statute limiting the right of teachers to
speak out in favor of homosexual rights was justified by the illegal sta-
tus of homosexual acts.8 A justice of the Florida Supreme Court, com-
menting on homosexual applicants to the Florida Bar, wrote that
"[e]ven without evidence of actual conduct, I am opposed to the admis-
sion of any person whose admitted 'orientation' indicates a lifestyle
likely to involve routine violation of a criminal statute."9 Justice Rehn-
quist, dissenting from a denial of certiorari in a case concerning a uni-
versity's recognition of a gay student group, wrote that "the issue posed
in this case is the extent to which a self-governing democracy, having
made certain acts criminal, may prevent or discourage individuals from
engaging in speech or conduct which encourages others to violate those
laws."10 Anti-gay measures which are defended by reference to the ille-
gality of homosexual acts may, however, face serious constitutional
challenges.""
7. Sodomy laws state that homosexuals are deviants. In response, many homosex-
uals develop unhealthy coping mechanisms, including "excessive concern with the mi-
nority group membership, feelings of insecurity, denial of membership in the group,
withdrawal, self-derision, self-hatred, militancy, neuroticism, and acting out self-fulfil-
ling prophecies about one's own inferiority." Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici
Curiae and Brief Amici Curiae of American Psychological Association, American Psy-
chiatric Association, and American Public Health Association in Support of Respon-
dents at 28, New York v. Uplinger, 104 S. Ct. 2332 (1984). For a brilliant British
analysis of the oppression of homosexuals, see A. HODGES & D. HUTrER, WITH DOWN-
CAST GAYS: ASPECTS OF HOMOSEXUAL SELF-OPPRESSION (1979).
8. The law was later declared to be unconstitutional. Board of Education of
Oklahoma City v. National Gay Task Force, 105 S. Ct. 1858 (1985). See infra text
accompanying notes 57 to 59.
9. Florida Board of Bar Examiners Re N.R.S., 403 So. 2d 1315, 1318 (Fla.
1981) (Boyd, J., dissenting). See Note, Private Homosexual Activity and Fitness to
Practice Law: Florida Board of Bar Examiners, In re N.R.S., 6 NOVA L.J. 519 (1982).
10. Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080, 1082 (1978). Justice Blackmun joined
the dissent.
See also Dressier, Survey of School Principals Regarding Alleged Homosexual
Teachers in the Classroom: How Likely (Really) is Discharge, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV.
599, 607-09 (1985) (12% of principals in sample favor revocation of license of teacher
who commits noncriminal, consensual private homosexual act with an adult; figure rises
to 30% if act was criminal, even if the teacher is not actually convicted of the crime).
11. See infra note 62 and Section V passim.
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Hardwick v. Bowers is significant because a determination that
sodomy laws are unconstitutional would change the content of the de-
bate over homosexual rights; no longer could such discussions begin
and end with a reference to the criminal status of homosexual acts.
In the following section of this Note, the constitutional issues in-
volved in challenges to sodomy statutes are discussed. Then, in section
III, there is an examination of the Supreme Court's decisions on pri-
vacy over the last two decades. Section IV will provide a discussion of
Supreme Court cases dealing with homosexual rights. Section V is an
examination of recent lower court rulings involving statutory prohibi-
tions against homosexual acts and will provide the framework for dis-
cussion of Hardwick v. Bowers in Section VI. Subsections of Section
VI examine the plaintiff's standing to sue, the precedential weight of a
1976 Supreme Court decision, 12 and the constitutional basis for the ex-
tension of the right of privacy to private, consensual, noncommercial
homosexual conduct.
II. The Constitutional Issues
Arguments that sodomy statutes are unconstitutional have been
based on several sections of the United States Constitution. In essence,
though, all arguments originate from the fundamental right of
privacy.' 3
12. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Richmond, 425 U.S. 901
(1976).
13. A recent law review comment suggests that the best strategy for gay rights
litigators is to treat homosexuality as a suspect classification and argue that laws dis-
criminating on the basis of sexual orientation should be subject to heightened scrutiny
(either strict or intermediate). The author argues that the right of privacy argument
fails "to provide an adequate remedy for unequal treatment of gays. . . . The social
world, where most discrimination against gays occurs, is left untouched by the seem-
ingly neutral abstention of the state." Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Ori-
entation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classifiction, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1285, 1291
(1985). "Even if homosexuality were accorded the full protection of privacy doctrine,
majoritarian norms would still govern the expression of gay personhood outside the
bedroom." Id. at 1292. For a similar argument see Note, An Argument for the Appli-
cation of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosex-
uality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 797 (1984). See also Rowland v. Mad River Local School
District, 105 S. Ct. 1373, 1377 (1985) (Brennen, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari: "[D]iscrimination against homosexuals or bisexuals based solely on their sexual
preference raises significant constitutional questions under . . . equal protection
analysis").
While the argument is provocative, it ignores the reality of American society to-
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The right to privacy was first recognized by Judge Cooley and was
adopted by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in an 1890 law review
article.14 Seventy-five years later the Supreme Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut'5 formally declared that there is a constitutional right to
privacy. Though this has been frequently reaffirmed,"6 it remains un-
clear from which section of the Constitution the right derives. Various
answers have been suggested: 1) the privileges and immunities clauses
of article IV and the fourteenth amendment; 2) the "penumbras" or
"shadows" of the first, third, fourth, and fifteenth amendments; 3) the
preamble to the Constitution; and 4) the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment in the eighth amendment.' 7
Perhaps the most convincing explanation of the newfound right to
privacy is that it is actually the rebirth of substantive due process. Sub-
stantive due process was in great disrepute after the period in the early
part of this century when the Supreme Court used it, most notably in
Lochner v. New York, 8 to strike down laws regulating the economy.
Lochner was later repudiated by the Court, but substantive due process
continues to be tarred with the stigma of excessive judicial interference
with the will of the people as expressed through the legislature. Some
modern scholars now see the privacy decisions of the Court as being
substantive due process, yet the Court itself has been hesitant to place
its decisions under that mantle.' 9
day. A society that is just now coming to a consensus that private acts should be pro-
tected from government interference is unlikely to protect the public persona of gay
people. While the determination that homosexuality is a suspect classification may be
an admirable goal, the right to privacy is a first, necessary step.
14. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
The article referred to the right to privacy within tort actions.
15. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
16. See infra Section III.
17. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-10 (1978).
18. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (law regulating maximum hours of bakers held to be an
unconstitutional violation of the right to contract and an excessive use of the state's
police powers).
19. Kenneth Karst writes that "Griswold was part of a larger doctrinal move-
ment: the revival of substantive due process as a guarantee of individual freedoms."
Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L. REV. 624, 626 (1980). "Af-
ter so many years of heaping scorn on Lochner v. New York, the Court has not found it
easy to admit that substantive due process has returned." Id. at 644. Professor Tribe
calls Griswold "the most important substantive due process decision of the modern
period." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11-3 (1978).
Justice Stewart on several occasions expressed his agreement. See Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 167-68 n.2 (1973) (concurring) (this decision is based on the due process
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The constitutional right to privacy, whatever its origins, is well-
entrenched. The Supreme Court has frequently based decisions on it,
and the doctrine has several times been raised in cases involving homo-
sexual rights.
III. The Supreme Court on Privacy
In Griswold v. Connecticut20 the Supreme Court found that a law
making the use of contraceptives illegal violated the right to privacy
inherent in the Constitution. Justice Douglas, in the plurality opinion,
eschewed reliance on due process and found the right to privacy ema-
nating from the Bill of Rights." Justice Goldberg concurred but found
the right to privacy based on the fourteenth amendment's concept of
liberty.22 Justice Douglas' comment that the law in question "concerns
a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fun-
damental constitutional guarantees"2 3 is important in the context of
challenges to sodomy statutes. It is noteworthy that the issues and opin-
ions in Griswold were limited to married persons.24
In Stanley v. Georgia2 5 the Court found that a law making crimi-
nal the private possession of obscene material violated the first and
fourteenth amendments. The facts were similar to those in Hardwick v.
Bowers in that a search of Stanley's apartment for bookmaking equip-
ment inadvertently uncovered a number of obscene films. The Court
said that the sale of obscene material could be punished, but not the
clause, as "[t]here is no constitutional right of privacy as such") and Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 395 (1978) (concurring in the decision that a Wisconsin law
was unconstitutional, but arguing that the majority's decision is "no more than sub-
stantive due process by another name"). Justice Stevens, in his majority opinion in
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), wrote that in Roe v. Wade the right of privacy
was said to be "founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty."
Id. at 598 n.23. See also Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-503 (1977)
(plurality).
20. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
21. Id. at 481-84.
22. Id. at 486-87. "Because the opinion of the Court and the three separate con-
currences are complex and often contradictory, Griswold does not afford any clear or
simple answers. Focusing on one thought in one opinion or trying to explain Griswold
in a sentence is almost necessarily manipulative or misleading." Note, On Privacy:
Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 670, 674 (1973).
23. 381 U.S. at 485.
24. See infra text accompanying note 189.
25. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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private use in one's own home. Writing for six members of the Court,
Justice Marshall stated that "fundamental is the right to be free, ex-
cept in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intru-
sions into one's privacy. . . . Whatever may be the justifications for
other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the
privacy of one's own home."28 The decision was ostensibly based upon
the first amendment's right to receive information and ideas, but the
opinion seems to be based on the right to privacy: Some matters should
not be regulated by the government, as they are private concerns.1
7
This interpretation was given support by the Court three years later in
United States v. Orito,28 where a federal law making the transportation
of obscene material across state lines a criminal offense was upheld.
The Court limited the right to possess obscene material to one's own
home. Chief Justice Burger wrote for the Court that the "Constitution
extends special safeguards to the privacy of the home, just as it protects
other special privacy rights such as those of marriage, procreation,
motherhood, child rearing, and education."2 9
In Eisenstadt v. Baird30 the Court went significantly beyond its
holding in Griswold and determined that a law banning the distribution
of contraceptives to single persons was unconstitutional. "If the right of
privacy means anything," Justice Brennan wrote for the court, "it is
the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting
a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."'"
Roe v. Wade32 is of course the most controversial Supreme Court
decision of our time. The Court declared that: 1) Women have an abso-
lute right to obtain an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy;
2) From the end of the first trimester until the time the fetus becomes
viable, the state can regulate abortions only to protect the mother; and
3) When the fetus becomes viable, states can prohibit all abortions,
except those necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. The
Court stated that only personal rights that are "fundamental" or "im-
26. Id. at 564-65.
27. Later cases have "erased all of [Stanley's] first amendment content and
transformed it into a pure privacy case." Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection
for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 670, 690 (1973).
28. 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
29. Id. at 142.
30. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
31. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
32. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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plicit in the concept of ordered liberty" are protected by the "guarantee
of personal privacy. '' 3 Where fundamental rights are involved, laws
will be upheld only when a "compelling state interest" is shown and
when the law is "narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state
interests at stake. 34
IV. The Supreme Court on Homosexual Rights
As homosexuals began to assert themselves in society,35 the battle
for gay rights reached the courts, and the legal argument relied on was
often the right to privacy. "In law," wrote one commentator, "the turn-
ing point on gay rights was Griswold v. Connecticut."'36 In the era of
gay liberation, the Supreme Court was first confronted with homosex-
ual rights in 1976.37
In the landmark case of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for
City of Richmond,38 male homosexuals sought to have Virginia's sod-
omy statute" declared unconstitutional as a violation of their constitu-
tional rights to due process, freedom of expression, and privacy. A
three-judge District Court upheld the law. The Supreme Court was
then confronted with the case on its appellate docket. This offered the
33. Id. at 152.
34. Id. at 155.
35. See J. D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES (1983) and T.
MAROTTA, THE POLITICS OF HOMOSEXUALITY (1981).
36. Adamany, The Supreme Court at the Frontier of Politics: The Issue of Gay
Rights, 1980 HAMLINE L. REV. 185, 187 (1980).
37. An earlier memorandum opinion, ONE, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958),
concerned a local postmaster's refusal to mail a homosexual magazine.
In 1967 the Court upheld the deportation from the United States of a homosexual
man. Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 387 U.S. 118 (1967). The
Court found that Congress' intent was that the term "afflicted with psychopathic per-
sonality" be interpreted as including homosexuals. The Court further found that the
statute was not void for vagueness.
The statute remains on the books and continues to be enforced. See Fowler &
Graff, Gay Aliens and Immigration: Resolving the Conflict between Hill and Long-
staff, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 621 (1985).
38. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), afl'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
39. VA. CODE § 18.1-212 (1950): "Crimes against nature.-If any person shall
carnally know in any manner any brute animal, or carnally know any male or female
person by the anus or by or with the mouth, or voluntarily submit to such carnal
knowledge, he or she shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than one year nor
more than three years." The statute was repealed in 1975 and replaced by VA. CODE §
18.2-361.
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Court an opportunity to clearly state its views on the subject, but it
declined to do so. The Court chose not to see briefs or hear oral argu-
ments; instead, it simply said "Judgement Affirmed."40 By not issuing
an opinion the Court set the stage for a decade of confusion about the
meaning of the summary affirmance. Every court throughout the coun-
try deciding upon the validity of a sodomy law has had to grapple with
the enigma of Doe.41
40. 425 U.S. 901 (1976). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens voted to hear
the case.
41. As if the unexplained affirmance by the Supreme Court on an issue of great
constitutional import was not mysterious enough, the dilemma is made even worse by
the poor quality of the district court's opinion.
First, parts of the opinion were ridiculously circular: "[I]f the State has the bur-
den of proving that it has a legitimate interest in the subject of the statute or that the
statute is rationally supportable, Virginia has completely fulfilled this obligation. Fun-
damentally, the State action is simply directed to the suppression of crime, whether
committed in public or private." 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1975). In short,
the law is constitutional because violations of it are illegal.
A second weakness of the decision is its distortion of Justice Harlan's dissent in
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), on which it relies heavily. In Poe the Court
declined to consider the merits of a challenge to the Connecticut law banning the use of
contraceptives which was declared unconstitutional four years later in Griswold.
Harlan believed the law to be unconstitutional. While Harlan did state that there can
be criminal sanctions against private homosexual activity, he stressed the degree to
which decisions on the constitutionality of state action reflect both precedent and the
times. Constitutional interpretation, Harlan wrote, cannot be approached "in a literalis-
tic way, as if we had a tax statute before us, but as the basic charter of our society,
setting out in spare but meaningful terms the principles of government." Id. at 540.
There is a balance struck between respect for the liberty of the individual and the
demands of organized society. "The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by
the country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it
developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living
thing." Id. at 542. The plaintiff argued that many people now approve of the use of
contraceptives by married people. Harlan commented:
What they do not emphasize is that not too long ago the current of opinion
was very probably quite the opposite, and that even today the issue is not
free of controversy. Certainly, Connecticut's judgment is no more demon-
strably correct or incorrect than are the varieties of judgment, expressed in
law, on marriage and divorce, on adult consensual homosexual conduct,
abortion and sterilization, on euthanasia and suicide.
Id. at 546-47. What the Doe court ignored was the flexibility of Harlan's jurispru-
dence. He believed that constitutional interpretation should reflect the times. The Doe
court, on the other hand, approached the Constitution in a "literalistic way," as if it
had a "tax statute" before it.
The third and greatest flaw of the Doe opinion is its failure to deal with the pri-
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The confusion sown by the summary affirmance in Doe became
even more pronounced after the decision in Carey v. Population Ser-
vices International.42 In Carey, the Court declared unconstitutional a
law which: 1) banned the distribution of contraceptives to anyone
under sixteen; 2) limited to licensed pharmacists distribution to those
over sixteen; and 3) banned the advertising or display of contraceptives.
Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion, the various sections of
which were joined by a varying number of Justices.
Early in the opinion Justice Brennan (writing for five Justices)
said that zones of privacy exist in which the government should not
interfere. Among them are a person's "interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions."4 3 Justice Brennan added
that "the outer limits of this aspect of privacy have not yet been deter-
mined. ' 44 A few pages later, writing for only four members, Justice
Brennan stated in an infamous footnote that "the Court has not defini-
vacy cases that followed Griswold. Two scholars who favor sodomy laws point out that
while the Doe court announced that Griswold was controlling, "it failed even to men-
tion the possible extensions of Griswold in Stanley v. Georgia, Eisenstadt, and
Roe. . . . An emerging constitutional quandry-whether after Stanley, Eisenstadt,
and Roe, a right existed to engage in private sexual practices outside the traditional
marital context-was thus assumed away by the Doe majority." Wilkinson & White,
Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563, 592
(1977).
It should be noted that Judge Merhige dissented, and wrote that he viewed Gris-
wold and the later cases "as standing for the principle that every individual has a right
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into one's decisions on matters of
intimate concern." 403 F. Supp. at 1203. Interestingly, Judge Merhige recently de-
clared unconstitutional sections of two laws proscribing private, consensual heterosex-
ual conduct. Doe v. Duling, 603 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Va. 1985). The Virginia fornica-
tion and cohabitation statutes prohibited "[a]ny person, not being married, who
voluntarily shall have sexual intercourse with any other person ... ,." VA. CODE §
18.2-344 (1950), and "any persons, not married to each other, [who] lewdly and lasciv-
iously associate and cohabit together or, whether married or not, be guilty of open and
gross lewdness and lasciviousness .. " VA. CODE § 18.2-345 (1950). Judge Merhige
accepted that Doe was binding, but only regarding homosexual conduct. The plaintiffs
in Doe v. Duling "do not assert a right to engage in such homosexual conduct; their
assertion is that, as applied to them, the cohabitation and fornication statutes are un-
constitutional." Doe v. Duling, 603 F. Supp. at 965.
Judge Merhige's decision was recently reversed by a panel of the Fourth Circuit.
Doe v. Duling, No. 85-1326 (Feb. 7, 1986) (available March 5, 1986, on Westlaw).
The court found that the plaintiffs failed to state a "case or controversy."
42. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
43. Id. at 684 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)).
44. Carey, 431 U.S. at 684.
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tively answered the difficult question whether and to what extent the
Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating [private consensual sex-
ual] behavior among adults. 45
Justice Powell, concurring in part and dissenting in part, took
strong exception with what he viewed as the majority's determination
that all state laws regulating adult sexual relations must withstand the
strict scrutiny test. "[T]he extraordinary protection the Court would
give to all personal decisions in matters of sex is neither required by the
Constitution nor supported by our prior decisions." '46
Justice Brennan's reply to Justice Powell, in a section supported by
six Justices, was that Justice Powell was incorrect in his understanding
of the majority opinion. Justice Brennan explained that, "[a]s we ob-
serve [in the section referred to above], 'the Court has not definitively
answered the difficult question whether and to what extent the Consti-
tution prohibits state statutes regulating [private consensual sexual] be-
havior among adults,' and we do not purport to answer that question
now."47 Justice White joined this section of Justice Brennan's opinion,
and added that he did not regard it as "declaring unconstitutional state
laws forbidding extramarital sexual relations. '"48
Finally, Justice Rehnquist wrote in dissent that he could not "let
pass without comment" the statement by the majority that the Court
has not definitively answered the question of constitutional protection
for private consensual sexual acts. "While we have not ruled on every
conceivable regulation affecting such conduct the facial constitutional
validity of criminal statutes prohibiting certain consensual acts has
been 'definitively' established." 49 Justice Rehnquist cited Doe v. Com-
monwealth's Attorney as authority for this statement.
When the Court granted certiorari in New York v. Uplinger" it
seemed ready to settle some of the issues involving the rights of homo-
sexuals. The defendant had been charged with violating a statute which
prohibited loitering "in a public place for the purpose of engaging, or
soliciting another person to engage, in deviate sexual intercourse or
45. Id. at 694 n.17.
46. Id. at 703. Justice Powell added that strict scrutiny should be applied "only
when the state regulation entirely frustrates or heavily burdens the exercise of constitu-
tional rights in this area." Id. at 705. This of course somewhat begs the question; what
are the "constitutional rights in this area?"
47. Id. at 688 n.5.
48. Id. at 702.
49. Id. at 718 n.2.
50. New York v. Uplinger, 104 S. Ct. 2332 (1984).
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other sexual behavior of a deviate nature.""1 The statute had been de-
clared unconstitutional by the New York Court of Appeals. 52 The Su-
preme Court accepted briefs from counsel and amici curiae and heard
oral argument, but in a 5-4 vote ruled that certiorari had been "im-
providently granted."53 In a per curiam opinion the majority said that
the statute was related to a sodomy statute that the New York Court
of Appeals had struck down in an earlier case,54 and that a decision on
the loitering law could not be made without a consideration of the ear-
lier decision. "[W]e are persuaded that this case provides an inappro-
priate vehicle for resolving the important constitutional issues raised by
the parties." 55 Justice White, in a dissent joined by three other Justices,
wrote that "[a]s I see it, the New York statute was invalidated on fed-
eral constitutional grounds, and the merits of that decision are properly
before us and should be addressed."56
The most recent Supreme Court case involving homosexuality was
Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. National Gay Task Force,5"
which concerned the first amendment rather than the right to privacy.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had declared unconstitutional a
law providing for the dismissal of teachers who advocated homosexual-
ity.58 The Supreme Court heard the case during the period in early-
1985 when Justice Powell was ill, and his absence left the Court dead-
locked 4-4.59 While some of the cases which Justice Powell missed were
51. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35-3 (McKinney 1980).
52. People v. Uplinger, 58 N.Y.2d 936, 447 N.E.2d 62, 460 N.Y.S.2d 514 (N.Y.
1983).
53. Uplinger, 104 S. Ct. at 2334.
54. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (N.Y.
1980), cert. denied sub nom. New York v. Onofre, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
55. Uplinger, 104 S. Ct. at 2334.
56. Id. at 2335.
57. 105 S. Ct. 1858 (1985).
58. National Gay Task Force v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City, 729 F.2d
1270 (10th Cir. 1984).
59. It is interesting to speculate how Justice Powell might have voted. However,
an examination of his previous decisions in the area is inconclusive. On the one hand,
he voted to uphold the constitutionality of the Virginia sodomy statute in Doe, and in
Carey wrote that neither "precedent nor sound principles of constitutional analysis"
justified the application of the strict scrutiny test whenever sexual freedom is affected
by a state law. Carey, 431 U.S. at 705. On the other hand, Justice Powell voted with
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun that certiorari had been improvi-
dently granted in New York v. Uplinger. It seems that on this issue as on many others,
Justice Powell (and to a lesser extent Justice Blackmun) controls the direction of the
Court. See National Law Journal, Sept. 2, 1985, at S-4, col. 3.
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rescheduled, this one was not.
Considering the summary affirmance in Doe, the finding that cer-
tiorari was improvidently granted in Uplinger, and the decision in
Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. National Gay Task Force
not to reschedule arguments, one cannot but agree that "[t]he Court
apparently is avoiding a written opinion involving homosexual rights." 60
This lack of leadership on an important issue has understandably left
the lower courts at a loss on how to rule on this difficult constitutional
issue.
V. Since Doe: Confusion in the Lower Courts
Lower courts have, not surprisingly, had difficulty determining the
Supreme Court's views on constitutional protection for private consen-
sual homosexual conduct. The issue has arisen infrequently in the lower
courts in challenges to sodomy statutes; more commonly it arises in
challenges to discharges from the military because of homosexuality.6 '
Some of the major cases that have dealt with the larger constitutional
issue will now be examined. 62
60. Note, Dronenburg v. Zech: The Wrong Case for Asserting a Right of Pri-
vacy for Homosexuals, 63 N.C.L. REv. 749, 759 n.126 (1985).
61. See Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 and
454 U.S. 855 (1981); Hatheway v. Secretary of the Army, 641 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981); Miller v. Rumsfeld, 647 F.2d 80 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981); Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir.
1984); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, reh'g denied, 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir.
1984); and benShalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
62. Cases which deal with homosexual rights but which do not consider even
tangentially the right of privacy will not be considered. For example, Mississippi Gay
Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976) (not unconstitutional for a news-
paper at a state college to refuse to run an ad for a gay student group, if the editors
alone make the decision and if they are not pressured by the college administration);
National Gay Task Force v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City, 729 F.2d 1270
(10th Cir. 1984) (law requiring that teachers be dismissed for "advocating" homosexu-
ality is unconstitutional); Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (constitutionality of discharge of airman by Air Force cannot be determined
without learning what the military's reasons were); benShalom v. Secretary of the
Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (dismissal from military for homosexual
orientation-as opposed to actual conduct-violates first amendment rights); Krugler v.
United States Army, No. 83-C8265 (E.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 1984) (available August 29,
1985, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Newer file) (suit to contest dismissal from the mili-
tary is dismissed for being "premature," as plaintiff had not exhausted her administra-
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Cases decided soon after Doe found the Supreme Court's summary
affirmance to be binding. In Lovisi v. Slayton 3 a husband and wife
who allowed a third person into their bedroom were convicted of sod-
omy. The right to privacy was lost, the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals declared, when that third person became involved. In an adden-
dum written after Doe was decided, the Lovisi court found that Doe
"necessarily confined the constitutionally protected right of privacy to
heterosexual conduct, probably even that only within the marital
relationship. '6 4
A state university's refusal to give full recognition to a gay student
group was found to be unconstitutional in Gay Alliance of Students v.
Matthews.6 5 The court said that it had "little doubt that the University
could constitutionally regulate [homosexual] conduct," but there was
no indication that the organization was engaged in such conduct. 66
A few years after Doe some state courts, perhaps feeling more in-
dependent than the lower federal courts, struck down state sodomy
laws. Often the decisions were based on federal constitutional grounds.
In State v. Saunders67 the New Jersey Supreme Court found the
state's fornication law to be unconstitutional. "[T]he conduct statuto-
rily defined as fornication involves, by its very nature, a fundamental
choice. Thus, the statute infringes upon the right to privacy."6 , The
court said that its decision was "consistent with the tenor and thrust"
of the recent United States Supreme Court decisions. It dealt with Doe
by stating that it was "not inclined to read this controversial decision
too broadly. Though the lower court's decision is technically binding as
a precedent, . . . it does not necessarily represent the reasoning of the
Court. . . .Furthermore, the significance of Doe .. .is a matter of
tive remedies). Also not discussed are attacks on sodomy statutes as being unconstitu-
tionally vague. See Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971) (law punishing
"[w]hoever commits the abominable and detestable crime against nature, either with
mankind or with beast" is unconstitutionally vague). The Florida Supreme Court later
upheld the constitutionality of FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West 1980), which prohibits
"unnatural and lascivious acts with another person." Thomas v. State, 326 So. 2d 413
(Fla. 1976) and Johnsen v. State, 332 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1976).
63. 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1977).
64. Id. at 352.
65. 544 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1976).
66. Id. at 166.
67. 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977).
68. Id. at N.J. 213, A.2d 339.
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some dispute within the Court [Carey is cited]." '69 The decision may
also have been based on rights under the New Jersey Constitution.70
The next year a New Jersey Superior Court stated its view that the
Saunders opinion had impliedly declared the state's sodomy law to be
unconstitutional.7 1
Not long after the Saunders decision New York joined New
Jersey in refusing to be bound by Doe. In People v. Onofre2 the New
York Court of Appeals found that the state's sodomy law violated the
federal Constitution's right to privacy and right to equal protection.
The court said of Doe that "the affirmance by the Supreme Court of
the District Court's dismissal of the action may have been predicated
on a lack of standing on the part of the plaintiffs. ' 3
The same year as Onofre, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled
unconstitutional the state's "Voluntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse"
statute.74 In Commonwealth v. Bonadio75 the court said that the law
"has only one possible purpose: to regulate the private conduct of con-
senting adults. Such a purpose, we believe, exceeds the valid bounds of
the police power while infringing the right to equal protection of the
laws guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and of this
Commonwealth. '76 The law, "despite the fact that it provides punish-
ment for what many believe to be abhorrent crimes against nature and
perceived sins against God, is not properly in the realm of the temporal
69. Id. at N.J. 216, A.2d 340-41.
70. Id. After discounting the effect of Doe and discussing the U.S. Supreme
Court's decisions on privacy, the New Jersey Court added that its decision was also
"impelled" by its own prior decisions on privacy. "It is now settled that the right of
privacy guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment has an analogue in our State
Constitution." Id. at N.J. 216, A.2d 341.
71. State v. Ciuffini, 164 N.J. Super. 145, 395 A.2d 904 (1978).
72. 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied sub
nom. New York v. Onofre, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
73. Id., 51 N.Y.2d at 493, 415 N.E.2d at 943, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 954. The view
that the Supreme Court's decision may have been based on a lack of standing is not
rare. See infra Section IV(C). A "companion" loitering statute was struck down by the
Court of Appeals in People v. Uplinger, 58 N.Y.2d 936, 447 N.E.2d 62, 460 N.Y.S.2d
947 (1983), cert. dismissed sub nom. New York v. Uplinger, 104 S. Ct. 2332 (1984).
74. Deviate sexual intercourse was defined as "[s]exual intercourse per os or per
anus [sic] between human beings who are not husband and wife ... " 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3101 (Purdon 1973).
75. 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980).
76. Id. at 95, 415 A.2d at 50.
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police powers."77 Despite the fact that the decision was based in part
on federal constitutional law, the court failed to mention Doe. More
surprising are the facts of the case: Plaintiff Bonadio was the cashier at
the Penthouse Theater, where "exotic dancer" Mildred Kannitz (a.k.a.
"Dawn Delight") was arrested for engaging in sexual acts with mem-
bers of the audience." The dancers, theater owner, and participating
members of the audience were also arrested. The sexual acts involved
were arguably both public and commercial, yet the court ruled that the
statute was facially unconstitutional. 9
Questioning of the precedential effect of the Doe summary affirm-
ance became increasingly common, especially in light of the indication
in Carey that the Supreme Court had not yet "definitively" settled the
issue of constitutional protection for private sexual acts.80 For example,
a federal district court in benShalom v. Army stated in dictum that
"the law remains unsettled as to whether private sexual conduct be-
tween consenting adults is protected by the right to privacy ... "I'
Whenever possible, federal courts avoided the issue. In Belier v.
Middendorft2 two men and one woman were discharged from the Navy
for separately engaging in homosexual acts. The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals upheld the discharges, but stated that "this case does not
require us to address whether consensual private homosexual conduct is
a fundamental right. . . ."" The nature of the employer-the
Navy-was crucial to the court's decision. 84
77. Id. at 96, 415 A.2d at 50.
78. Id. at 101, 415 A.2d at 52 (Nix, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 102, 415 A.2d at 53 (Nix, J., dissenting) ("Here the sex acts were
performed in public and in return for monetary compensation") (emphasis in the
original).
80. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 694 n.17 (1977).
81. benShalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 976 (E.D. Wis.
1980).
82. 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 and 454 U.S. 855
(1981).
83. Id. at 807.
84. Id. at 810. The court explained the narrow scope of its decision:
[W]e can concede arguendo that the reasons which led the [Supreme]
Court to protect certain private decisions intimately linked with one's per-
sonality ... and family living arrangements beyond the core nuclear fam-
ily . . . suggest that some kinds of government regulation of private con-
sensual homosexual behavior may face substantial constitutional
challenge. . . . The instant cases, however, are not ones in which the state
seeks to use its criminal processes to coerce persons to comply with a moral
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A bold exception to the trend toward avoiding the issue was Baker
v. Wade,85 in which a district court for the Northern District of Texas
found that the Texas deviate sexual intercourse law was an unconstitu-
tional violation of the right to privacy and the right to equal protection.
"The right to privacy . . . extend[s] to private sexual conduct between
consenting adults (whether heterosexual or homosexual) ... .
More common was the approach of the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals in United States v. Lemons.87 The court upheld the conviction,
under a state sodomy statute, of a man who engaged in sexual acts
with another man in a public restroom. The Court declined to consider
a facial challenge to the law, and thereby avoided having to determine
the meaning of Doe and Carey. "We only decide whether the Arkansas
sodomy statute as applied to sexual acts between members of the same
sex in a public restroom-the circumstances of Lemons' conviction-is
constitutional." 88 The court emphasized that it "did not reach the ques-
tion whether the statute is constitutional under all hypothetical circum-
stances." 89 Judge Fagg, concurring, wrote that the "issue of Lemons'
right to make private affectional choices is not involved in our
holding." 90
The Tenth Circuit acted similarly in Rich v. Secretary of the
Army.9 1 The court upheld a serviceman's discharge from the Army for
precept even if they are consenting adults acting in private without injury
to each other .... The nature of the employer-the Navy-is crucial to
our decision.
Id.
The court reaffirmed its rationale in Hatheway v. Secretary of the Army, 641 F.2d
1376 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981), and in Watkins v. United States
Army, 721 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1983) (Norris, J., concurring at 691: Belier is binding,
but "[tlo me, the Army's current bias against homosexuals is no less repugnant to
fundamental constitutional principles than was its long-standing prejudice against mi-
nority servicemen").
85. 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Texas 1982), rev'd en banc, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.
1985). See infra text accompanying notes 101 to 106. The district court opinion is
perhaps the best yet written on the subject of homosexuality. Scientific, psychological,
sociological and religious perspectives on homosexuality are considered. In addition, the
opinion is unique in that it discusses what it is like to be homosexual in America. Id. at
1126-28.
86. Baker, 553 F. Supp. at 1140.
87. 697 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1983).
88. Id. at 834 n.4.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 839.
91. 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984).
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fraudulently stating on his application that he was not homosexual.
Once again the constitutional issue was avoided:
[I]t is unnecessary for us to decide whether there is any constitu-
tional protection for private consensual homosexual conduct among
adults. Even if we assume, arguendo, that the constitutional right
to privacy protects some private consensual homosexual activity
among adults, it does not follow that the Army could not exclude
homosexuals. 92
The court noted that whether private consensual homosexual activity is
constitutionally protected "appears to be an unsettled question" on
which "the authorities have not been in agreement. ... "'
In recent years, then, a consensus had emerged among the lower
courts: Whenever possible avoid the question of constitutional protec-
tion for private consensual homosexual acts. There was general agree-
ment that the issue was unsettled.94
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, in Dronenburg v. Zech,9 5 de-
parted from the consensus and considered the constitutional issue head-
on. The facts were like those in many other cases: A serviceman was
discharged from the Navy for engaging in a homosexual act. Instead of
narrowly upholding the discharge, the Circuit Court, in an opinion by
Judge Robert Bork, reviewed the Supreme Court's opinions on privacy.
Judge Bork was very critical of the line of cases beginning with Gris-
wold,96 finding that no clear legal standard had evolved over time.
"Aside from prior listed holdings, the Court provided no explanatory
principle that informs a lower court how to reason about what is and
what is not encompassed by the right to privacy."9 Judge Bork wrote
92. Id. at 1228 (emphasis in original).
93. Id. at 1228 n.8.
94. See, more generally, City of North Muskegon v. Briggs, 105 S. Ct. 3535,
3536 (1985) (certiorari denied-but leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted-in a
case in which a man was awarded damages after being fired from a police department
for being a married man living with a married woman who was not his wife; White, J.,
dissenting from denial of cert, wrote that the lower courts are in disagreement on the
issue of constitutional protection for extra-marital sexual activity).
95. 741 F.2d 1388, reh'g en banc denied, 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
96. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
97. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1395. Judge Bork's statement is not correct. See the
discussion of "intimate associations" in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct.
3244 (1984). See also infra text accompanying notes 192 to 198. Roberts was decided
a month and a half before the Dronenburg decision. Perhaps Judge Bork was not famil-
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that the privacy cases protected activities related to marriage, procrea-
tion, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and educa-
tion. "It need hardly be said that none of those covers a right to engage
in homosexual conduct." 98 In conclusion, Judge Bork wrote that "we
can find no constitutional right to engage in homosexual conduct, and
... . as judges, we have no warrant to create one." 99 The opinion was
the subject of intense criticism from other judges in the D.C. Circuit
and from academic critics.1 °0
A recent Fifth Circuit decision on constitutional protection for pri-
vate homosexual conduct was a throw-back to the cases decided almost
a decade earlier 01 in that Doe was found to be fully binding. The
Court of Appeals sitting en banc in Baker v. Wade1 °2 found in a 9-7
decision that the Texas sodomy statute 03 did not violate the Constitu-
Jar with the case.
98. Id. at 1395-96.
99. Id. at 1397.
100. See Dronenburg v. Zech, 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Dissenting from
the denial of a rehearing en banc, Judges Spottswood W. Robinson, Wald, Mikva, and
Harry T. Edwards wrote that the "panel's extravagant exegesis on the constitutional
right to privacy was wholly unnecessary to decide the case before the court." Id. at
1580.
We find particularly inappropriate the panel's attempt to wipe away se-
lected Supreme Court decisions in the name of judicial restraint. Regard-
less of whether it is the proper role of lower federal courts to 'create new
constitutional rights,' . . . surely it is not their function to conduct a gen-
eral spring cleaning of constitutional law. Judicial restraint begins at
home.
Id. "Instead of conscientiously attempting to discern the principles underlying the Su-
preme Court's privacy decisions, the panel has in effect thrown up their hands and
decided to confine those decisions to their facts." Id.
The case could have been decided on several narrow grounds. First, there is a
judicial deference to military regulations, as in many of the military cases cited above.
Second, the homosexual activity in Dronenburg took place on military premises. Third,
the acts were between a petty officer and a lower-ranked enlisted man. Note,
Dronenburg v. Zech: The Wrong Case for Asserting A Right of Privacy for Homosex-
uals, 63 N.C.L. REV. 749, 766 (1985). See also Note, Dronenburg v. Zech: Judicial
Restraint or Judicial Prejudice?, 3 YALE L. & POLICY REV. 245 (1985); Saphire, Gay
Rights and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Theory, Practice, and
Dronenburg v. Zech, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 767 (1985); and Note, Dronenburg v.
Zech: Sexual Preference Discrimination Sanctioned in the Name of Judicial Restraint
5 PACE L. REV. 847 (1985).
101. See supra text accompanying notes 63 to 66.
102. Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289, reh'g denied, 774 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1985).
103. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1974). The law makes criminal
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tion. In reversing a district court decision, the majority devoted most of
its opinion to procedural matters. 04 The discussion of the constitutional
issue was limited to two paragraphs. The majority cited no Supreme
Court privacy decisions other than Doe; instead it simply stated that it
considered Doe "to be binding upon us for the reasons stated" by the
Dronenburg court and in the dissent in Hardwick v. Bowers. 0 5 The
court said that it would follow Doe until the Supreme Court issues an
"unequivocal statement that Doe no longer controls."'' 06 It is interesting
to recall, however, that the Dronenburg court did not base its decision
fully on Doe. Judge Bork examined the Supreme Court's decisions on
privacy. The Baker court decided the issue much more narrowly, and
did not consider the merits at all; it declared that it was foreclosed
from such consideration by Doe.
The lower courts are obviously deeply divided on the question of
engaging "in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex." "De-
viate sexual intercourse" is defined as "any contact between any part of the genitals of
one person and the mouth or anus of another." TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.01 (1)
(Vernon 1974).
104. The case has an interesting history. The law was first declared unconstitu-
tional in a far-reaching district court opinion. Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D.
Texas 1982). The Texas Attorney General decided not to appeal, after which the Dis-
trict Attorney of Potter County, Texas, petitioned the court for permission to appeal
the decision. The Circuit Court ruled that the appeal was proper, but there was vigor-
ous dissent. Judge Alvin B. Rubin, writing for the seven dissenters, said of the major-
ity's allowing the District Attorney to appeal:
Determined to uphold the constitutionality of a Texas statute whatever ob-
stacles bar the way, the majority opinion tramples every procedural rule it
considers. . . .If this en banc decision is precedent, it assuredly rewrites
the adjective law. If it is not intended to be precedential, but only a special
life-support contrivance, undertaken for the one purpose of salvaging the
statute, it denies equal justice both to the litigants before us and to those
who, in the future, will be denied equally extreme judicial measure.
Baker, 769 F.2d at 293. The seven dissenters, with one exception, expressed no opinion
on the constitutional issues. They believed that the lower court decision should stand
because the District Attorney did not have standing to bring the appeal.
The Fifth Circuit's denial of the petition for a rehearing en banc, 774 F.2d 1285,
contains a longer discussion of the constitutional issue. Judge Reavley, writing for the
Court, said that the issue of constitutional protection for private sexual acts should be
decided by the legislature, not the courts. "Moral issues should be resolved by the
people, and the laws pertaining thereto should be written or rescinded by the represent-
atives of the people." Id. at 1287.
105. Baker, 769 F.2d at 292.
106. Id. This is based on a misreading of the Supreme Court's decisions on the
precedential weight of summary affirmances. See infra note 178.
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constitutional protection for private homosexual conduct. Many courts
have avoided the issue completely. The Fifth Circuit, in Baker, found
Doe to be fully binding. The Dronenburg court seemed to find that Doe
was not binding, and decided that the right to privacy did not extend to
homosexual acts. The Eleventh Circuit, in Hardwick v. Bowers, staked
out a new position in the controversy.
VI. Hardwick v. Bowers
After years of judicial evasions of the issues raised in Doe, the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals decided in Dronenburg
that it was time to consider the merits of the question of constitutional
protection for private consensual homosexual conduct.107  The
Dronenburg court found that no constitutional protection of homosex-
ual conduct existed.110 A few months later a panel of the Eleventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals considered the same question but reached the
opposite conclusion and found that the right to privacy was indeed im-
plicated by laws regulating private consensual homosexual conduct.
Hardwick v. Bowers0 9 thus became the first Court of Appeals decision
in which such a constitutional right was declared to exist.110
107. The Supreme Court's failure to address the constitutional issue in New
York v. Uplinger, 104 S. Ct. 2332 (1984), may have contributed to the willingness of
the Dronenburg court (and later the Hardwick court) to find Doe to be of little prece-
dential weight.
108. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1397.
109. 760 F.2d 1202, reh'g en banc denied, 765 F.2d 1123 (lth Cir.), cert.
granted, 106 S. Ct. 342 (1985). The district court, in an unpublished opinion by Judge
Robert H. Hall, dismissed Hardwick's suit as failing to state a claim on which relief
could be granted, in light of the Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Doe. On
appeal the Circuit Court found that Doe is not binding precedent and that there is
constitutional protection for private consensual homosexual conduct. The case was re-
manded with the instruction that the district court should uphold the sodomy law only
if the state could demonstrate a compelling interest for the law and that the law was
drawn as narrowly as possible in accomplishing that state interest. Hardwick, 760 F.2d
at 1213. The determination that a compelling state interest must be shown-that is,
that the law must meet the strict scrutiny test mentioned in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 155 (1973)-is important. "[T]he outcome of a case depends largely upon which
standard of review the court uses . . . ." Note, Constitutional Protection of Private
Sexual Conduct Among Consenting Adults: Another Look at Sodomy Statutes, 62
IOWA L. REV. 568, 579 (1976). It is very difficult for a law to survive the strict scrutiny
test.
110. Judge Frank Johnson wrote the opinion for a divided court. Senior Judge
Elbert P. Tuttle concurred. Judge Phyllis A. Kravitch dissented on the ground the Doe
1985]
134
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss1/1
Nova Law Journal
Before reaching the constitutional question the Hardwick court
had to consider four questions: 1) whether Hardwick had standing to
sue; 2) how much precedential weight is generally given to summary
affirmances; 3) what the Supreme Court actually decided in Doe; and
4) whether decisions since Doe have released the lower courts from fol-
lowing the summary affirmance.
A. Hardwick's Standing to Sue
A threshold question in every lawsuit in the federal courts is
whether there is a "case or controversy.""' If the plaintiff lacks stand-
ing the court does not have the authority to decide on the merits of the
case. All the judges who considered Hardwick v. Bowers (the district
court judge and both the majority and the dissenter in the court of
appeals) found that Hardwick met the Constitutional requirement of
standing. 112 Nevertheless, the case raises some difficult questions which
must be considered. While the State of Georgia is not contesting stand-
ing in the Supreme Court, 113 the Court can raise the issue on its own.
Considering the Court's reticence to decide gay rights cases, it would
not be suprising if the Court vacated the judgement below on the
ground that Hardwick lacked standing.
To gain standing a plaintiff must at a minimum show that: 1) he
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury; 2) the injury was
the result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant; and 3) the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.1 4 Past injury is
was controlling. She stated, though, that were it not for Doe she too would have found
a constitutional protection for private consensual homosexual acts. Hardwick, 760 F.2d
at 1213 n.l.
111. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
112. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1204-07. Co-plaintiffs with Hardwick were John and
Mary Doe, a heterosexual couple. They claimed that the sodomy law left them "uncer-
tain" of their legal rights. Id. at 1206. Both the district and circuit courts found that
the Does did not have standing.
113. Phone conversation with Michael Hobbs, Georgia Senior Assistant Attorney
General, August 12, 1985. See also Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
114. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). In addition to the constitutional
requirements there are prudential considerations in determining whether a plaintiff has
standing: I) The plaintiff should assert his own rights, rather than the rights of others,
2) Generalized grievances shared with the rest of society will be left to the representa-
tive branches of government, and 3) The complaint should concern interests protected
by statute or Constitution. Id. at 474-75.
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not sufficient to gain standing "if unaccompanied by any continuing,
present, adverse effects." 115 Past wrongs may, however, provide an indi-
cation of the likelihood of future harm." 6 A person challenging the
constitutionality of a statute need not expose himself to arrest, but
there must be a threat of prosecution that is "credible" rather than
"imaginary or speculative.""117
In recent years the Supreme Court has restricted its view of stand-
ing. This approach, it has been argued, is "representative of the Court's
general disapproval of public law litigation and reflects the Court's de-
sire to limit the role of the federal courts."" 8
Perhaps the most important of these recent cases is Lyons v. City
of Los Angeles." 9 The facts in Lyons are similar to those in Hardwick
in that the plaintiffs in both cases challenged governmental actions
which they had previously been exposed to, but which there was no
guarantee they would ever again have to face. In Lyons the plaintiff
was stopped for a traffic violation. Lyons claimed not to have offered
any resistance, but nevertheless was subjected to a choke hold which
caused him to temporarily become unconscious. Lyons requested in-
junctive relief, but the Supreme Court ruled that he lacked standing.
Justice White wrote in the 5-4 decision "[t]hat Lyons may have been
illegally choked ...does nothing to establish a real and immediate
threat that he would again be stopped for a traffic violation, or for any
other offense, by an officer or officers who would illegally choke him
into unconsciousness without any provocation or resistance on his
part."' 20 The plaintiff's fear of repeated injury is irrelevant. "It is the
reality of the threat of repeated injury that is relevant to the standing
inquiry, not the plaintiff's subjective apprehensions."'' "Absent a suffi-
cient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar way, Lyons
is no more entitled to an injunction that any other citizen of Los Ange-
les . . . ," and the federal courts cannot entertain a claim by a citizen
who simply asserts that certain practices of law enforcement officers
115. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974).
116. Id. at 496.
117. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289, 299
(1979).
118. Note, Standing and Injunctions: The Demise of Public Law Litigation and
Other Effects of Lyons, 25 B.C.L. REv. 765, 769 (1984).
119. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
120. Id. at 105.
121. Id. at 107 n.8 (emphasis in original).
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are unconstitutional.' 22
In Hardwick the majority found that four factors combined to give
Hardwick standing. First, the prior arrest showed that Hardwick's fear
of future prosecution is reasonable. 123 Second, there was a "continuing
resolve on the part of the State to enforce the sodomy statute against
homosexuals .... "124 Third, Hardwick stated that "his arrest resulted
from a situation in which he regularly places himself, one that will re-
cur often in the future. ' 125 Fourth, Hardwick's homosexual "status"
suggests that his stated desire to violate the statute is sincere, rather
than merely an attempt to gain standing.126
The Hardwick majority considered the above factors and con-
cluded that Michael Hardwick had standing to challenge Georgia's
sodomy statute. 127 Another court, looking at the same facts, could eas-
ily come to the opposite conclusion. It does seem unlikely that the po-
lice will once again stumble upon Mr. Hardwick in flagrante delicto. A
more convincing analysis of Hardwick's standing can be gained by
comparing his case with Lyons. As the Supreme Court recently stated,
"[iln many cases the standing question can be answered chiefly by
comparing the allegations of the particular complaint to those made in
122. Id. at 111.
123. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1205. This might appear to contradict the Supreme
Court's statement that fear of repeated injury is irrelevant. See supra text ac-
commpanying note 121. However, the Hardwick majority was referring to a reasonable
fear, which seems to be what the Supreme Court was concerned with.
124. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1206. The court bases this statement on Hardwick's
assertion that the Atlanta police enforce the statute "in a way that places all practicing
homosexuals in imminent danger of arrest." Id. at 1205. The court noted that
"[b]ecause Hardwick appeals from a dismissal for failure to state a claim on which
relief can be granted, the allegations of his complaint must be taken as true." Id. at
1205 n.4.
Hardwick said in a brief to the court that the Georgia sodomy statute is routinely
and consistently enforced. He claimed that had he been permitted to proceed with dis-
covery he "could show that there are people now serving time in prison for sodomy."
Appellants' Reply Brief at 3. The court does not mention this seemingly important
assertion.
125. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1205.
126. Id. "While a plaintiff hoping only to challenge a statute might overestimate
his or her willingness to risk actual prosecution, a plaintiff who genuinely desires to
engage in conduct regardless of its legal status presents a court with a more plausible
threat of future prosecution." Id.
127. The Does (the heterosexual co-plaintiffs) were found to lack standing. Id. at
1206-07.
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"1128prior standing cases.
There is a clear similarity between the facts in Lyons and those in
Hardwick. As mentioned above, each plaintiff sued the government on
constitutional grounds, and each based his claim to standing in consid-
erable measure on a prior incident which is not very likely to recur.
There are, however, substantial differences between the two cases. 129
First, Hardwick continues to suffer from the stigma of his criminal
status.130 His stigmatic injury stands separate from his arrest. Whether
or not he had been arrested this would be the case. His arrest simply
adds to the injury. In contrast, there was no allegation that Lyons had
done anything seriously improper. Neither the Los Angeles police nor
the laws of California suggest that Lyons had committed any offense
more serious than a traffic violation.
Second, while Lyons is no more likely than any other Los Angeles
resident to have the choke hold applied to him, Hardwick is much more
likely than the average Georgian to be arrested for violating the State's
sodomy statute. Hardwick is a regular violator of the law, and the po-
lice are aware of this. In addition, it seems reasonable to believe that
the law, which facially applies to heterosexual as well as homosexual
acts, is more likely to be enforced against homosexuals. In sum, there
are few people in the state of Georgia who are known to violate the
128. Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3325 (1984).
129. One difference that will be only briefly mentioned is that Lyons asked for
injunctive relief, while Hardwick requested only a declaratory judgment. Appellants'
Reply Brief at 4. It is unclear whether Lyons also applies to declaratory judgments. In
Lyons the Court relied upon cases dealing with declaratory judgments. "It bears noting
that the Lyons Court's reliance on declaratory judgment decisions has caused at least
one district court to find that . . . 'Lyons fully applies to declaratory judgment ac-
tions.'" Note, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 165, 170 n.24
(1985). "Arguably the Court implicitly approved the application of Lyons to declara-
tory judgments in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983)." Id.
For an argument that one cannot logically claim both that Hardwick lacks stand-
ing and that Doe was decided on the merits, see infra note 160.
130. The Supreme Court has recognized that "stigma" alone can be the basis of
standing. See Heckler v. Matthews, 104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984), and Allen, 104 S. Ct. at
3315. In Allen, Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court that "[t]here can be no doubt
that this sort of noneconomic injury is one of the most serious consequences of discrimi-
natory government action and is sufficient in some circumstances to support standing."
Allen, 104 S. Ct. at 3327. "The stigmatic injury thus requires identification of some
concrete interest with respect to which respondents are personally subject to discrimi-
natory treatment." Id. at 3328 n.22.
For more on Hardwick's stigmatic injury, see supra note 7 and accompanying
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State's sodomy law; none are better known than Michael Hardwick.
Third, the theoretical basis for Lyons does not apply to the facts in
Hardwick. The essence of Lyons (and of earlier similar decisions such
as O'Shea v. Littleton 3' and Rizzo v. Goode12) is that the judiciary
must allow the executive branch wide latitude in administering the
laws. In O'Shea residents of Cairo, Illinois, claimed that city officials
used racially discriminatory practices in bond setting, sentencing, and
jury fee payments. In Rizzo, citizens filed suit against city officials to
obtain injunctive relief against abuses by the Philadelphia police. In
Lyons, choke holds applied by police to peaceful traffic offenders were
challenged. In none of these cases was there a claim that any law was
unconstitutional.
Justice White wrote in O'Shea that it was significant that the
plaintiff did not allege that any criminal statute was unconstitutional
facially or as applied, or "that respondents have been or will be im-
properly charged with violating criminal law."' 3 3 A "reluctance to in-
terfere with the normal operation of state administration of its criminal
laws in the manner sought by respondents strengthens the conclusion"
that the plaintiffs lacked standing.3 In Lyons, Justice White said that
"recognition of the need for a proper balance between state and federal
authority counsels restraint in the issuance of injunctions against state
officers engaged in the administration of the state's criminal laws in the
absence of irreparable injury which is both great and immediate.' 3 5
What was strongly implied in O'Shea and Lyons was explicitly
stated in Allen v. Wright. 36 Justice O'Connor wrote that in O'Shea,
Rizzo, and Lyons the plaintiffs "sought injunctive relief directed at cer-
tain systemwide law enforcement practices. . . . Animating this
Court's holdings was the principle that '[a] federal court . . . is not the
proper forum to press' general complaints about the way in which gov-
ernment goes about its business."'31 7 The opinion continued:
When transported into the Art. III context, that principle [that
government has wide latitude to dispatch its own internal affairs],
grounded as it is in the idea of separation of powers, counsels
131. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
132. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
133. O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 496.
134. Id. at 498-99.
135. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 112.
136. 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984).
137. Id. at 3330 (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111-12).
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against recognizing standing in a case brought, not to enforce spe-
cific legal obligations whose violation works a direct harm, but to
seek a restructuring of the apparatus established by the Executive
Branch to fulfill its legal duties. The Constitution, after all, assigns
to the Executive Branch and not the Judicial Branch, the duty to
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. Const. Art.
II, § 3.138
Justice Stevens, in dissent, argued that standing decisions should not be
based upon whether the relief sought by the plaintiff "would intrude
upon the prerogatives of other branches of government; the possibility
that the relief might be inappropriate does not lessen the plaintiff's
stake in obtaining that relief." 139 The majority responded that it dis-
agreed with Justice Stevens' "suggestions that separation of powers
merely underly standing requirements, have no role to play in giving
meaning to those requirements, and should be considered only under a
distinct justiciability analysis. . . . [We] rely on separation of powers
principles to interpret the 'fairly traceable' component of the standing
requirement."1 40
Lyons is clearly inspired by a judicial reluctance to interfere with
the way the executive branch enforces the laws. The Court is willing to
grant the executive branch a great deal of leeway. In Hardwick, by
contrast, executive and administrative actions are not at issue. Hard-
wick does not claim that the Georgia sodomy law is unconstitutionally
administered; instead, he argues that the law itself is unconstitutional.
The issue is not the way the law is enforced, but the validity of the law
itself. In sum, the concern for federalism that underlies O'Shea, Rizzo,
and Lyons is not at issue in Hardwick. Applying the law of Lyons to
the facts in Hardwick would require the separation of the doctrine
from its theoretical foundation.
Hardwick, then, can be distinguished from Lyons. The narrow test
for standing stated in Lyons is not applicable to Hardwick. Michael
Hardwick, more so than any other person in Georgia, is injured by the
State's sodomy law. He has been arrested for violating it, the police are
aware that he will continue to violate it, and he continues to suffer
from the stigma of being branded a criminal. These factors combine to
form a reasonable argument that Hardwick has suffered some injury,
138. Id. at 3330.
139. Id. at 3346.
140. Id. at 3330 n.26.
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"actual or threatened," '141 and has standing to sue.
B. The Precedential Effect of Summary Affirmances
A tenet basic to the American judicial system is that lower courts
must comply with and follow the decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court. This truism is, however, often easier to state than to put
into practice. When the Court speaks less than clearly the precise obli-
gation of lower courts becomes uncertain. The obligation of the lower
courts is perhaps never more difficult to determine than when, as in
Doe, the Court's decision was a mere summary affirmance.
In finding that Doe was not binding precedent, the Hardwick ma-
jority had to consider the precedential weight of summary affirmances.
As the Supreme Court's workload has increased in recent years sum-
mary affirmances have become more common. Accompanying this in-
crease has been a debate about whether summary affirmances carry the
same precedential weight as cases which are decided after briefs and
oral argument and which are explained by an opinion of the Court. The
Court has yet to comprehensively discuss the issue, but several themes
have become apparent:
1) Summary affirmances have precedential weight, but not as
much as fully considered and explained opinions.142
2) Lower courts must use care in interpreting what issues the
Supreme Court decided in declaring a summary affirmance. 43
3) Summary affirmances affirm the judgment below, but not nec-
essarily the reasoning of the lower court.144
141. Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 472.
142. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974) (summary affirmances
"obviously" have precedential value, but "[e]qually obviously they are not of the same
precedential value as would be an opinion of this Court treating the question on the
merits"); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975) (summary affirmances are deci-
sions on the merits, and must be followed by the lower courts until the Supreme Court
says otherwise or until "doctrinal developments" indicate otherwise); Tully v. Griffin,
Inc., 429 U.S. 68, 74 (1976) (a summary affirmance is not of the same precedential
weight as a decision on the merits); Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Work-
ers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 180-81 (1979) ("summary affirmances have considerably less
precedential value than an opinion on the merits").
143. "Ascertaining the reach and content of summary actions may itself present
issues of real substance .. " Hicks, 422 U.S. at 345 n.14. See also Fusari v. Stein-
berg, 419 U.S. 379, 388 n.15 (1975).
144.
The District Court erred in believing that our affirmance in [a previ-
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4) Summary affirmances "without doubt reject the specific chal-
lenges presented in the statement of jurisdiction" and "pre-
vent lower courts from coming to opposite conclusions on the
precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those
actions."145
5) Summary affirmances cease to become binding precedents for
the lower courts "when doctrinal developments indicate
otherwise."1 46
6) Summary affirmances do not have the same authority within
the Supreme Court as do fully considered opinions. 147 "In-
deed, upon fuller consideration of an issue under plenary re-
view, the Court has not hesitated to discard a rule which a
line of summary affirmances may appear to have
established. ' 4 s
ous case] adopted the reasoning as well as the judgment of the three-judge
court in that case .... Because a summary affirmance is an affirmance of
the judgment only, the rationale of the affirmance may not be gleaned
solely from the opinion below.
Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977). See also Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S.
at 391-92 (Burger, C.J., concurring: "When we summarily affirm, without opinion, the
judgment of a three-judge District Court we affirm the judgment but not necessarily
the reasoning by which it was reached."); Washington v. Confederated Bands and
Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 476-77 n.20 (1979) ("A summary
dismissal of an appeal represents no more than a view that the judgment appealed from
was correct as to those federal questions raised and necessary to the decision. It does
not, as we have continued to stress .... necessarily reflect our agreement with the
opinion of the court whose judgment is appealed."); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64
n.13 (1982) ("[S]ummary affirmance by this Court is not to be read as an adoption of
the reasoning supporting the judgment under review.").
145. Mandel, 432 U.S. at 176. See also Tully, 429 U.S. at 74 ("The correctness
of that holding was placed squarely before us by the Jurisdictional Statement that the
appellants filed in this Court in [an earlier case]."); Washington v. Confederated Bands
and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. at 476-77 n.20 (summary dismis-
sals are rulings on the merits in that they reject the challenges presented in the juris-
dictional statement).
146. Hicks, 422 U.S. at 344, quoting Port Authority Bondholders Protective
Committee v. Port of New York Authority, 387 F.2d 259, 263 n.3 (2d Cir. 1967).
147. Metromedia v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 500 (1981) (summary affirmances
"do not present the same justification for declining to reconsider a prior decision as do
decisions rendered after argument and with full opinion.")
148. Fusari, 419 U.S. at 392 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See also Washington v.
Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 476-77
n.20 (1979) ("It is not at all unusual for the Court to find it appropriate to give full
consideration to a question that has been the subject of a previous summary action.").
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There are two arguments, then, available to those who wish to find that
Doe has no precedential effect: 1) The summary affirmance in Doe did
not decide the issue of constitutional protection for private consensual
homosexual acts, and 2) Doctrinal developments have obviated Doe.
The majority in Hardwick argued both.
C. The Issues Decided in Doe
Judge Frank Johnson wrote in the Hardwick majority opinion that
the effect of a summary affirmance is determined by examining the
jurisdictional statement and the issues necessarily decided. 149 In Doe
the jurisdictional statement'"0 referred only to the constitutional issues,
but Judge Johnson argued that the Supreme Court may not have
reached any of those issues. "[T]he constitutional issues presented in
Doe were issues listed in the jurisdictional statement but not necessary
to the disposition of that case."15' In determining the precedential ef-
fect of a summary affirmance, one considers "the most narrow plausible
rationale for the summary decision."' 52 The summary affirmance, he
argued, may have been the result of the Supreme Court having deter-
mined that the plaintiffs in Doe lacked standing.' 53 This is a defensible
argument as the plaintiffs in Doe had neither been arrested nor
threatened with arrest under the Virginia sodomy statute.
Though the majority's argument that the summary affirmance in
Doe was based on a lack of standing is plausible, it is not convincing.
The district court's decision 54 was clearly decided on constitutional
"Although lower courts must adhere to precedents established by the Court's sum-
mary disposition, the Court has not considered itself to be so constrained." 12 J.
MOORE, H. BENDIX, & B. RINGLE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 400.05-1 (2nd ed.
1982).
149. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1207-8.
150. "Whether Virginia Code § 18.1-212, as applied to sexual activity between
consenting adults in private, violates appellants' constitutional rights to privacy, to due
process of law, and to the equal protection of the laws, under the First, Fourth, Fifth,
Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution." Jurisdictional Statement for
Appellants at 3, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Richmond, 425 U.S.
901 (1976).
151. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1207-8.
152. Id. at 1208.
153. Id. at 1207-08.
154. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199
(E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976). There was no court of appeals
decision; under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1253, "an order granting or denying ... an injunction in
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grounds, and not on the question of standing. The papers submitted to
the Supreme Court by both parties did not raise the issue of standing.
The Jurisdictional Statement by Doe made no mention of his stand-
ing.155 There was only one argument in the State of Virginia's Motion
to Dismiss: "Whether a state statute can constitutionally prohibit
sodomitic acts by consenting homosexuals in private is not a substantial
question. ' 156 On this matter the Dronenburg court was correct: "[W]e
doubt that a court of appeals ought to distinguish a Supreme Court
precedent on the speculation that the Court might possibly have had
something else in mind.'15 7
The argument that Doe was based on a lack of standing has a
second weakness: If this were true then the Supreme Court would not
have had jurisdiction to decide the merits of the case. Instead, it would
have had to dismiss the appeal or remand with instructions to dis-
miss.158 For example, in a recent per curiam opinion the Court said
that "[b]ecause the Court dismissed the appeals for lack of appellate
jurisdiction, we had no occasion to adjudicate the merits of the consti-
tutional questions presented in the jurisdictional statements."'159 In
sum, the Doe summary affirmance could not have been for lack of
standing; had that been the case, the Court would not have had the
power to summarily affirm.' 60
any civil action ... required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a
district court of three judges" is appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
155. This is not surprising; the appellants were unlikely to put forward the argu-
ment that they lacked standing.
156. Appellee's Motion to Dismiss at 1, Doe, 425 U.S. 901.
157. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1392, reh'g en banc denied, 746 F.2d
1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
158. See Note, Hardwick v. Bowers: An Attempt to Pull the Meaning of Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney Out of the Closet, 39 U. MIAMI L. REv. 973, 987 (1985).
159. Hopfmann v. Connolly, 105 S. Ct. 2106, 2107 (1985).
160. Judge Johnson correctly pointed out that the Supreme Court has on occa-
sion made exceptions to the rule that the Court cannot consider cases over which it
does not have jurisdiction. Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 721 (1975). There
were, however, no exceptional circumstances in Doe like there were in Philbrook,
where: 1) The question of jurisdiction was very complex, 2) The case could proceed
without the party whose standing was questioned, and 3) The defendant whose stand-
ing was questioned-the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare-agreed to be
bound by the decision of the Court, even if he were not a party to the case. Id.
The view that Doe was decided on the merits has interesting implications for the
determination of whether Hardwick has standing. See supra Section VI (A). Justice
Rehnquist has been one of the leaders of the movement to restrict standing; he wrote
the majority opinion in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Sepa-
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D. Doctrinal Developments Since Doe
Perhaps realizing the weakness of its interpretation of the original
holding in Doe, the Hardwick majority then argued that Doe is not
binding because of "doctrinal developments ' 161 occurring after 1976.
Judge Johnson argued that the issue of the constitutionality of sodomy
statutes is still open.16 2
The first doctrinal developments are the footnotes in Carey v. Pop-
ulation Services International'6 3 in which a majority of the Justices
stated that "the Court has not definitively answered the difficult ques-
tion whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state stat-
utes regulating [private consensual sexual] behavior among adults. 16 4
Judge Johnson commented:
The implications of footnote 5 could hardly be clearer. The plain
meaning of the phrase "private consensual sexual behavior among
adults" encompasses acts of sodomy carried out between consenting
adults in private. . . . The ability of the state to regulate conduct
as Georgia has attempted to do, according to the Court in Carey, is
now an open question.165
ration of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982). He has also stated that Doe was
decided on the merits (and, necessarily, that the plaintiffs in that case had standing).
See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 718 n.2 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting), and supra text accompanying note 49. It would be logically difficult for
Justice Rehnquist to now argue that Hardwick does not have standing, since Hardwick
clearly has a greater claim to standing than did the plaintiffs in Doe (who had never
been arrested or threatened with arrest). In short, either Hardwick has standing or Doe
was not decided on the merits; both of these positions cannot be argued consistently.
It might be suggested that the plaintiffs in Doe have standing but that Hardwick
does not because of the recent changes in standing law, especially Lyons. But Justice
White stated in Lyons that there had not been a change in the law. He said that Lyons
was decided on the basis of two pre-Carey decisions: O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488
(1974), and Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). "No extension of O'Shea and Rizzo
is necessary to hold that respondent Lyons has failed to demonstrate a case or contro-
versy with the City that would justify the equitable relief sought." Lyons, 461 U.S. at
105. "This case, therefore, as it came to us, is on all fours with O'Shea and should be
judged as such." Id. at 105 n.6.
161. The "doctrinal developments" phrase is from Hicks, 422 U.S. at 344.
162. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1208-09.
163. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
164. Id. at 688 n.5, 694 n.17.
165. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1209. The court goes on to point out that in footnote
17, just after the quote in question, there is a citation to a law review note that is about
(among other things) homosexual acts. Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for
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Judge Kravitch, dissenting in Hardwick, argued that the Carey foot-
note "simply acknowledges the fact that the Court has not yet passed
on the validity of many kinds of state statutes regulating sexual con-
duct," and cited fornication statutes as an example. 6 The defendant
in Hardwick argued that the footnote is in a decision discussing contra-
ceptives, and therefore the phrase should be read as discussing hetero-
sexual acts only, since "decisions as to child birth . . . necessarily are
the result of heterosexual, not homosexual conduct."'61 7 These argu-
ments are similar to the one made by Justice Rehnquist in dissent in
Carey, where he said that while it is true that the constitutional valid-
ity of every possible law regulating private sexual acts had not been
decided upon, it had been decided in Doe that there was no constitu-
tional protection for homosexual conduct.168 However, if the footnote
means what the defendant in Hardwick and Judge Kravitch say that it
does, then one would have expected that the Carey majority would
have taken issue with Justice Rehnquist. The majority did object to
Justice Powell's interpretation1 6 9 of the crucial footnote, but it did not
dispute Justice Rehnquist's comment.
The footnote in Carey is obviously ambiguous. Nevertheless, it can
reasonably be interpreted to mean that the Court has not yet defini-
tively decided the issue of constitutional limitations on laws regulating
private consensual homosexual behavior. The Court did not limit the
comment to heterosexual conduct, and there is no need for others to
read the language as doing so.
The second "doctrinal development" upon which the Hardwick
majority relied was New York v. Uplinger,17 0 in which the New York
Court of Appeals declared unconstitutional a law which made a crimi-
nal offense of loitering in a public place for the purpose of engaging in
deviate sexual intercourse.' 7 ' To reiterate, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari but later, in a 5-4 vote, ruled that certiorari had been improv-
Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 670, 719-738 (1973). The section of the Note
cited is not exclusively about homosexual acts, however, so this point is of dubious
merit.
166. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1215 & n.7 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
167. Brief of Appellee in Reply to Appellants' Supplemental Brief at 5, Hard-
wick v. Bowers.
168. Carey, 431 U.S. at 718 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
169. See the response to a comment by Justice Powell. Id. at 688 n.5. See also
supra text accompanying notes 46 to 48.
170. 104 S. Ct. 2332 (1984).
171. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35-3 (McKinney 1980).
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idently granted. The two reasons stated by the Court were: 1) The stat-
ute may have been a companion to the New York sodomy statute ear-
lier declared unconstitutional by the New York Court of Appeals,172
and 2) It was unclear which federal questions had been presented.'73
The Hardwick majority pointed to the fact that the State of New
York said in its petition for certiorari that it was willing to argue the
constitutionality of the sodomy law that had earlier been overturned. 74
In his brief, however, the counsel for New York chose not to argue the
earlier case. Judge Johnson suggested that this, and the fact that the
sodomy law was only a subissue of the case, were the factors which
caused the Court to declare certiorari improvidently granted. "It is fair
to conclude from this order that the Supreme Court was prepared to
address the constitutionality of state regulations like Georgia's sodomy
statute but chose to address the issue when presented more directly in
another case.'1 75 This suggested to Judge Johnson that the questions
presented in Hardwick were still open for consideration by the Su-
preme Court. 76
172. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947
(1980), cert. denied sub nom. New York v. Onofre, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
173. Uplinger, 104 S. Ct. at 2333. The per curiam opinion concluded that "we
are persuaded that this case provides an inappropriate vehicle for resolving the impor-
tant constitutional issues raised by the parties." Id. at S. Ct. 2334.
174. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947.
175. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1210.
176. Id. Judge Johnson might also have noted that the amicus brief of the Na-
tional Association of Business Councils, et al, may have influenced the Court's decision.
Alone among all briefs in the case, it contained the argument that Uplinger was "not a
proper vehicle for review of Onofre" and that the Court should declare that certiorari
had been improvidently granted. Review of the issues in Onofre "should not be through
the back door by way of a footnote in a petition. If the Court desires to review those
issues, such review should be in a case in which the issues are clearly presented." Mo-
tion for Leave to File Brief and Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Association of
Business Councils, et al at 5-7, Uplinger. Emphasis in original. The Petitioner filed an
objection to the Amicus brief:
[T]he entire premise of the instant amicus curiae brief is that certiorari
was improvidently granted by this Court which should not review at this
time the legality of private, noncommercial consensual sodomy. Since the
issue before this Court, as set forth in petitioner's brief, concerns the con-
stitutionality of [the loitering statute] and not the correctness of the New
York Court of Appeals ruling in Onofre, supra, the amicus curiae brief
proffered by the above listed organizations and individuals is wholly irrele-
vant and uninformative.
Petitioner's Objection to Motion of National Association of Business Councils et al to
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Interpreting Uplinger to mean that the Supreme Court wants to
consider the constitutionality of sodomy statutes is a bit of a leap. The
Court may want to do this, but it is by no means clear from Uplinger.
Uplinger alone is not enough to constitute a "doctrinal development"
sufficient to free a lower court from following Doe. However, Uplinger
combined with the clearer statement in Carey is more than sufficient. 17
The Hardwick majority was justified in disregarding Doe v. Common-
wealth's Attorney; it appears that the Supreme Court has.178
file brief Amicus Curiae at 2, Uplinger. The motion of the National Association of
Business Councils for leave to file an amicus brief was granted. 464 U.S. 1035 (1984).
177. Another doctrinal development may be Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984), an important case that has been overlooked by many, includ-
ing the Hardwick court. In Roberts a majority of the Court gave a general definition of
which "intimate associations" are constitutionally protected. Roberts, 104 S. Ct. at
3249-51. The case is discussed further infra text accompanying notes 192 to 198.
One reason why the decision has been overlooked may be that the discussion of
"intimate associations" is not in a case involving abortion, birth control, or rights ex-
isting in family relationships; rather, Roberts concerns the assertion that the Minnesota
Jaycees have a constitutional right to discriminate against women, despite a state law
banning such discrimination.
178. A recent Fifth Circuit en banc decision upholding the Texas sodomy statute
presented a revisionist version of the "doctrinal developments" exception. In Baker v.
Wade, 769 F.2d 289, reh'g denied, 774 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1985), the court did not
consider any Supreme Court decisions on privacy other than Doe; it simply stated that
it considered Doe "to be binding for the reasons stated" in Dronenburg v. Zech, 741
F.2d 1388, 1391-92, reh'g en bane denied, 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984), and by
Judge Kravitch's dissent in Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1213-16. Baker, 769 F.2d at 292.
The Baker court explained: "We should follow that controlling authority [Doe]
until the Supreme Court itself has issued an unequivocal statement that Doe no longer
controls. We refuse to speculate, on the basis of the writings cited to us by the appellee,
about what the Court might do today on this issue." Baker, 769 F.2d at 292 (emphasis
added).
The court's decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of the Supreme
Court's opinions on the precedential weight of summary affirmances-namely, that a
decision is binding until an "unequivocal statement" that the precedent no longer con-
trols. The Baker court treats Doe as if the case had been fully considered by the Su-
preme Court. In doing so, it ignores much case authority on the precedential weight of
summary affirmances, and makes a challenge to the precedential weight of a summary
affirmance impossible anywhere but in the Supreme Court.
What the Baker court is saying is that it will follow Doe until it is explicitly over-
turned. But this renders meaningless the "doctrinal developments" clause in Hicks v.
Miranda, 422 U.S: 332 (1975). It is obvious that when the Supreme Court explicitly
overturns a prior decision the lower courts must follow; after all, the Supreme Court is
the highest court in the land. The "doctrinal developments" language is an exception to
the rule that a decision by the Supreme Court is fully binding until explicitly over-
1985]
148
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss1/1
Nova Law Journal
It is worth noting that any precedential effect of Doe is binding
only on the lower courts. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated
that it will without hesitation overrule one of its prior summary affir-
mances."1 9 Though lower courts must consider the precedential effect of
summary affirmances, the Supreme Court can proceed directly to the
constitutional issues.
E. The Extension of the Right to Privacy to Private Consen-
sual Homosexual Conduct
The Supreme Court's decisions on privacy, from Griswold'80 to the
present, have created two types of constitutionally protected privacy
interests. 8"
The first type of privacy interest is that of "intimate associa-
tions ' 182 or "associational interests.' 8 3 This is grounded in Griswold
(right to contraceptives),'18 Eisenstadt v. Baird (right to contraceptives
not limited to married persons), 85 Moore v. East Cleveland (right of
turned. "Doctrinal developments" means that a summary decision-and a summary
decision alone-can be disregarded without an explicit overruling of precedent, if doc-
trinal developments warrant.
In treating Doe as if it were a decision reached after plenary consideration and
explained by a full opinion, the Baker court ignores the dictates of the Supreme Court,
as expressed in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974), Hicks v. Miranda, 422
U.S. 332, 344 (1975), Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U.S. 68, 74 (1976), and Illinois State
Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 180-81 (1979). Doctrinal
developments after Doe may or may not warrant the finding that it can be disregarded;
but the Baker court was mistaken in requiring an "unequivocal statement that Doe no
longer controls."
179. See supra section VI(B), on the precedential weight of summary
affirmances.
180. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
181. For two somewhat different taxonomical approaches to the Supreme Court's
privacy decisions, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 15-18, 20, 21
(1978) and Adamany, The Supreme Court at the Frontier of Politics: The Issue of
Gay Rights, 1980 HAMLINE L. REV. 185, 195 (1980). Professor Adamany has sug-
gested a third type of privacy interest: "privacy in autonomy of the body." Id. at 202-
II.
182. See Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 635
(1980).
183. See Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1211, and L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 15-18 (1978).
184. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
185. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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extended families to live in one house),186 Carey v. Population Services
International (right to access to contraceptives, even for minors), 18 7
and Zablocki v. Redhail (right to marry without state interference for
the purpose of collecting child support payments). 88 In each of these
cases the Court protected an intimate relationship. The government
was prohibited from interferring with matters of sex and family.
The right to associate with whom one wishes is basic to democ-
racy. As Justice Douglas wrote in Griswold:
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an asso-
ciation that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living,
not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social
projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any in-
volved in our prior decisions. 189
This judicial deference to intimate associations has clearly been ex-
panded beyond the institution of marriage. The Court in Eisenstadt
wrote that the right to privacy required that all people, even those not
married, "be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into mat-
ters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child."' In Moore a plurality of the Court noted that
"[o]urs is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds unit-
ing the members of the nuclear family."'191
In a recent case the Supreme Court explicitly adopted the "inti-
mate associations" analysis of its prior privacy decisions. At issue in
Roberts v. United States Jaycees 92 was the application to the Minne-
sota Jaycees of a state anti-sex discrimination law. The national
186. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
187. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
188. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
189. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
190. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
191. Moore, 431 U.S. at 504.
192. 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1985). "Freedom of intimate association" is used at id. at
3250.
Justice Brennan wrote the decision for the Court. Justices Marshall, Powell, Ste-
vens, and White concurred. Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment only. Justice
O'Connor concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. She did not join the sec-
tion of the opinion on intimate association, but her disagreement concerned the Court's
adjacent discussion of the First Amendment. The Chief Justice and Justice Blackmum
did not participate, perhaps because of their ties to Minnesota.
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Jaycees claimed that the law violated their right to privacy and their
first amendment rights. The Court unanimously found that the Jaycees'
discrimination against women was not constitutionally protected. In
reaching that decision the Court discussed why some activities are pro-
tected by the right to privacy and why others are not.193
The Court found that the "freedom of intimate associations" is
fundamental to individual liberty. 94 "[C]hoices to enter into and main-
tain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against in-
trusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safe-
guarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional
scheme. . . . [F]reedom of association receives protection as a funda-
mental element of personal liberty."' 95 One of the reasons such rela-
tionships are protected is that "individuals draw much of their emo-
tional enrichment from close ties with others."'' 96 Intimate associations
help people to "independently .. .define one's identity," and this is
"central to any concept of liberty."' 97
The Court stated factors to be considered in determining whether
an activity is constitutionally protected as an intimate association:
Family relationships, by their nature, involve deep attachments and
commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom
one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences,
and belief but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life.
Among other things, therefore, they are distinguished by such at-
tributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in deci-
sions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from
others in critical aspects of the relationship. 198
These factors would seem to describe private consensual homosexual
conduct. Homosexual associations of the sort which Hardwick was
found to have engaged in are: 1) small in their membership, 2) selec-
tive in membership, and 3) practiced in seclusion. These associations
193. Neither the Hardwick, Dronenburg, nor Baker v. Wade opinions mentioned
Roberts. For a brief discussion of why the case has not received the attention it de-
serves and for a view that Roberts is a "doctrinal development", see supra note 177.
194. Roberts, 104 S. Ct. at 3250.
195. Id. at 3249.
196. Id. at 3250.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 3250. "We only note that factors that may be relevant include size,
purpose, policies, selectivity, congeniality, and other characteristics that in a particular
case may be pertinent." Id. at 3251.
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afford homosexual persons an opportunity to share with others their
thoughts, experiences, and beliefs. Through private consensual sexual
conduct, homosexuals share a distinctively personal aspect of their
lives.
The Hardwick majority was well grounded in precedent when it
said that "[the intimate association protected against state interfer-
ence does not exist in the marriage relationship alone. .... The benefit
of marriage can inure to individuals outside the traditional marital re-
lationship. For some, the sexual activity in question here [private con-
sensual homosexual acts] serves the same purpose as the intimacy of
marriage."199
The second aspect of the constitutional right to privacy "protects
conduct that occurs in a specific place, the home."200 In Stanley v.
Georgia the Supreme Court stated that "fundamental is the right to be
free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusions into one's privacy." 0' Chief Justice Burger wrote for
the Court in United States v. Orito that the Constitution "extends spe-
cial safeguards to the privacy of the home."20 2 While conduct unpopu-
lar with the public would not be tolerated if engaged in openly, such
conduct will be allowed if it is within the home. "[T]he constitutional
protection of privacy," noted Judge Johnson, "reaches its height when
the state attempts to regulate an activity in the home."203 Here is the
heart of Hardwick's claim, and the reason why the facts of his case are
so compelling. It seems inappropriate, in late twentieth century
America, that the government should intrude into the bedrooms of its
citizens.
Both aspects of the right to privacy-the right to intimate associa-
tions and the special right of privacy in one's home-support the deci-
199. Hardwick, 760 F.2d 1212.
200. Adamany, The Supreme Court at the Frontier of Politics: The Issue of
Gay Rights, 1980 HAMLINE L. REV. 185, 195 (1980).
201. 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
202. 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973).
203. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1212. "The right to privacy extends to some activi-
ties that would not normally merit constitutional protection simply because those activ-
ities take on added significance under certain limited circumstances." Id. See L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-20, at 985 (1978): "[W]hatever the threshold
of harm the state must otherwise establish to justify intruding upon an aspect of per-
sonhood in the public realm, the required threshold is significantly higher when the
conduct occurs in a place, or under circumstances, that the individuals involved justifia-
bly regard as private."
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sion in Hardwick. As Judge Johnson wrote, "[t]he activity [Hardwick]
hopes to engage in is quintessentially private and lies at the heart of an
intimate association beyond the proper reach of state regulation. 2 04
The Hardwick court was justified in finding that "the Georgia sodomy
statute implicates a fundamental right of Michael Hardwick. 2 0 5
VII. Conclusion
Despite the confusion apparent in the lower courts, the Supreme
Court has yet to fully consider the question of a constitutional protec-
tion for private consensual homosexual conduct by adults. Outside of
the courts, however, many people and institutions have in recent years
accepted that there is diversity in society, and that the government
should not invade the bedrooms of Americans in order to ensure con-
formity. For example, the American Bar Association more than a dec-
ade ago passed a resolution urging states to repeal all laws classifying
as criminal any form of private noncommercial sexual conduct between
consenting adults.20 6 The Model Penal Code includes no sanctions
against private consensual noncommercial homosexual acts.20 7 The
American Psychiatric Association has urged the repeal of all legislation
making criminal offenses of sexual acts performed by consenting adults
in private. 0
It is time for the Supreme Court to confront the issue of constitu-
tional protection for private consensual homosexual conduct. The Court
can once again avoid the issue by declaring that Hardwick lacks stand-
204. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1212.
205. Id.
206. 42 U.S.L.W. 2095 (1973). The resolution passed the Assembly by a vote of
183 to 20. By a nine vote margin (161-152) the A.B.A. House of Delegates recently
defeated a resolution urging federal, state, and local governments "to adopt legislation
prohibiting discrimination in employment, housing and public accommodations, on the
basis of sexual orientation." The margin of defeat had been 24 votes in the previous
attempt to get the resolution passed, and its sponsors expect that it will pass in the next
few years. See Gay Rights Loses, A.B.A.J. 22 (September 1985) and N.Y. Times, July
10, 1985 at A12, col. 1.
207. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 213.2 (Official Draft and Re-
vised Comments 1980). The official comment states that "the Model Penal Code takes
the view that private homosexual conduct between consenting adults should not be pun-
ished as a crime." Id. comment on section at 367. The comment includes a fine history
of sodomy laws in the Anglo-American legal tradition.
208. R. BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY 137 and passim
(1981).
[Vol. 10
153
: Nova Law Review 10, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1985
Bowers v. Hardwick
ing; it should avoid the temptation to do so. In light of the changing
mores of society, the Court should extend the right of privacy to homo-
sexual acts. Such conduct is an intimate association in which the gov-
ernment should not meddle. "To individuality should belong the part of
life in which it is chiefly the individual that is interested; to society, the
part which chiefly interests society."2 9 As shown above, the Supreme
Court's privacy decisions at the very least allow this extension of the
right of privacy; they may even demand it.210 The law is there for the
Court and now, with Hardwick v. Bowers, so are the facts.
Robert Glazier
209. Mill, On Liberty, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 10 (R. Wasserstrom ed.
1971).
210. "[T]he Court's development of the constitutional right of privacy unavoid-
ably requires the protection of sex acts between consenting adults, homosexual as well
as heterosexual, in a secluded place." Adamany, The Supreme Court at the Frontier of
Politics: The Issue of Gay Rights, 1980 HAMLINE L. REV. 185, 189 (1980).
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Praying For Direction: The Establishment Clause and
the Supreme Court
I. Introduction
The United States Supreme Court decided three establishment
clause cases last term and in so doing, reconsidered the application of
criteria originally set forth in the 1971 decision of Lemon v. Kurtz-
man.' Specifically the Court examined the applicability of the Lemon
criteria to prayer in public schools and to state aid for nonpublic
schools. Through these decisions, it appears that the Court may be
redefining the Lemon criteria, reaffirming the use of the Lemon test in
establishment clause2 cases and giving needed direction to lower courts
and legislatures.
In Wallace v. Jaffree,3 the Court was asked to determine if an
Alabama statute4 authorizing a one minute period of silence in all pub-
lic schools for meditation or voluntary prayer was constitutional within
the meaning of the establishment clause. The Court held it was not. In
School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball5 and in Aguilar v. Felton,' both
decided the same day, the Court dealt with two similar issues involving
aid to nonpublic schools. In Grand Rapids, the Court was asked
whether two programs, Shared Time and Community Eduction,7 were
constitutional. A closely divided Court said they were not. In Aguilar
the Court was asked to decide whether a New York Title IP program
which provided public school teachers to teach in parochial schools to
meet the needs of educationally deprived children of low income fami-
1. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The three criteria of Lemon are 1)
The law must have a secular purpose, 2) Its primary purpose or effect must not ad-
vance nor inhibit religion, and 3) There must not be excessive government entangle-
ment with religion.
2. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion ......
3. 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
4. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (1975 & Supp. 1984)(See infra note 56).
5. 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985).
6. 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985).
7. These two programs provide classes to nonpublic school students at public ex-
pense in classrooms located in and leased from nonpublic schools.
8. 20 U.S.C. § § 3801-07 (1982). See infra text accompanying note 120.
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lies was constitutional. Again, the majority held it was not.
These three cases provided the Court with an opportunity to re-
examine the Lemon criteria. This article will demonstrate how the
Lemon criteria are still firmly imbedded in the Supreme Court's think-
ing. The article begins by giving a brief overview of past establishment
clause cases, highlighting the important cases of the 1960s, 70s and
80s.9 The Justices that now make up the Court and past changes in the
Court's composition will be briefly discussed in an effort to explain the
Court's division on establishment clause issues. Discussion of the
Court's reasoning in reaching its three recent decisions will exemplify
how the Lemon criteria have been reshaped. Finally, analysis of the
three recent establishment clause cases will provide the probable path
the Lemon criteria will lead the Court along in its future decision
making.
A. The Sixties: A Time for Change
Interpretation of the establishment clause of the Constitution has
left lower courts in disarray due to the often confusing and seemingly
conflicting decisions by the United States Supreme Court. The Court's
inability to come to a clear-cut and thorough decision in its establish-
ment clause cases has led to very narrow decisions. An evenly divided
Court has given unsure precedent for lower courts to follow.
In 1947, the Court expressed a separationist"° view of the estab-
lishment clause in Everson v. Board of Education." The Court gave its
first definitive interpretation of the establishment clause in Everson:
Neither a state nor the federal government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another . . . . [N]o tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities of
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they
may adopt to teach and practice religion . . . . [I]n the words of
9. An excellent analysis of past establishment clause cases during the Burger
Court can be found in Kurland, The Religion Clauses and the Burger Court, 34 CATH.
U.L. REv. 1 (1984).
10. A separationist view is one that believes the church and the state should act
independently of each other, without any influence by one over the other. There should
be a wall of separation between church and state which marks the line which neither
may transgress.
11. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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Jefferson, the clause against the establishment of religion by law
was intended to erect a wall of separation between church and
state."'
The Court held that a New Jersey statute which provided money for
bus transportation for public and nonpublic school children was consti-
tutional. The Court recognized that the subsidy was a legitimate public
safety measure for children and not aid to further educational purposes
of nonpublic schools.
After Everson, the Court, with few exceptions,13 adhered to a sep-
arationist view of the establishment clause. In 1961, the Court held in
McGowan v. Maryland 4 that a statute which closed businesses and
other secular activities on Sundays, the blue laws, was constitutional.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court said that even though Sunday
closing was initially religious in purpose, through the years this non-
secular activity had been transformed into a secular purpose by provid-
ing a community day of rest.15 Thus the fact that the chosen day was
Sunday was not constitutionally significant. The first turn toward ac-
commodating 16 church and state was beginning.
In 1963, a major setback for the accommodationists came when
the Court decided School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp.17
The Court held that providing Bible readings in public schools was un-
constitutional under the establishment clause. Justice Clark, delivering
the opinion of the Court, attempted to construct a test to apply to reli-
gion cases.
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and pri-
mary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhi-
bition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legisla-
tive power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that
to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must
be a secular purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor
12. Id. at 15, 16.
13. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (allowing religious instruction
off school grounds).
14. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
15. Id. at 445.
16. Accommodation refers to the relationship between church and state which
would allow some intertwining of the government with religion, for instance allowing
moral teachings of religion or influence to dictate the actions of government.
17. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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inhibits religion."a
The criteria combined earlier Court rulings and were a first attempt at
fashioning a workable test for lower courts. This test is remarkably
similar to the first two prongs of Lemon in use today.
After Schempp the Court went back to its accommodationist trend
in Board of Education v. Allen19 in which the Court found constitu-
tional a New York statute which allowed aid to nonpublic schools for
textbooks in secular subjects from state approved lists. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court and applied the purpose and effect
test articulated by Justice Clark in Schempp. For the purpose prong he
merely insisted that some valid purpose be demonstrated. For the effect
prong Justice White looked to what the first effect of the law would be.
Since the first effect of the New York law was to give children books,
and its second effect was to aid nonpublic schools, the law was held
constitutional.
In 1969, the makeup of the Supreme Court began to change, and
in a span of six years five new justices were appointed. In 1969, Justice
Burger was named Chief Justice replacing Earl Warren. Chief Justice
Burger would lead the Court with a moderate accommodationist view
of establishment. In 1970, Justice Fortas was replaced by Justice
Blackmun who held a moderate separationist view of the establishment
clause. In 1972, Justice Black was replaced by Justice Powell who also
held a moderate separationist view of the establishment clause. Also in
1972, Justice Rehnquist replaced Justice Harlan. Justice Rehnquist
holds a strong accommodationist view and has been pivotal in the
struggle for full accommodation between church and state on all issues
involving the establishment clause. The final appointee of the seventies
was Justice Stevens, who replaced Justice Douglas. Justice Stevens
holds a very strong separationist view.
Thus, the make up of the Supreme Court of the '70s was again
nearly evenly divided into separationists, 20 accommodationists, 21 and
the moderates,22 who carried the swing votes on any particular issue.
The most recent appointment, Justice O'Connor in 1981, replaced
Justice Stewart. This was important since Justice Stewart had leaned
18. Id. at 222.
19. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
20. The separationists were Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.
21. The accommodationists were Justices White, Rehnquist, and Stewart.
22. The moderates were Justices Burger, Blackmun, and Powell.
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toward an accommodationist stance. The close 5-4 decisions of the
Court might now be changed depending on where Justice O'Connor
stood on the establishment clause.
B. The Seventies: Accommodation, Separation, or Confusion?
In 1971 the landmark case of Lemon v. Kurtzman" was handed
down, setting forth the newly combined criteria which would provide
the touchstone for future establishment clause cases. The three criteria
announced for determining if a law violated the establishment clause
were: 1) The law must have a secular purpose; 2) Its primary purpose
or effect must not advance nor inhibit religion; and 3) There must not
be excessive government entanglement with religion. 4 The Court then
went on to declare a Rhode Island statute25 and a Pennsylvania stat-
ute,26 which provided state aid to church related elementary and sec-
ondary schools and to teachers, unconstitutional for failing the Lemon
test. Henceforth, failing any one of the three prongs of the Lemon
test would result in the law being declared unconstitutional.
Tilton v. Richardson,2" decided the same day as Lemon, upheld
several sections of the Federal Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963,
which authorized grants to colleges and universities. 9 Although no ma-
jority was formed, five justices determined that any government entan-
glement was minimal and that religion did not, on a college level, so
permeate the secular education program as to make the two
inseparable.30
23. Lemon, 403 U.S. 602.
24. Id. at 612-13.
25. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-61-1 (1969)(this statute provided for payment of up to
15% annual salary supplements to teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic elementary
schools).
26. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN., tit. 24 § § 5601-5609 (Purdon & Supp. 1971)(this
statute provided for state reimbursement of nonpublic elementary and secondary
schools for costs of teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional material in specified
secular subjects. It prohibited reimbursement for any course that contained any subject
matter expressing religious teachings or the morals or forms of worship of any sect).
27. The statutes were found to have a secular purpose and would not advance
religion, but since the statutes might lead to excessive government entanglement, be-
cause of the need for the state supervision, the statutes were void.
28. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
29. This included church related institutions.
30. Chief Justice Burger announced the judgment of the Court in which Justices
Harlan, Stewart, and Blackmun joined, upholding the Federal Higher Educations Act
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After the Lemon criteria were in place, in 1973 the Court struck
down aid for nonpublic schools in Committee for Public Education and
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist. 13 In Nyquist three kinds of subsidies to
nonpublic school were at issue: Direct money grants for maintenance
and repair, a partial tuition reimbursement for parents, and a tax relief
plan for those not qualifying for the tuition reimbursement. The Court
said this aid had the primary effect of advancing religion, violated the
second prong of Lemon, and was therefore, unconstitutional.
In 1975, Meek v. Pittenger32 upheld a law allowing public funds to
be used for acquisition of textbooks for nonpublic school children be-
cause the law's primary effect was to benefit the school children and
not the school. The Court struck down the part of the statute providing
funds for auxiliary services, 33 because the constant government supervi-
sion of the services would result in excessive government entanglement.
In 1976, in Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland,34 the
Court upheld a Maryland statute which provided funds to private col-
leges that were religiously affiliated, if the funds were used for secular
purposes. Because the statute provided subsidies only on an annual ba-
sis, the Court determined that the occasional audits used to verify the
sectarian purposes of the expenditures would be quick and non-judg-
mental. The infrequent auditing would therefore not result in excessive
entanglement.
In 1977, in Wolman v. Walter,35 the Court upheld those parts of a
comprehensive Ohio Statute which authorized "the state to provide
nonpublic school pupils 'With books, standardized testing and scoring,
diagnostic services, and therapeutic and remedial services."3 6 It held
unconstitutional "those portions relating to instructional materials,
of 1963 because minimal government inspections of the program would not lead to
excessive entanglement. Justice White concurred in the result on the ground that legis-
lation having a secular purpose and extending governmental assistance to sectarian
schools in the performance of their secular funcions did not violate the First Amend-
ment merely because the legislative program incidentally benefited a church in fulfil-
ling its religious mission.
31. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
32. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
33. The auxilary services were counseling, testing, psychological services and
speech and hearing therapy.
34. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
35. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
36. Id. at 255.
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equipment and field trip services."13 7
In the '70s, the Court marked out its position on religion in the
law. Despite the many changes of composition, the Court continued in
the direction of accommodating state support of the church. The Court
also endeavored to come up with a workable test that lower courts
could apply in resolving establishment clause cases. Despite disagree-
ment as to the Lemon test's usefulness, it endures to the present day.
The '80s would see a plethora of wide ranging establishment clause
cases that would test the inclination of the Court towards continuing
accommodation.
C. The Eighties: From Symbols to Silence
In 1980, two establishment clause cases came before the Court. In
the first, Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Re-
gan,38 the Court upheld a New York law39 which offered reimburse-
ments to nonpublic schools for performing various testing and reporting
services mandated by the State.40 The Court determined that grading
state tests by nonpublic school employees affords no substantial risk
that the examinations can be used for religious educational purposes.
Reporting services are not part of the teaching process and cannot fos-
ter a sectarian outlook. Therefore, reimbursement for the cost of com-
plying with state law had primarily a secular, rather than religious,
purpose and effect. No supervision was required to administer and
grade the test, nor would the reporting need to be monitored. There-
fore, no excessive government entanglement would occur.
In the second case, Stone v. Graham,41 the Court held unconstitu-
37. Id. The Court held that the statute authorizing instructional materials and
equipment was unconstitutional because it had the primary effect of providing a direct
and substantial advancement of the sectarian enterprise. Paying for field trip services
was unconstitutional because the school rather than the children was the recipient of
the service, and this advanced the sectarian enterprise. Therefore, secular field trips
would be unlikely without close supervision of nonpublic school teachers, and this
would create excessive entanglement.
38. 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
39. N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 3601 (McKinney & Supp. 1971-1979)(This statute ap-
propriated public funds to reimburse both church-sponsored and secular nonpublic
schools for performing various services mandated by the state).
40. This differed from Wolman v. Walter in that funds went directly to the non-
public schools and testing was handled by nonpublic school personnel, not strictly by
the state or its agents.
41. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
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tional a Kentucky statute42 that required that a copy of the Ten Com-
mandments be placed in every public school classroom in the state. The
Court found the law violated the first prong of the Lemon test because
it did not have a secular purpose.
In Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.43 the Court held unconstitutional
a Massachusetts law44 that gave churches and schools the power to veto
liquor license applications from any businesses within a 500-foot radius
of their premises. The Court stated that placing governmental power in
religious institutions violated the establishment clause's core rationale
of preventing "a fusion of government and religious functions. '4 The
secular objective of protecting schools and churches from the commo-
tion associated with liquor stores could have been accomplished by
other means. Allowing a church to decide public policy can be seen as
having the effect of advancing religion and will enmesh churches in the
processes of government, producing excessive entanglement. Justice
Rehnquist was the only dissenter in this eight-to-one decision. This in-
dicates the Court's strong predilection that laws which enable religious
institutions to involve themselves in government operations clearly over-
step the boundary of separation between church and state.
In 1983, the Court appeared to abandon the Lemon test on histori-
cal practice alone when it decided Marsh v. Chambers." In Marsh, the
Court upheld the long-standing practice of the Nebraska Legislature's
appointing a state-compensated chaplain to deliver opening prayers at
its sessions. The Court stated that long standing traditions which have
"become part of the fabric of our society,"4 7 do not violate the estab-
lishment clause. In dissent, Justice Brennan stated that the Court was
carving out an exception to the establishment clause, and that if the
Lemon test were applied, Marsh would clearly violate it.41
42. Ky. REV. STAT. § 158.178 (1980)(This statute required the posting of a copy
of the Ten Commandments, purchased with private contributions, on the wall of each
public school classroom in the state).
43. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
44. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 138, § 16C (1974)(This statute vests in the
governing bodies of schools and churches the power to prevent issuance of liquor li-
censes for premises within a 500-foot radius of the church or school by objecting to the
license applications).
45. 459 U.S. at 126-27 (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222).
46. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
47. Id. at 792.
48. Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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In Mueller v. Allen,49 the Court upheld a Minnesota statute 0 per-
mitting taxpayers to deduct tuition, transportation, instructional mate-
rial and textbook expenses incurred in sending their children to non-
public schools. The Court stated that the tax deduction had the secular
purpose of ensuring that the state's citizenry was well-educated, as well
as assuring the continued financial health of private schools, both secta-
rian and nonsectarian. Because the tax deduction was only one of many
deductions, the Court felt it did not have the primary effect of advanc-
ing the sectarian aims of nonpublic schools. The tax deduction would
not require state supervision; therefore, there was no excessive
entanglement.
Finally, in 1984, the Court decided Lynch v. Donnelly,51 the con-
troversial Nativity scene case. The Court, in a five to four decision,
upheld as constitutional the display of a Nativity scene which was in-
cluded in the city of Pawtucket's annual Christmas decorations. The
Court loosely applied the Lemon test, stating that it would not "be con-
fined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area. '52 The Court
stated that the secular purpose of the creche was apparent in that it
"depicts the historical origins of this traditional event long recognized
as a National Holiday." 53 Therefore, celebrating a national holiday was
a worthy secular activity. The Court also felt that the creche did not
advance religion any more than lending textbooks or granting tax de-
ductions did, and excessive entanglement would be minimal since this
was a once-a-year activity. The Court stated that the question of politi-
cal divisiveness had never allowed the Court to invalidate otherwise
permissible conduct, and it would not do so now.5 4 Indications were
that the Lemon test may have been overruled or that its three criteria
might be reshaped in the near future. The Court's loose interpretation
of Lemon seemed to point out the Court's dissatisfaction with the
Lemon test and its willingness to abandon or restructure it.
These cases suggest some moderate accommodation of church and
state extending into the early eighties; they also suggest that the Lemon
test might be discarded or reformed in the near future. In Wallace,
49. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
50. MINN. STAT. § 290.09 (1982)(This Statute allowed taxpayers, in computing
their state income tax, to deduct expenses incurred in providing tuition, textbooks, and
transportation for their children attending elementary or secondary school).
51. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
52. Id. at 1362.
53. Id. at 1363.
54. Id. at 1364.
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Grand Rapids, and Aguilar, the lower courts were looking for a clarifi-
cation of the Lemon criteria and for an indication how the Supreme
Court would decide future establishment clause cases.
Wallace v. Jaffree
a. The Lower Courts
In Wallace, the plaintiff had three minor children attending public
schools in Mobile, Alabama. On May 28, 1982, Jaffree filed a com-
plaint on behalf of his three children, seeking a declaratory judgment
and injunctive relief restraining the defendants 55 from maintaining or
allowing the maintenance of regular religious prayer services or other
forms of religious observances in Mobile County Public schools in vio-
lation of the first amendment. The complaint further alleged that two
of Mr. Jaffree's children had been subjected to religious indoctrination
since the beginning of the school year, when two of the public school
teachers led their classes in saying certain prayers in unison. Jaffree,
prior to filing the complaint, had unsuccessfully requested that the
leading of prayer in class be stopped. His original complaint made no
mention of any challenge to the Alabama prayer statutes,56 but was
55. The defendants were the Mobile County School Board, school officials and
three teachers.
56. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20 (Supp. 1985) At the commencement of the first
class each day in the first through the sixth grades in all public schools, the
teacher in charge of the room in which each such class is held shall an-
nounce that a period of silence, not to exceed one minute in duration, shall
be observed for meditation, and during any such period silence shall be
maintained and no activities shall be maintained and activities engaged in.
ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1985) At the commencement of the first
class of each day in all grades in all public schools, the teacher in charge
of the room in which each class is held may announce that a period of
silence not to exceed one minute in duration shall be observed for medita-
tion or voluntary prayer, and during any such period no other activities
shall be engaged in.
ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.2 (Supp. 1985) From henceforth, any teacher or pro-
fessor in any public educational institution within the state of Alabama,
recognizing that the Lord God is one, at the beginning of any homeroom
or any class, may lead willing students in prayer, or may lead the willing
students in the following prayer to God: Almighty God, you alone are our
God. We acknowledge You as the Creator and Supreme Judge of the
world. May Your justice, Your truth, and Your peace abound this day in
the hearts of our countrymen, in the counsels of our government, in the
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subsequently amended to do so.
The district court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the
school from further leading of prayers. An evidentiary hearing revealed
that State Senator Holmes' purpose in sponsoring the Alabama law
was to return voluntary prayer to the public schools.57
At trial,58 the district court examined three previous Supreme
Court cases59 which had dealt with school prayer.60 In re-examining the
establishment clause from a historical perspective, the district court
concluded that the Supreme Court had erred in its analysis of the es-
tablishment clause, and that "[b]ecause the establishment clause of the
First amendment to the United States Constitution does not prohibit
the state from establishing a religion, the prayers offered by the teach-
ers in this case are not unconstitutional."61 In a second opinion, the
district court dismissed the plaintiffs' challenge to the three Alabama
statutes for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted,
congruent with its previous holding that the establishment clause did
not bar the States from establishing a religion.6 2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit con-
solidated the two cases63 and reversed the district court's ruling. 4 The
Court of Appeals held that the county school-prayer activities and Ala-
bama Statutes sections 16-1-20.1 and 16-1-20.2 were in violation of the
establishment clause of the first amendment to the Constitution of the
United States,6 5 because they did not have a clear secular purpose.
The appeals court reviewed the district court's historical findings
which led to the dismissal of the Jaffree cases, and concluded that the
court misapplied the doctrine of stare decisis66 and disregarded Su-
sanctity of our homes and in the classrooms of our schools in the name of
our Lord. Amen.
57. Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 731 (S.D. Ala. 1982).
58. Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs. of Mobile County, 554 F. Supp. 1104
(S.D. Ala. 1983).
59. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Murray v. Curlett, 374 U.S. 203
(1963); and Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
60. Jaffree v. School Board Comm'rs., 554 F. Supp. at 1109.
61. Id. at 1128.
62. Jaffree v. James, 554 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Ala. 1983).
63. The first case was Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs., 554 F. Supp. 1104
(S.D. Ala. 1983), the second case was Jaffree v. James, 554 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Ala.
1983).
64. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (1lth Cir. 1983).
65. Id. at 1536.
66. Policy of courts to stand by precedent and not to disturb a settled point;
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preme Court precedent. 67
b. The Supreme Court Opinion
In Wallace v. Jaffree,6 8 the Court held that Alabama Statute sec-
tion 16-1-20.1, which gave state approval for meditation or voluntary
prayer, violated the establishment clause of the first amendment. This
decision is significant both because it is an affirmation of the Lemon
test, notwithstanding the language of Lynch, and because it is also a re-
examination and reshaping of the secular purpose prong of the Lemon
test.
The majority opinion written by Justice Stevens began by af-
firming the Court of Appeals judgment concerning Alabama Statutes
section 16-1-20.2.69 Before considering the issue before it, the Court
noted that the states have no greater power to restrain individual free-
doms than does the Congress of the United States." This has been
confirmed time and again by the Court."' In Everson, the Court had
stated "the establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another. 72
After listing the criteria for the Lemon test7 3 the Court stated, "It
is the first of these three criteria that is most plainly implicated in this
case." 74 If a statute does not have a clearly secular legislative purpose,
then consideration of the effect or entanglement prongs of the Lemon
test is unnecessary. "[T]he First Amendment requires that a statute
must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance
religion."' 75 The Court determined that in applying the purpose prong
of Lemon it is appropriate to ask "whether government's actual purpose
is to endorse or disapprove of religion."1 7 6 The Court concluded that in
literally, "let the decision stand."
67. The Supreme Court examined the same historical data as the district court
and reached a different conclusion. See Everson, 330 U.S. 1.
68. 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
69. See supra note 55.
70. 105 S. Ct. at 2486.
71. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
72. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.
73. Wallace, 105 S. Ct. at 2489.
74. Id. at 2490.
75. Id.
76. Id. (quoting Lynch, 104 S.Ct. at 1368).
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this case it was the legislature's intent to endorse religion by the enact-
ment of Alabama Statute section 16-1-20.1.
In applying the purpose prong of Lemon, the Court analyzed the
legislative history of Alabama Statute section 16-1-20.1. In doing so, it
noted that the record revealed that Senator Donald Holmes, the spon-
sor of the bill, had said in the legislative record that the bill was an
effort to return voluntary prayer to the public schools."7 Since prayer is
pervasively sectarian, the Court concluded that there was no evidence
of any secular purpose in the enactment of Alabama Statutes section
16-1-20.1. 8
Putting into the record the fact that the statute's purpose was to
return prayer to the public schools, in defiance of previous Supreme
Court cases," the Alabama Legislature left the Court no choice but to
declare the statute unconstitutional. To do otherwise would have struck
a serious blow to the validity of the purpose prong of the Lemon test.
The Court had stated earlier"° that even though a statute is motivated
in part by religious purpose, it may still satisfy the purpose prong of
Lemon. The Alabama Legislature left the Court no alternative to strik-
ing down the statute, since no secular purpose could be inferred from
the statute or its history.
Justice Powell wrote a separate concurring opinion in response to
criticism of the Lemon test."' He feared that continued criticism of the
Lemon test "could encourage other courts to feel free to decide estab-
lishment clause cases on an ad hoc basis."8s2 His concern seems justi-
fied. The Court had already decided Marsh without using the Lemon
test, and Lynch with what appears to be a very loose application of
Lemon. Continued aversion to Lemon might cause lower courts to de-
cide establishment clause cases without the help of any bright line rule.
The confusion already communicated to lower courts was due to the
Supreme Court's statement in Lynch that it will not "be confined to
any single test or criterion in this sensitive area."8 3 The question that
logically follows is, if the Supreme Court will not be confined to the
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
80. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397
U.S. 664 (1970).
81. Wallace, 105 S. Ct. at 2493 (Powell, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 2494 (emphasis in original).
83. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1362.
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Lemon criteria, then what standard should the lower courts be held to
in deciding establishment clause cases?
Powell went on to clarify the purpose prong of Lemon by stating,
"We have not interpreted the first prong of Lemon, however, as requir-
ing that a statute have 'exclusively secular' objectives. If such a re-
quirement existed, much conduct and legislation approved by this
Court in the past would have been invalidated." 84 The purpose of the
Alabama statute in question was religious in character.85 This indicated
that Justice Powell found the Lemon criteria the proper guide for the
lower courts to follow. The Lemon test is useful and in most cases easy
to apply. Justice Powell supported this conclusion by stating that
neither lower court found a clearly secular purpose when applying the
Lemon purpose prong.86
Justice O'Connor, concurring, wrote that she felt the Lemon test is
problematic, but that she was not ready to abandon all aspects of it.87
Justice O'Connor suggested that the Lemon criteria should be re-ex-
amined in order to develop a test that was "capable of consistent appli-
cation to the relevant problems." 88 Her answer to the refinement of the
Lemon purpose prong was the "endorsement test."89 This would require
courts to "examine whether government's purpose is to endorse religion
and whether the statute actually conveys a message of endorsement." 9
She said this does not preclude the government from taking religion
into account when making the law, but does preclude the government
from conveying a message that one religion or religious belief is pre-
ferred over another. 91 Therefore, since the Alabama law was an effort
to endorse religion - by endorsing the views of those who wish to pray
over those who do not - the statute must be declared unconstitutional.
84. Wallace, 105 S. Ct. at 2494 (Powell, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
85. The Court established the religious nature of Alabama Statute section 16-1-
20.1 by examining the legislative record, intent, and the history of the statute.
86. Wallace, 105 S. Ct. at 2495 (Powell, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 2496 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 2497.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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Grand Rapids School District v. Ball
a. The Lower Courts
At issue in Grand Rapids,92 was whether two programs, Shared
Time and Community Education,"3 which provided classes to nonpublic
school students at public expense in classrooms located in and leased
from the nonpublic school violated the establishment clause. The
Shared Time program offered classes during the regular school day in
nonpublic schools to supplement the core curriculum courses required
by the State. 4 The Shared Time teachers were full time employees of
the public school system.
The Community Education program offered classes at the conclu-
sion of the school day on a voluntary basis for children and adults."
The Community Education program teachers were part-time public
school employees who were employed full time for the nonpublic school
in which they taught the Community Education courses. 6 The students
attending the remedial programs were the same students that attended
the nonpublic schools where the programs were held. Administrators of
nonpublic schools decided which courses would be offered and in which
classrooms they would be held. The director of the program, a public
school employee, then inspected the premises to insure that it was free
of any religious artifacts, and a sign was posted stating that it was a
"public school classroom. ' 97
Taxpayers filed suit in federal district court9 against the school
district and certain officials, alleging that both programs violated the
establishment clause. The district court found that there was no evi-
dence that any public school student had ever attended the Shared
Time or Community Education class in a nonpublic school.9 9 The dis-
trict court also found that the makeup of the classes for the programs
92. 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985).
93. See supra, note 7.
94. 105 S. Ct. at 3218.
95. Id. at 3219.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 3220 n. 7. The sign reads as follows: "Grand Rapids Public Schools'
Room. This room has been leased by the Grand Rapids Public School District, for the
purpose of conducting public school educational programs. The activity in this room is
controlled solely by the Grand Rapids Public School District."
98. Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. School Dist.,
546 F. Supp. 1071 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
99. Id. at 1097.
1985]
169
: Nova Law Review 10, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1985
Nova Law Journal
was entirely religious without consideration of school district
boundaries.'
The district court applied the three-part Lemon test and held that,
although the purpose of each program was secular, the effects were
distinctly impermissible.' 0 ' The district court also found the programs
entailed an unacceptable level of entanglement between the public and
sectarian schools.' 0 2 Therefore, the court entered judgment for plain-
tiffs and enjoined further operation of the programs.10 3 The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in a divided decision, affirmed the dis-
trict court's findings.104
b. The Supreme Court Opinion
In Grand Rapids v. Ball,'0 5 the Court held that the Shared Time
and Community Education programs had the primary or principal ef-
fect of advancing religion, and, therefore, both violated the establish-
ment clause. This decision evinces the Court's decision to continue us-
ing the Lemon test, and it signals a more separationist position being
taken by the Court.
The Court, in reaffirming its continued use of the Lemon crite-
ria, 106 stated that "the Lemon test concentrates attention on the issues
- purposes, effect, entanglement - that determine whether a particu-
lar state action is an improper law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion.' 0 7 The Court went on to state that the two programs in question
did not violate the first prong of Lemon. "Both the district court and
the Court of Appeals found that the purpose of the Community Educa-
tion and Share Time programs was 'manifestly secular.' We find no
reason to disagree with this holding."'' 08
The Court then examined the effect prong of Lemon in relation to
the two programs. The Court held that the two programs impermissibly
100. Id. at 1093.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1098.
103. Id. at 1100.
104. Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. School Dist. of
City of Grand Rapids, 718 F.2d 1389 (6th Cir. 1983).
105. Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3216.
106. Id. at 3223.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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advanced religion in three ways.109 First, the teachers participating in
the programs may influence their classes with religious indoctrination;
second, the programs may provide a symbolic link between religion and
government; and finally, the programs may promote religion by provid-
ing a subsidy for religious institutions in their primary religious mis-
sions. The second criterion of Lemon, that the effect of the statute was
to neither advance nor to inhibit religion, had not been satisfied, and
therefore, the statute was struck down as violative of the establishment
clause.
The Court focused on the fact that in the Community Education
program, practically every course taught on leased private school prop-
erty was taught by a teacher employed by that private school.110 The
majority reasoned that the teacher could not put aside religious instruc-
tion and engage in completely secular education in the Community Ed-
ucation program.
The main problem in the Shared Time program was that even
though the teachers were full time public school employees, since they
were teaching in a sectarian school, they may "subtly (or overtly) con-
form their instruction to the environment in which they teach." ' The
students might then perceive that the government was giving its ap-
proval to a religious message.
Justice O'Connor, dissenting from the Shared Time opinion, 1 2
noted that nothing would indicate that Share Time instructors had at-
tempted to indoctrinate students.1 13
The majority stated that another important concern of the effects
test of Lemon is
whether the symbolic union of church and state effected by the
challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be perceived
by adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement,
and by the nonadherents as disapproval, of their individual reli-
gious choices. The inquiry into this kind of effect must be con-
ducted with particular care when many of the citizens perceiving
the governmental message are children in their formative years. 14
109. Id.
110. Id. at 3224.
111. Id. at 3225.
112. Id. at 3231 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 3226.
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The Court felt that indoctrination of young children was detrimen-
tal due to their ages, but that this was not a major problem for adults
since they are not as impressionable. The Court had articulated this
view in its holding in Marsh.115 To lessen symbolic impact, the Court
opined that similar programs held off the premises of nonpublic schools
may pass constitutional muster. In this instance, the students could
then perceive the difference between religious classes and public school
classes if the classes were held off religious school premises. Since the
classes in the present case were held on nonpublic school premises,
"this effect - the symbolic union of government and religion in one sec-
tarian enterprise - is an impermissible effect under the Establishment
Clause."1 '
The Court then examined whether the aid was direct and substan-
tial or indirect and incidental. The Court expressed the view that aid
which is indirect and incidental is not, for that reason alone, constitu-
tionally invalid.' 1 7 But in direct aid cases "the government, although
acting for a secular purpose, has done so by directly supporting a reli-
gious institution."'"18 The programs at issue, providing teachers, in ad-
dition to the instructional equipment and materials, was the type of
direct aid which is forbidden as advancing religion.
The majority concluded that the effect prong of Lemon was vio-
lated by the promotion of religion in three ways: subtle indoctrination
of students by state paid teachers, symbolic union of church and state
because of instruction delivered in religious schools, and subsidization
of religious functions of nonpublic schools. The Court felt that some
involvement between church and state is inevitable, but that lines must
be drawn. Therefore, the guidelines of Lemon v. Kurtzman will be
what the Supreme Court will apply when deciding if state aid to non-
public schools violates the establishment clause.
Aguilar v. Felton
a. The Lower Courts
The issue in Aguilar v. Felton"19 was whether the city of New
York could use federal funds to pay the salaries of public employees
115. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
116. Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3227.
117. Id. at 3228.
118. Id.
119. 105 S. Ct. 3232.
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who taught in parochial schools. The City of New York received fed-
eral funds under the Title I program of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965.120 The program gave federal assistance to local
educational institutions to meet the needs of educationally deprived
children from low income families.1 21 To qualilfy for government fund-
ing, the program must have met the following requirements: First, the
children involved in the program must be educationally deprived; sec-
ond, the children must reside in areas comprising a high concentration
of low income families; and finally, the program must supplement pro-
grams that would exist absent funding under Title 1.122
In 1978, six taxpayers commenced this action in the District Court
for the Eastern District of New York, alleging that the program vio-
lated the establishment clause. Summary judgment was given for de-
fendants based on the evidentiary record of an earlier case.i23 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that the
federal funds used to send instructors into nonpublic schools violated
the establishment clause as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court.1
24
b. The Supreme Court Opinion
In Aguilar, the Supreme Court held that the Title I program, as
administered by New York City, violated the establishment clause.
This program was similar to the one considered in School District of
Grand Rapids v. Ball,25 decided the same day. The case was of similar
importance in showing the Court's further use and affirmance of the
Lemon criteria and the Court's re-examination and reshaping of the
third prong of Lemon.
120. 20 U.S.C. § 3801 (1982)(This statute is known as the Elementary and Sec-
ondary Education Act. This statute authorized federal financial assistance to local edu-
cational institutions to meet the needs of educationally deprived children from low in-
come families).
121. 105 S. Ct. at 3234 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 2701).
122. Id. at 3235.
123. National Coalition for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Harris, 489 F.
Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)(The evidentiary record in the other case involved an iden-
tical challenge to the city's Title I program, in which the constitutionality of the pro-
gram was upheld).
124. Felton v. Secretary, United States Dep't of Educ., 739 F.2d 48 (2d Cir.
1984).
125. Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3216.
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The Supreme Court opinion given by Justice Brennan discussed
the defendant's attempts to distinguish Aguilar from Grand Rapids;
but the distinction fails,
because the supervisory system established by the City of New
York inevitably results in the excessive entanglement of church and
state, an Establishment Clause concern distinct from that ad-
dressed by the effects doctrine. Even where state aid to parochial
institutions does not have the primary effect of advancing religion,
the provision of such aid may nonetheless violate the Establishment
Clause owing to the nature of the interaction of church and state in
the administration of that aid. 126
The Court, in analyzing Aguilar, applied the Lemon test and
found that the third criterion, excessive entanglement, had been vio-
lated. Justice Brennan pointed out that the inspections needed to ensure
that religious indoctrination was not occurring in the Title I classes
would create excessive entanglement. Brennan then identified the ele-
ments that were important to non-entanglement in school aid programs
and stated that what was crucial to avoid excessive entanglement was
"the ability of the State to identify and subsidize separate secular func-
tions carried out at the school, without the on-the-site inspections being
necessary to prevent diversion of the funds to sectarian purposes. '127
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist pointed out the interesting Catch-22
paradox which the Court created, "whereby aid must be supervised to
ensure no entanglement, but the supervision itself is held to cause an
entanglement."' 128 This was important because any aid could create en-
tanglement and, therefore, even some previous cases would not have
passed constitutional muster. 12 9
The Court referred to the critical elements of entanglement set out
in Lemon and Meek that were present in this case: aid provided in a
purely sectarian environment and assistance needed to provide inspec-
tion to keep the aid purely secular would lead to excessive entangle-
ment.130 The Court stated that a religious school whose function was to
indoctrinate students in a certain religion would be hard pressed if the
126. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3237.
127. Id. at 3238 (quoting Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736
(1976)).
128. Id. at 3243 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
129. See e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
130. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3238.
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state must come in and decide what was and what was not religiously
affiliated in the Title I classroom."" This would cause excessive entan-
glement because the public and private school instructors would have to
work together closely to monitor Title I classroom assignments, sched-
uling and other related matters.13 2 The Court went on to point out that
separation of church and state does not mean absence of all contact,
but that "the detailed monitoring and close administrative contact re-
quired to maintain New York's Title I program can only produce a
kind of continuing day-to-day relationship which the policy of neutral-
ity seeks to minimize. '133
Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, stated that political divi-
siveness over the issue among voters is also an important consideration,
since taxpayers who support the public schools would be disconcerted
to find aid flowing to sectarian schools, and those who support sectarian
schools would now feel that funds are being diverted from them.134
Even though the Court had stated it would not invalidate a law if the
only result of the law was the creation of political divisiveness, 35 the
majority now indicates that political divisiveness may one day be dis-
positive in certain circumstances. Justice Powell went on to say that
Aguilar may fail the second prong of Lemon by advancing religion,
though the majority opinion makes no specific mention of this.
Justices Burger and White dissented because the majority's appli-
cation of the Lemon criteria of state aid to private schools was "con-
trary to the long-range interests of the country."13 6 White declared that
aid to nonpublic schools is not forbidden by the establishment clause,
and Chief Justice Burger rejected the idea that tidy formulas such as
Lemon could be used to decide, in school aid cases, whether a law will
take a step toward establishing a religion.
Justice O'Connor, dissenting, pointed out that time has already
proven that religious indoctrination has not occurred in all the years
the Title I programs have been in effect. Therefore, excessive entangle-
ment will not become a problem because supervision was never needed
in the first place.
131. Id. at 3239.
132. Id.
133. Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970)).
134. Id. at 3240 (Powell, J., concurring).
135. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1364.
136. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3242 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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Given that not a single incident of religious indoctrination has been
identified as occurring in the thousands of classes offered in Grand
Rapids and New York over the past two decades, it is time to ac-
knowledge that the risk identified in Meek was greatly exagger-
ated. Just as the risk that public school-teachers in parochial class-
rooms will inculcate religion has been exaggerated, so has the
degree of supervision required to manage the risk.137
Justice O'Connor expressed her doubts as to the usefulness of the en-
tanglement test. She thought laws which had a valid purpose and effect
should not be invalidated due to excessive entanglement in cases of aid
to parochial schools. She stated that the unusual results obtained in
previous establishment clause cases were due in part to problems with
the entanglement prong of Lemon.138
II. Analysis
The three cases139 just examined represent two important points.
First, the Court has reaffirmed its use of the three part Lemon test, and
in so doing it has elaborated on each test prong. In Wallace, the Court
examined the first prong, secular purpose. In Grand Rapids, the Court
examined the second prong, primary effect. Finally, in Aguilar, the
Court examined the third prong, excessive entanglement.
The second point which these cases demonstrate is the Court's di-
rection for the near future. Will the Court continue to accommodate
religion or will it go back to a more separationist stance? Wallace
showed the strongest majority, a six to three margin, striking down Al-
abama's school prayer statute. In Grand Rapids, the margin was a five
to four majority1 40 on defeating the Shared Time program, and Aguilar
was a five to four majority invalidating the Title I program. Trends are
hard to extract from an analysis of such close cases. It is submitted,
however, that these cases suggest that the pendulum is swinging toward
a more separationist position.
By understanding the Court's view of Lemon and how the criteria
should be applied, one should gain a better understanding of how the
Court is likely to apply the criteria in future cases. By examining this,
137. Id. at 3246 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 3247.
139. Wallace, Grand Rapids, Aguilar.
140. A seven-two majority was obtained on the Community Education Issue
holding this program invalid.
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we can then begin to forecast on the Supreme Court's future treatment
of establishment clause issues.
A. The Purpose Prong
In Wallace, the Court reaffirmed its use of Lemon when it struck
down the Alabama prayer statute'41 for failing the secular purpose
prong of Lemon. The Court had emphasized in previous cases that a
statute may be motivated in part by a religious purpose yet satisfy the
first criterion of Lemon.' This language has been the source of many
differing opinions from the Supreme Court, as well as lower courts,
since it was written. What is a clearly secular purpose? The majority,
in Wallace, seemed to embrace Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Lynch 43 as the pertinent answer to this question. In Lynch, Justice
O'Connor stated that "The proper inquiry under the purpose prong of
Lemon, is whether the government intends to convey a message of en-
dorsement or disapproval of religion.' 44 If every statute that has the
incidental effect of promoting or hindering a sectarian belief was inva-
lid, the Court could not criminalize murder for fear it would promote
the sectarian belief that killing is wrong. 45 Justice O'Connor coined
the term endorsement test 146 and went on to give the parameters within
which the test should operate. 147 "The endorsement test does not pre-
clude government from acknowledging religion or from taking religion
into account in making law and policy. It does preclude government
from conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a
particular religious belief is favored or preferred." 48 The kernel to be
gleaned from Wallace is that when applying the Lemon purpose prong,
the endorsement test should be looked to as being dispositive on
whether there is a secular purpose, unless the statute in question is "en-
tirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion.' 49
141. See supra note 4.
142. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 296-303.
143. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. 1355.
144. Id. at 1368 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
145. Wallace, 105 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
146. Id. at 2497.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2490.
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B. The Effect Prong
In Grand Rapids,150 the Court applied the second criterion of
Lemon in striking down two school aid programs. The majority showed
its solidarity for the Lemon test by stating that "[w]e. . .reaffirm that
state action alleged to violate the Establishment Clause should be mea-
sured against the Lemon criteria.' 15' The Court went on to state that
the school aid programs had passed scrutiny under the purpose prong
of Lemon, and next used Grand Rapids to examine the effects prong.
Under the effects prong of Lemon, Grand Rapids could not pass consti-
tutional muster.
The Court identified two elements crucial in the effects prong for
advancing or inhibiting religion. The Court had previously stated in
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist 52 that "not every law that
confers an indirect, remote or incidental, benefit upon religious institu-
tions is, for that reason alone, constitutionally invalid."' 153 Therefore, it
seems that indirect aid to nonpublic schools, having no primary effect
of advancing religion, would be valid under the second prong of Lemon.
The second element identified is whether there is "a direct and substan-
tial advancement of the sectarian enterprise.' 54 This indicates that di-
rect aid to a sectarian educational function would be invalid despite the
argument that the effect of the aid would ultimately benefit the stu-
dent. It is important to identify the ultimate secular end of the statute
in question, then to make the crucial decision of whether the effect of
that aid would be to advance or inhibit religion by direct and substan-
tial means or whether any advancement was merely indirect and inci-
dental. Hence, the crucial question to be answered in future parochial
aid cases is whether the effect of the aid will have a direct and substan-
tial advancement of the religious institution or whether this advance-
ment is merely indirect and incidental.
C. The Entanglement Prong
In Aguilar'55 the Court applied the third and most confusing part
of the Lemon test, excessive government entanglement, and held the
150. Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3216.
151. Id. at 3223.
152. 413 U.S. 756.
153. Id. at 771.
154. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 250.
155. 105 S. Ct. at 3232.
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Title I program of New York invalid. Since the early days of Lemon,
the Court has been dogged by this element, which has been described
as a "blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier. 1 5 Despite this past con-
fusion, the Court in Aguilar seems to come no closer to giving a ra-
tional explanation of the entanglement prong of Lemon. The closest the
Court came to giving such an explanation was its statement that the
crucial factor to a non-entangling aid program is "the ability of the
State to identify and subsidize separate secular functions carried out at
the school, without on-the-site inspections being necessary to prevent
diversion of the funds to sectarian purposes.' 57 But this simplicity is
deceiving. The crucial problem is when on-the-site inspections are nec-
essary and what criteria can be used. The Court pointed to two ele-
ments that may be helpful in deciding when inspections are necessary.
One is whether the aid is going to a "pervasively sectarian environ-
ment;"158 the second is whether the aid is in the form of teachers, in
which case "ongoing inspection is required to ensure the absence of a
religious message.' 1 59 It is easy enough to derive that a sectarian envi-
ronment is any religious organization; but ongoing inspection to ensure
absence of religious content is ludicrous. Justice O'Connor has already
pointed out in dissent that ongoing inspection is a transparent fantasy.
She noted that in 19 years there has never been a single incident in
which a Title I instructor has subtly or overtly attempted to indoctri-
nate the students in particular religious tenets at public expense.' 60 It
seems reasonable that professional adult instructors can generally fol-
low orders, and that if they could not, one would have to close every
public school for fear the teachers would indoctrinate the pupils in the
beliefs of religion. 6' Experience has already shown that if the risk of
inculcation of religion by public school teachers is exaggerated, so is
the degree of supervision required. 16 2 Logic dictates that law must be
flexible and the law must recognize the lessons that come from expo-
sure to time. Time has shown that excessive entanglement will not oc-
cur if maximum supervision is not applied. Therefore, the law should
be flexible and should drop the proscription of ongoing inspection which
156. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
157. Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 765 (1976).
158. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3238.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 3246 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 3247.
162. Id.
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leads to entanglement and a rigid interpretation of the law. As Justice
Rehnquist points out in his dissent, 163 the Court has created its own
"Catch-22.' 64 Aid must be supervised, but that supervision leads to
entanglement.6 5
The Court, in Aguilar, has not given clarification of excessive en-
tanglement but has muddied the waters further. The Court has alluded
to the fact that political divisiveness' 6 may become more important
when the government is forced to make religious judgments. Although
not discussed at length, the Court implies that political divisiveness
could be problematic if allowed to increase. 167 This compounds the con-
fusion of entanglement. The question to be asked is how important po-
litical divisiveness is in determining the third criterion of Lemon. Will
it become a dispositive factor, or merely remain as one factor to weigh
in deciding whether a statute will cause excessive entanglement? Jus-
tice Powell's concurrence states that political divisiveness is another
reason to hold Aguilar and Grand Rapids invalid on entanglement
grounds. 6 18 The problem is that the Court in Lynch pointed out that
political divisiveness alone is not enough to invalidate otherwise permis-
sible conduct. 69 Arguably, it is unlikely that the Court will change its
mind and make political devisiveness by itself dispositive under the en-
tanglement criterion of Lemon, since Court precedent has continuously
indicated otherwise over the years.
Logic would indicate that the quagmire of excessive entanglement
has not lead to any hard and fast elements with which to measure fu-
ture disputes. Justice O'Connor has recognized that the Court's most
anomalous results are attributed to the entanglement prong.17 0 There-
fore, the Court's decision in Aguilar gives no more insight on applica-
tion of excessive entanglement than previous holdings did. The lower
courts must wait until the entanglement section is given adequate de-
163. Id. at 3243 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. The concept of political divisiveness means activity which would cause frag-
mentation or disputes along political lines.
167. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3239 (Powell, J. concurring) (if the government must
make the decisions in nonpublic schools over what is or what is not religiously con-
nected, political divisiveness will increase).
168. Id. at 3240.
169. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1364.
170. See, Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling
the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L.R. 673, 681 (1980).
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velopment in future cases, and must continue to use the test as best as
is possible in its present form. In any event, the Justices' differing inter-
pretations of what to do with the entanglement criteria will surely lead
lower courts away from the goal of functional analysis, with the result
being another establishment clause case on the Supreme Court's door-
step as soon as the excessive entanglement section of Lemon is applied.
D. Forecasting Future Trends in Establishment Clause
Decisions
Future cases raising issues of state involvement with religion can
generally expect an application of the Lemon criteria. If the law is of
recent origin and raises issues regarding the establishment clause, the
three prong Lemon test will generally be applied. Challenged laws or
programs can satisfy the purpose prong provided that they are not
clearly motivated by a religious purpose and that the government does
not intend to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of reli-
gion. Cases involving the effects prong can be sustained if the advance-
ment or inhibition of religion is merely an indirect and incidental by-
product of the laws primary function. The entanglement prong will
cause some difficulty in cases in which supervision must be maintained
by the state in order to assure adequate administration of that aid. But
entanglement will occur when the state becomes enmeshed with a given
denomination in matters of religious significance. Political divisiveness
will still be only one factor to be weighed in determination of entangle-
ment, and will not alone be dispositive on the issue.
Cases involving long standing traditions may be decided in accor-
dance with Marsh. The Court, in carving out an exception to Lemon,
seems to indicate that certain practices may be deemed constitutional if
they have their roots in long-standing traditions. Therefore, traditions
which have been practiced in the states for many years may be vali-
dated as becoming a part of the fabric of our society and may be ex-
empt from examination under the three part Lemon test.
Cases involving symbols, or symbolic activities, which violate the
establishment clause should also be analyzed using the Lemon test. The
Court has been more likely to give a moderate reading of Lemon in
light of symbols which have their origins in the roots of long-standing
traditions. The critical issue in symbol cases must be resolved by exam-
ining not only the religious nature of the activity, but also the context
in which it takes place.
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III. Conclusion
The Court has once again reaffirmed its adherence to the Lemon
test thereby clarifying the language of Lynch v. Donnelly. The purpose
and effect prongs have been amply examined and explained by the
Court. Excessive entanglement once again has left the lower courts
with little more than a clue as to what parameters entanglement en-
compasses. Some Justices have expressed their dissatisfaction with the
entanglement prong17' and a change may be forthcoming. The majority
in Aguilar seemed more inclined to include political divisiveness as a
dispositive factor in entanglement cases, but without further elabora-
tion, this will be confined to explanation in some future case. The Court
has laid the first stones to a smoother path in unraveling establishment
clause litigation. Further fine tuning of the Lemon criteria and a dis-
positive position on entanglement in particular, will lead lower courts
and legislatures in the direction of a more encompassing establishment
clause standard and will give the guidance that has been sorely needed.
Dale Alan Bruschi
171. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. at 1355; Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. at
[Vol. 10
182
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss1/1
Mnookin, Robert H., In the Interest of Children: Advocacy, Law
Reform, and Public Policy, New York: W. H. Freeman and
Company, 1985. 527 pp.
Reviewed by Laurence M. Hyde, Jr.*
This well-conceived and provocative book undertakes to answer the
question: "Is test-case litigation a sensible way to promote the welfare
of children?" The book delivers more than it promises. It quite thor-
oughly deals with the complex issue undertaken, but at the same time,
it provides an unusually clear look at American courts and the role
they play in the making of public policy, including the strengths and
weaknesses of policy-making through litigation. While the focus is on
test-case litigation brought by public interest groups as class actions,
many of the insights are equally applicable to other kinds of cases.
Mnookin has used the vehicle of well-selected cases as a means of
examining the following problems:
1. The enigma of children's interests. Neither the public interest
group nor the court can reliably determine the best interest of children
as a class or of an individual child. It is difficult to forecast the impact
of a policy decision on a child or on many children. The difficulty is
compounded because one must predict the consequences of alternative
policies of children in different circumstances. It is compounded be-
cause a policy that benefits some children hurts others.
2. The dilemma of the legitimate role of courts. In a democracy,
public policies are made by popularly elected representatives. However,
the language in which a policy is enacted may well be open to more
than one interpretation, and even if the language is clear with respect
to situations the legislation envisioned, cases often present situations
not contemplated by the legislature. Thus, courts cannot resolve these
questions without making policy. While this is true of other kinds of
policy, it has special importance in the field of children's policy, be-
cause children lack political power.
3. The paradox of child advocacy. Children need advocates be-
cause they cannot speak for and defend their own interests. Yet, since
* Professor of Law, Nova University Law Center, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. J.D.,
University of Mississippi at Columbia, 1952; A.B., University of Mississippi at Colum-
bia, 1950; Member, Missouri and Nevada Bars.
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this is true, how can the advocate know for certain what those interests
are? How can the advocate, the public interest agency, or the court
know that the interests being pressed are not those of the advocate, the
agency, or the parents, since the nominal client is not able to control
the litigation?
4. The debate over judicial competence. To what extent is the ju-
dicial branch of government the appropriate branch for policy decision-
making, considering the inherent limitations of the adjudicative pro-
cess? "Courts, simply because they are courts, may not be able to eval-
uate policy issues adequately. They are captives of the parties .... "
The book examines these issues by means of a detailed analysis of
five public policy cases. They are:
1. Smith v. Offer, brought by the New York Civil Liberties Union
to determine whether foster parents have a right to an administrative
hearing prior to removal of children placed in their care under
contract.
2. Bellotti v. Baird, in which the medical director of an abortion
center and two pregnant, unmarried minors brought suit to challenge
the Massachusetts statute requiring the unmarried minor to secure the
consent of both parents in order to obtain an abortion, or, in the alter-
native, to have a parental refusal overriden by a state court judge.
3. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital, brought to
complain about conditions in a state residence for mentally retarded
children. The case became a wholesale attack on the very existence of
institutions for mentally retarded people, and sought the dispersal of
the residents to small, community-based facilities.
4. Roe v. Norton, a case brought by Connecticut Legal Aid law-
yers on behalf of welfare mothers in relation to governmental efforts to
pursue child support rights against the fathers of their "illegitimate"
children.
5. Goss v. Lopez, a class action against the Columbus, Ohio
School Board to determine the rights to a hearing prior to suspension of
children involved in racial disturbances.
Mnookin's issues are carefully examined by the contributing writ-
ers who deal with these issues in relation to each of these cases, demon-
strating the issues' applications to the several cases. Each case, in vary-
ing degrees, contains the enigma, the dilemma, the paradox and the
issue of competence. Therefore, each case demonstrates that there is a
serious question as to whether we can determine the successes achieved
by test-case litigation, even though the public interest litigant wins, and
the win involves considerable impact upon the rights, services, agencies
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and clients.
The book is a valuable reference to anyone interested in children's
issues, but beyond that to anyone seriously interested in how courts
function as problem solvers, reform agents and policymakers. One of
the serious problems that courts face in their essential task of maintain-
ing public confidence is the lack of understanding of inherent limita-
tions of courts in ways so clearly shown by this book.
In discussing the dilemma of public policy decisions being made by
courts, Mnookin makes the point that, since all federal judges and
many state judges are appointed for life and not elected by the public
and are not subject to recall by the public for unpopular decisions, they
are not an ideal democratic policymaker. This reviewer was disap-
pointed that Mnookin did not further explore the issue of whether this
removal of courts from the direct control of the popular will was desira-
ble in the overall political scheme under which our nation functions.
However, in spite of leaving that important question untouched, the
book is intellectually satisfying and well worth careful and serious at-
tention to readers concerned with issues of how our various branches of
government interact and how they deal with important issues.
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Schrag, Philip G., Behind the Scenes: The Politics of a Constitu-
tional Convention. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University
Press, 1985. 252 pp., $19.95.
Reviewed by Ronald Benton Brown*
A constitutional convention occurred in 1982, but it went unno-
ticed by the people of the United States. It did not deal with amend-
ments to the federal constitution, a topic much in the news lately, but it
did deal with matters of national concern. This convention was called
to draft the constitution for a new state, a state which the convention
chose to name "New Columbia" because it would encompass the pre-
sent District of Columbia.'
Shocked readers may wonder if the above announcement is fiction,
like Orson Wells' announcement of the martian invasion in the legen-
dary "War of the Worlds" broadcast. Rest assured it is not. The con-
vention did occur. Miraculously it did produce a state constitution and,
even more miraculously, that constitution was ratified by the voters.
However, New Columbia has not yet become, and may never become,
a state.
The motivations for seeking statehood are simple enough. Many
District residents feel that they are the victims of colonialism and ra-
cism. They are ruled by a foreign power, the United States,2 which
exercises nearly total control over the District, particularly its finances.
The residents of the Districts have no voting member in the United
States' legislature, the Congress, only an envoy.3 The District residents
have been deprived of the fundamental right of citizenship in a democ-
* Professor of Law, Nova University Law Center, Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
LL.M., Temple University, 1976; J.D., University of Connecticut, 1973; B.S.M.E.
Northeastern University, 1970.
I. The District of Columbia also will be referred to hereafter as "the District" or
"D.C."
2. P. SCHRAG, BEHIND THE SCENES: THE POLITICS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
VENTION 9-10 [hereinafter cited as Schrag].
3. The envoy is the District's one nonvoting member of Congress. However, D.C.
voters have cast votes for the President and Vice President since the twenty-third
amendment to the Constitution was ratified in 1961. Also, by statute, D.C. voters do
elect the Council of the District of Columbia and the District's Board of Education.
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racy, the right to choose their own government.' What makes this
"colonialism" feel even more oppressive is that the residents of the Dis-
trict, unlike the members of Congress or their constituents, are primar-
ily black and poor.5 Statehood would mean the right to elect two Sena-
tors and at least one member of the House of Representatives.
Statehood would also free the District from the control of Congress on
local matters.
The procedure for admitting a new state is very simple. It involves
only a simple legislative act.7 Absent a veto by the President, a major-
ity vote in both houses of Congress could admit the new state. But
there lies the difficulty. Statehood for D.C. would deprive Congress of a
prerogative it now enjoys; controlling its working environment which
includes patronage opportunities. Statehood is also resisted because it
4. Congress passed a proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United
States which provided for voting representatives for D.C. residents, but not statehood.
The amendment would become effective only if ratified by three-fourths of the state
legislatures within seven years. Some of the opposition to the statehood movement was
apparently based on the fear that statehood was unattainable and the agitation for it
would jeopardize any chance the amendment would be ratified. On August 22, 1985,
the seven-year period expired and the unratified amendment died.
5. Moreover, an affluent District resident will generally maintain a voting resi-
dence in one of the states and, consequently, be able to vote for senators and
representatives.
6. There are arguments against statehood, such as: 1) the area is too small to
function effectively as a state; 2) it does not have an adequate tax base; and 3) the seat
of national government should be controlled by the national government, not by a state.
Schrag does not attempt to thoroughly analyze or refute these. See generally, Provision
for the Admission of the State of New Columbia into the Union: Hearing on H.R.
3861 Before the Subcomm. on Fiscal Affairs and Health of the House Comm. on the
District of Columbia, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter cited as Hearing].
7. Under article IV, section 3, clause 1, of the United States Constitution, this is
all that is required for the admission of a state. The admission of the District as a state
may, however, present special problems because the existence of the district is specified
in the Constitution. Article I, section 8, clause 17 gives the Congress exclusive legisla-
tive power ". . . over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession
of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Govern-
ment of the United States .... " Also the twenty-third amendment specifies that the
District shall appoint electors for the office of President and Vice President.
Senator Ted Kennedy asserted that the District of Columbia could be admitted as
a state by the regular means, that a constitutional amendment is not necessary. Not
everyone may share his certainty and this may prove to be another impediment to the
achievement of statehood. See, Hearing at 31-32. See also, S. 5740. 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1984) (speech by Senator Kennedy introducing S. 2672, the NEW COLUMBIA
ADMISSION ACT).
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might cause a shift in the balance of power in Congress.8 Statehood's
proponents have nothing with which to bargain for the needed votes.9
Philip Schrag is a Georgetown University law professor. He be-
came interested in the statehood issue when the question of whether to
hold a constitutional convention appeared on the ballot. In a moment of
innocent curiosity, he inquired about the progress of the convention. A
short time later, he was campaigning for election as a delegate.
Based on his credentials, Schrag would seem to be an ideal con-
vention delegate. He received an excellent formal education at Harvard
College and Yale Law School. He served as Assistant Counsel to the
N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Education Fund and as New York
City's Consumer Advocate; all ideal opportunities to learn about the
problems of poverty and racial discrimination, problems which afflicted
the District. He also served as Deputy General Counsel to the United
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and was a teacher of
legislation (as well as other subjects). His background in government,
politics and diplomacy seemed complete.
Schrag's prime motivation for becoming a delegate was his belief
that his skills and knowledge would be an asset to the convention. How-
ever, before declaring his candidacy, he consulted a respected but un-
identified advisor. His mysterious advisor warned that his education
and his professional status would be viewed with suspicion and hostility
by the other delegates. Living in an affluent white section of the Dis-
trict, and being white, male, Jewish, and a teacher at a private Catho-
lic university would all be obstacles to his effective participation in the
constitution-making. "'Don't do it [seek election as a delegate],' my
Source says. 'It could be a disaster for you .... It doesn't matter if you
lose [the election]. The headache is winning.' "10 What follows could
8. This has been expressed by the phrase, the "Four Too's;" i.e., a congressional
delegation from the District would be "too liberal, too urban, too Democratic and too
black." This phrase was used by supporters of the proposed constitutional amendment
(supra note 4) to explain the rejection of that amendment by the states.
News/Sun-Sentinel, July 21, 1985, §A, at 10, col. 1. The point is that any propo-
sal which would give the District voting representatives in Congress, e.g. statehood,
would be subjected to extraordinary scrutiny by a hostile Congress.
9. In its defense, Congress might point out that it did approve the proposed
amendment which would give the District voting representatives. However, it has been
suggested that it was an empty gesture and that the Congress approved the proposed
constitutional amendment only because of the certainty that the amendment would
never be ratified by a sufficient number of state legislatures.
10. Schrag at 42.
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well have been entitled "The Education of Philip Schrag."
Schrag could have given us a sterile report about what the conven-
tion did, and where the mistakes were made, and why. But he goes far
beyond that. He reports the twists and turns of the real convention,
including his own errors, from the unique vantage point of a partici-
pant. We suffer along with Schrag as he learns, and sometimes re-
learns, the lessons of group dynamics, politics and race. We experience,
along with Schrag, the discomfort of an educated white liberal who
finds himself a member of the racial minority and even, for a moment,
a reluctant participant in a "white caucus." Schrag sets an example by
his willingness to seek advice which he carefully weighs before acting.
His openness to learning from his experiences reminds the reader that
the learning process must continue forever, regardless of the strength of
one's resume. As we enjoy his triumphs, however minor, we appreciate
the value of his perseverance.
Professor Schrag also provides us with an interesting introduction
to the District's politics and history, particularly through his portrayals
of the individuals involved. As he discusses the convention itself, he
alternates between chapters of his personal reminiscences of the con-
vention and chapters of formal history which chronicle the official
events, debates, motions, committee reports, speeches, and the votes.
The contrast gives even the most trusting reader doubts about the va-
lidity of determining the true legislative intent from a legislative his-
tory. While the chapters on the formal history do become a bit dry, the
reader knows that an interesting real-life-story chapter is not too many
pages away. The sum of the two together is really more than either
read alone. The juxtaposition adds something because of the contrast,
and because while reading the dry history, one's appetite is whetted for
the real dirt which is to follow.
However, there are a few surprises in the book. Schrag is consid-
ered an innovator in legal education, a pioneer in clinical teaching, who
designed and implemented a legislation simulation to give law students
an appreciation for the legislative process. Law students could have
participated in the convention as members of the legislative staff or as
aides to the delegates, receiving an exceptional educational experience.
But, law students are seldom mentioned. The frequent complaints
about the lack of convention staff makes their absence particularly con-
spicuous. It is possible that no law students were interested, but that
seems unlikely considering the huge number of law students in the
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D.C. area."1 No explanation is given.
The lack of media coverage of the convention and the New Co-
lumbia constitution it produced is also surprising. The opposition to
statehood by the District's power structure may explain the minimal
coverage by the local press, but statehood for the District should be a
matter of national interest, and there is no explanation for the lack of
meaningful national coverage. Only the opening and closing ceremonies
seemed to attract very much attention. Perhaps statehood is not an in-
teresting topic. Perhaps even a newsworthy event needs a public rela-
tions professional to get it into the news, and the convention lacked the
appropriate staff. It seems unlikely that something more sinister was
afoot.
The constitution produced by this convention is a monument to the
spirit of the delegates. Underfunded, understaffed, lacking facilities and
support, hampered by the lack of formal preparation and a ninety-day
deadline, and peopled by political amateurs who also had to hold down
full time jobs, the convention seemed doomed from the start. Somehow
a constitution was produced.12 While it seems unlikely that this consti-
tution will ever become effective,13 it may be an important step in the
evolution of the government of the District of Columbia or its succes-
sor. Serious readers, however, may prefer to study the law review arti-
cle, which was the predecessor of this book, because in that version the
footnotes appear on the bottom of each page rather than at the end of
the chapter.14
Schrag's narrative is easy to read and comfortable, but something
is missing. It seems too restrained when he describes his own exper-
iences. When he describes anger or frustration, he just does not sound
angry or frustrated. His training as an academic, may have made his
unemotional reporting inevitable, or he may simply have exceptional
11. In addition to the students at Georgetown, law students from American Uni-
versity, Antioch, Catholic University, George Mason University, and Howard Univer-
sity are in the D.C. area.
12. The Constitution of the Proposed State of New Columbia is reproduced in its
entirety in Schrag at 257 app. B.
13. For a criticism of the proposed constitution see Oulahan, The Proposed New
Columbia Constitution: Creating a "Manacled State," 32 AM. U.L. REv. 635 (1983)
which contains negative criticism of the preamble and the bill of rights by a delegate
who was a member of the Judiciary Committee of the Convention. See also, Hearing,
particularly the statement of Senator Spector at 43-48.
14. Schrag, By the People: The Political Dynamics of a Constitutional Conven-
tion, 72 GEo. L.J. 819 (1984).
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emotional control. That minor flaw may deprive Professor Schrag of a
popular audience and this book will probably not become the basis of a
major motion picture, although it is easy to imagine Alan Alda in the
lead role. However, for the lawyer, for the student, or for the citizen,
Professor Schrag has provided lessons about civics,1 5 humility, politics,
group psychology, race, poverty, religion and education. That is quite
an accomplishment.
15. E.g., do you know which state has a unicameral legislature and what the
arguments are both for and against a unicameral legislature? Do you even know what
a unicameral legislature is?
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